As Dickens famously wrote in Bleak House: “Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means. … Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it.”

So to, the affirmative-action litigation about admissions policy at the University of Texas at Austin, where the Fifth Circuit held, inter alia, that an organization called “Students for Fair Admissions” was not barred by claim preclusion from bringing suit when (1) its principals were involved in earlier litigation, but did not control the new entity and had sued before in different capacities, and (2) the facts about UT’s policies and the makeup of its student body had materially changed since the earlier litigation. Students for Fair Admission, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 21-50715 (June 20, 2022).

Have the pre-Roe statutes (right) come back to life by operation of law? I give a high-level summary here.

Robinson v. Ardoin addressed whether to stay a preliminary injunction in a highly technical Voting Rights Act case about Louisiana’s congressional districts. The Court’s analysis of timeliness is of general interest in preliminary injunction practice involving similar situations (a board election or vote, etc.), even though some of the policy interests involved are unique to elections for public office. The key facts were:

• The primary election at issue was five months away; the deadline for a candidate to qualify for that election by paying a fee was approximately a month away, which was the path chosen by most candidates;
• While “multiple mailings could confuse some voters,” there was “[m]ore than enough time … for the state to assuage any uncertainty,” especially when no one had yet cast a ballot; and
• While “administrative burdens” related to equipment maintenance and voter-roll review were legitimate concerns, evidence showed that the state had significant administrative experience in adjusting to changes in the time, place, and manner of elections.

No. 22-30333 (June 12, 2022).

The Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to remand when:

1. The defendant’s claimed amount in controversy did not tie to the plaintiff’s specific claim. “Deutsche Bank failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy was over $75,000. Deutsche Bank submitted evidence of the Property’s value [$427,662], which obviously exceeded the jurisdictional threshold. But Deutsche Bank failed to show that the automatic stay at issue here put the house’s value in controversy.”
2. The plaintiff stipulated it sought no more than $74,500. Citing a statement in the plaintiff’s pleading and an near-identical one in a later declaration, the Court said: “The best reading of these two statements is that Durbois is seeking–and will accept–no more than $74,500.” It continued: “Deutsche Bank claims these statements are insufficient. We don’t see why. Durbois used two forms of the word ‘stipulation’ and even bolded it once. A reasonable reader would understand that Durbois was limiting not only what he demanded but what he would accept from the suit. Perhaps Deutsche Bank thinks Durbois “should have used CAPITAL LETTERS …. [o]r maybe … should have added: ‘And [I] really mean it!!!’” But we don’t think such measures are necessary.” (The opinion did not address the potential role of semaphore signals in providing emphasis.)

Durbois v. Deutsche Bank, No. 20-11082 (June 16, 2022) (emphasis added, citation omitted)). The opinion thoroughly reviews the case law on these basic issues, and the “CAPITAL LETTERS” point may prove meme-worthy in the months ahead.

The Fifth Circuit found that the natural-disaster exception to the WARN Act did not apply to COVID-19, reasoning:

The natural-disaster exception provides that “[n]o notice under this chapter shall be required if the plant closing or mass layoff is due to any form of natural disaster, such as a flood, earthquake, or the drought currently ravaging the farmlands of the United States.” Congress’s use of the term “such as” “indicat[es] that there are includable other matters of the same kind which are not specifically enumerated by the standard.”  By providing three examples after “such as,” Congress indicated that the phrase, “natural disaster” includes events of the same kind as floods, earthquakes, and droughts.

Easom v. U.S. Well Servcs., No. 21-20202 (June 15, 2022). The Court went on to discuss specific canons of interpretation relevant to this observation.

CitiMortgage complained that a borrower made his mortgage payments late under a Trial Period Plan, and was thus ineligible for a loan modification. The borrower countered that he satisfied the TPP’s grace period for payments and the Fifth Circuit agreed: “[T]he TPP establishes a grace period. It accepts payment so long as it is made ‘in the month in which it is due.’ Neither the TPP nor the parties use the term ‘grace period’ to describe this language. But that is plainly what the text contemplates. And no one disputes that Burbridge’s payments comply with the governing grace periods.” Burbridge v. Citi Mortgage, No. 21-40309 (June 16, 2022).

Overruling almost 30-year-old precedent from the Fifth Circuit, a 5-4 Supreme Court ruled for a Texas Indian tribe and its plans to operate bingo facilities. Ysleta del  Sur Pueblo v. Texas, No. 20-493 (U.S. June 15, 2022). The El Paso Matters website has a good summary of the case and the parties’ views of the opinion.

In his 19th round of judicial nominations, announced yesterday, President Biden has nominated U.S. Magistrate Judge Dana Douglas of New Orleans to the Fifth Circuit. The White House website provides a short biographical sketch:

From first-year Torts comes XL Insurance Am., Inc. v. Turn Servcs., LLC, with a discussion of the economic loss rule and the physical injury exception to it.

• The en banc Fifth Circuit held in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985): “Denying recovery for pure economic losses is a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of foreseeability, a limitation we find to be both workable and useful.”
• But only a few months later, the Fifth Circuit held that “owners of cargo aboard a ship involved in a collision could recover their economic losses, despite their cargo’s being undamaged,” noting that given “a risk-shifting provision in the cargo-owners’ agreement with the ship owner, there was no risk of ‘double recovery, much less runaway recovery.'” Amoco Transp. Co. v. S/S Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1985).

XL Insurance fell on the Amoco side of the line as to $1.254 million in repair costs after an allision. No. 21-30520 (June 10, 2022).

Our firm again achieved Chambers & Partners Band One status this year for commercial litigation in the D/FW area; my partner Mike Lynn and I wrote the lead article introducing this year’s rankings and talking about our area’s strong economy and legal market.

Certain app developers had a sufficient interest to intervene in an FLSA case against Anadarko when: “The plaintiffs … represented in their contracts with the Intervenors that they were ‘independent professionals’—somewhat in tension with the plaintiffs’ current litigation position that they were really Anadarko’s employees. More importantly, the plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate ‘every claim, controversy, allegation, or dispute arising out of or relating in any way to’ not only their relationship with the Intervenors, but also their resulting work placements with Anadarko.” Field v. Anadarko Petroleum, No. 22-20054 (June 7, 2022).

“Where, as here, a rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with a rule 12(b)(6) motion courts must consider the jurisdictional challenge first. The district court did so here, correctly finding jurisdiction lacking. But the district court then dismissed the action with prejudice, which our caselaw prohibits.” Williams v. Am. Commercial Lines, No. 21-30609 (May 24, 2022) (unpublished).

The Fifth Circuit recently put in place some new local rules about disclosure statements and certificates of service.

While the district court and the Fifth Circuit largely saw eye-to-eye on the contract in Otteman v. Knights of Columbus (a dispute between the Catholic lay organization and an affiliated insurance salesman), they differed on one provision related to the handling of “high-value prospects”:

The parties differ in their understanding of this conduct. Ottemann’s interpretation of this provision, as alleged in his complaint, is that “[S]ection[] 4 of the [GA] Agreement … stated that Plaintiff was an independent contractor that was ‘free to exercise independent judgment as to eligible persons from who applications for insurance will be solicited’ and have ‘freedom of action.’”

The Order responds that the GA contract explicitly stated that Ottemann had no “authority to bind the Order to issue any insurance policy,” and that it was no breach to tell Ottemann not “to waste his (and the Order’s) time and resources soliciting that person.” The Order also argues there would be no damages to sustain a claim because, even if Ottemann was allowed to solicit Lombardi, the Order contractually reserved rights to refuse the issuance of policies.

We hold that Ottemann’s claim as to Section 4 is plausible at the motion to dismiss stage. Although there is nothing particularly surprising about the Order’s interest in diverting high-value prospects into a special sales program, the contract states that the rules and procedures set up by the Order “shall not be construed as interfering with the freedom of action of the General Agent.” The contract does not demarcate the boundary between Ottemann’s freedom of action as a GA and the scope of the Order’s ability to dictate “rules and procedures” that would divert otherwise available insurance prospects from his territory.

No. 21-30138 (June 2, 2022) (additional spacing added).

Perhaps you have been wondering: “Did Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), implicitly overrule Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986), and thereby limit the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the Fifth Circuit?”

If so, you need fret no longer. While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine continues to “generally preclude[] lower federal courts ‘from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments,” we now know with certainty, from Miller v. Dunn, that “Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is pending when the federal suit is filing.” No. 20-11054 (June 2, 2022).

A thicket of issues surrounding an attempted prosecution of Netflix led to an unsuccessful mandamus petition by the prosecutor; among other holdings, the Fifth Circuit said: “We have not been shown any example of an effort by this circuit to consider the approach of the three circuits identified by the district court. Such caselaw from other circuits is not dispositive on whether there is a ‘clear and indisputable’ right to a writ of mandamus. Regardless of the precise reasoning that justifies a federal court to require discovery of state grand jury proceedings, we conclude that Babin has not demonstrated entitlement to mandamus relief under this theory.” No. 22-40306 (May 25, 2022).

At issue in Stewart v. Entergy Corp. was whether BP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021), allowed the review of non-CAFA grounds for removal, in the context of an appeal of a remand order taken pursuant to CAFA. The Fifth Circuit, acknowledging contrary authority from other Circuits, held that it did not, noting that unlike the statute at issue in BP, CAFA requires expedited appeals and thus establishes a unique, CAFA-specific system for review of rulings related to it. No. 22-30177 (May 27, 2022).

By a close vote, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s order that stayed the trial court’s preliminary injunction in the Netchoice litigation about Texas’s social-media statute.