Ever unafraid to make bad puns, 600Camp reports on the Fifth Circuit’s sharp analysis in Knife Rights, Inc. v. Blanche, which cut down the Federal Switchblade Act’s ban on moving switchblades through interstate commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 1242, as a violation of the Second Amendment. (While no fan of Bruen, this blog’s author supports this application of it, and recommends the Boker Kalashnikov (right) as a reliable and cost-effective option.)

The Court dissected the issue with Bruen‘s two-step framework. At step one, it held that switchblades are “Arms.” It relied on the founding-era definition of arms as “any thing that a man wears for his defence,” along with centuries of history showing that switchblades and their spring-blade predecessors were used for defense.

The government tried to carve out an exception for supply-chain restrictions, arguing that they do not burden the right to keep and bear arms. But that distinction didn’t cut it for the Court, which reasoned that the right to keep and bear arms “surely implies the right to purchase them,” which in turn implies the right to manufacture, transport, and distribute them.

At step two—consistency with historical tradition—the government’s authorities proved to be rather dull. The Court observed that every nineteenth-century case cited by the government regulated the manner of carrying concealed weapons, not their manufacture, transportation, or distribution. The Court concluded by putting a fine point on its analysis, noting that the switchblade ban, like the laws struck down in Heller and Bruen, responded to a “perceived societal problem”—here, a 1950s panic over juvenile delinquency fueled by the popular movie Rebel Without A Cause. No. 25-10754 (Oct. 21, 2026)

Texas law repeatedly reminds that the terms of written agreements usually supersede earlier oral representations, and Bank of America v. Haddad is the latest such reminder.

During 2018 negotiations for a new revolving line of credit, a bank’s relationship manager “repeatedly stated that ‘the new loan would not need a personal guaranty’ from Haddad,” and in an August 2018 email stated the guaranty language “can [be] remove[d].”

But more than seven months later, Haddad signed the actual loan documents without reading them. The final loan agreement listed a “Guaranty signed by Kevin T Haddad” as a required precondition to credit and contained an integration clause providing that the agreement “and any related security or other agreements required by this Agreement constitute the entire agreement” and “supersede all previous negotiations, communications, discussions and correspondence concerning the subject matter hereof.” Haddad separately signed a document titled “CONTINUING AND UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY” listing him as “GUARANTOR.”

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the bank. No. 25-11330 (Oct. 9, 2026, unpublished),

Archer Western Contractors v, McDonnel Group, affirmed a denial of attorneys fees in a contract dispute based on contract language.

Archer and McDonnel had a joint venture agreement for a project in Orleans Parish. McDonnel brokered a settlement of a cash-flow problem that did not benefit Archer. Archer unsuccessfully sued for breach of contract. McDonell then sought attorneys fees, which the trial court denied, concluding that “the agreement permitted fee shifting only after a judicial determination that the (would be) paying party breached. The determination that one party did not breach was not enough.” No. 25-30739 (Oct. 5, 2026), The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

In McCain v. Mary Mahoney’s, a diner paid premium prices for what the menu described as local Gulf snapper, but was then allegedly served cheap imported frozen fish.

The Fifth Circuit held that the aggrieved diner had suffered an Article III injury in fact.
The Court placed the case within its earlier opinions on a “fraudulent-inducement” theory of economic injury.

Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs and Earl v. Boeing Co rejected that theory where drug buyers and airline passengers never suffered the physical harm the product supposedly risked and otherwise got what they paid for. In Wilson v. Centene Management Co., by contrast, the Fifth Circuit accepted such a theory for health-plan buyers who received inaccurate provider directories, despite the insurer’s contractual promise that they would be accurate.

Unlike Rivera and Earl, which involved an “unmaterialized risk of physical harm,” this diner’s claim – like the claim in Wilson – involved “a product devoid of an important characteristic that the seller explicitly promised.” No. 25-60663 (Oct. 16, 2026).

Pittsburgh Logistics Systems v. Glen Rose Transportation Management, while affirming a judgment rendered after jury trial in a trade-secrets case, provides this footnote about the unusual but important issue of ex parte communications:

Ex-parte, in camera meetings with a party are strongly disfavored and often reversible error, however well-intentioned, here focused on admonishing a party about unacceptable communications with the court’s staff. See 28 U.S.C. § 753. Upon PLS’s motion for clarification, however, the court promptly disclosed all contents of the admonition into the record, disclosing it to both parties, and we see no reversible error nor that the administrative matter addressed touched on the substantive merits of the case, particularly where PLS admitted at oral argument that it knew the court was going to conduct the ex-parte conference in advance, and it did not object.

No. 25-50864 (Oct. 2, 2026).

Inspired by the recent BAFFC annual conference in New Orleans, I pulled together some short articles that I have written recently about appellate advocacy, and offer them to you in this this e-book. I hope you find it useful in your practice, and encourage you to share it with a friend or colleague if you do enjoy it.

In the Matter of Whitestone Uptown Tower involved an unfortunate loan guarantor who paid off a borrower’s secured debt, even though the borrower had removed the guarantor as its manager, and filed for bankruptcy protection on the day of the payoff, trapping the payment in a netherworld of “suspense.”

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the allowance of the guarantor’s subrogation claim arising from a settlement of the loan dispute among the principals. The relevant Bankruptcy Code provision says that “an entity that is liable with the debtor on, or that has secured, a claim of a creditor against the debtor, and that pays such claim, is subrogated to the rights of such creditor to the extent of such payment.” The court distinguished a guaranty of payment from other forms of secondary liability, explaining that “a guaranty of payment creates obligations (monetary) that correspond to the original note. But a guaranty of payment kicks in only after default on the note, creating immediate liability between guarantor and lender.” No. 25-10947 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2026) (unpublished),

Megalomedia Inc. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. presented, on its face, an unusual issue of insurance coverage, which the panel majority declined to consider:

“What is a ‘reality show’?” It contends that, because the term has no set meaning in the television industry, no one knows for certain whether My 600-lb Life qualifies as one. So, Megalomedia argues the district court erred by not reading the exclusion against Philadelphia.

We decline to enter this debate. While it would be fun to plumb the nuances of the term “reality show”—and ponder, as Megalomedia bids us, whether Monday Night Football and Fox News are “reality shows”—this appeal presents no such question.

Why, you ask? Because Megalomedia makes this argument for the first time on appeal. Indeed, in the district court, Megalomedia took the opposite position: it told that court, over and over, that My 600-lb Life was, in fact, a “reality show.” Its argument was that the policy really did cover “reality shows” . . . like My 600-lb Life. Having lost that argument, Megalomedia cannot now pirouette 180 degrees on appeal and try a new one. That is the reality of forfeiture

A dissent proposed a narrower view of the underlying “party presentation” principle. No. 23-20570 (Sept. 15, 2026).