Contentious litigation about the governance of the Jackson Municipal Airport again reached the Fifth Circuit in Jackson Municipal Airport Auth. v. Harkins, No. 21-60312 (May 10, 2023). The Court accepted jurisdiction in a document-production dispute for reasons unique to governmental privilege, but its waiver reasoning is instructive more broadly:

As relevant here, communications with third parties outside the legislature might still be within the sphere of “legitimate legislative activity” if the communication bears on potential legislation. Consequently, some communications with third parties, such as private communications with advocacy groups, are protected by legislative privilege when they are “a part and parcel of the modern legislative procedures through which legislators receive information possibly bearing on the legislation they are to consider.” Thus, we disagree with the district court’s broad pronouncement that the Legislators waived their legislative privilege for any documents or information that had been shared with third parties.

No 21-60312 (May 10, 2023) (citations omitted).

Majestic Oil v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s is an insurance coverage case in which the key issue is what caused a roof to leak. The plaintiff’s expert prepared a second report that added analysis of certain weather data; he characterized it as a permissible supplement to his original report, while the defense moved to strike it as containing an impermissible new opinion after the expert-report deadline.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court’s ruling that struck the new report, remanding for more fulsome consideration of all four factors identified by Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1): “(1) the explanation for the failure to identify the [information]; (2) the importance of the [information]; (3) potential prejudice in allowings the timeliness of an expert report and the [information]; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such
prejudice.” No. 21-20542 (March 17, 2023, unpublished).

The Fifth Circuit recently summarized the sometimes-confusing law about when an adverse ruling about a grand-jury subpoena may be appealed:

Our jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing final decisions of a district court. This rule applies to appeals of orders issued in grand jury proceedings. There are two exceptions. First, if a witness chooses not to comply with a grand jury subpoena compelling production of documents and is held in contempt, that witness may immediately appeal the court’s interlocutory order. Second, under what is called the Perlman doctrine, a party need not be held in contempt prior to filing an interlocutory appeal if “the documents at issue are in the hands of a third party who has no independent interest in preserving their confidentiality.

In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 21-30705 (Dec. 14, 2022). (At least in theory, a mandamus petition may also be available in this setting, see generally David Coale, Five Years After Mohawk, 34 Rev. Litig. 1 (2015)).

A specific federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), deals with discovery requests in aid of foreign litigation. In Banca Pueyo SA v. Lone Star Fund IX (US), L.P., the Fifth Circuit held that its precedent “cannot be read either for the proposition that adversarial testing may be precluded on the merits of a § 1782(a) application following an ex parte ruling [about the requested discovery], or that [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 45 furnishes the only means to challenge the initiation of the subpoenas approved ex parte by the district court.” No. 21-10776 (Dec. 13, 2022).

The Fifth Circuit granted mandamus relief as to an effort to subpoena Texas AG Ken Paxton for a deposition in a case about potentially overzealous enforcement of now-constitutional antiabortion laws.

The panel majority concluded: (1) that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and thus could not require his testimony, citing a recent Circuit case involving discovery and qualified immunity; (2) that the subpoena sought an inappropriate “apex” deposition; and (3) that plaintiffs overreached by opposing mandamus relief (because of a potential remedy by appeal), while also seeking to dismiss Paxton’s interlocutory appeal on immunity grounds (thus, extinguishing same).

A concurrence would have focused on the apex issue and not the broader dispute about jurisdiction, at least at this stage of the proceedings. In re Paxton, No. 22-50882 (Nov. 14, 2022) — REVISED, (Feb. 14, 2023).

A long-running discovery dispute in Texas state court led to a contempt order, which in turn led to a federal-court habeas action. The Fifth Circuit noted that habeas relief was potentially available under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, under which:

… if an adequate state ‘corrective process’ for raising a claim exists that the petitioner could avail him or herself of, a federal court may only consider the claim if the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. And when the petitioner has done so and the state court has rejected the claim on the merits, federal courts may provide relief only when the state court adjudication was either ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’

(citations omitted). Among other observations, the Court held: “A rule that due process does not permit the use of civil contempt to compel the production of documents that are in the hands of third parties would also overturn longstanding precedents and would likely be unworkable in practice.” Topletz v. Skinner, No. 20-40136 (July 30, 2021).

Another voice joined the chorus of appellate observations about perceived excesses involving sealed records in Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp.: “[E]ntrenched litigation practices harden over time, including overbroad sealing practices that shield judicial records from public view for unconvincing (or unarticulated) reasons. Such stipulated sealings are not uncommon. But they are often unjustified. With great respect, we urge litigants and our judicial colleagues to zealously guard the public’s right of access to judicial records their judicial records—so ‘that justice may not be done in a corner.'” No. 20-10377 (March 3, 2021).

The novelty of the international-discovery procedure in 28 USC § 1782 intersected with the collateral-order doctrine about interlocutory appeals in Banca Pueyo SA v. Lone Star Fund: “While we readily conclude that this appeal was premature, we recognize that the unusual nature of section 1782 proceedings results in some uncertainty about when to appeal. Indeed, respondents acknowledged that this might not be the right time, but they appealed now in an abundance of caution. They also worry that an appeal may never be ripe due to the possibility of a future dispute over privilege. But appellate jurisdiction is a ‘practical’ determination, not a speculative one. Once the district court fully resolves the second motion to quash, the scope of section 1782 discovery should be definitively resolved. When that conclusive determination comes, an appeal would be appropriate.”  No. 20-10049 (Oct. 27, 2020) (mem. op.).

The defendant in Coastal Bridge Co. v. Heatec, No. 19-31030 (revised Nov. 6, 2020) made a spoliation claim about the loss of a heater involved in a fire. The Fifth Circuit reasoned:

• “As a threshold matter, Because Coastal Bridge reasonably should have anticipated litigation over the fire damage, it had a duty to preserve the equipment.”
• But bad faith was not shown: “Adherence to normal operating procedures may counter a contention of bad faith. Here, an outdoor piece of industrial equipment was stored outdoors. The record does not support the finding that Coastal Bridge acted with a culpable state of mind.”
• And as to relevance: “Heatec did not specifically request to examine the pumps at the joint inspection. As such, the pumps are of questionable relevance for the purposes of its underlying claim that poor pump maintenance can be a cause of a heater fire.”

Billy Joel disputed causation about starting the fire. So did the parties in Coastal Bridge Co. v. Heatec, in which the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment, holding: “Here, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to: (1) the significance of the heating pumps; (2) what equipment was disassembled and disposed of; (3) the origin of the subject fire and whether the inlet pipe moved; and (4) the extent of communication4 that occurred between the parties before the formal notice of the fire. These factual disputes cannot be resolved without weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations, which are matters for the factfinder.” No. 19-31030 (Nov. 6, 2020, revised).

Each of the four factors for a deadline extension was in play in AIG Europe, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 19-40934, where the Fifth Circuit observed:

1. Explanation. “If AIG needed information from Caterpillar’s experts to allow Faherty to complete his expert report, AIG should have moved to compel the depositions of those experts.”
2. Importance. “AIG’s claims do not turn on Faherty’s report. Despite the exclusion, AIG had experts on causation.”
3. Prejudice. “Faherty’s report responded to the analysis of Caterpillar’s experts, it also contained new analyses and conclusions. Defendants were not given the opportunity to challenge these conclusions on the critical issue of causation.”
4. Continuance? “Yet another continuance would have delayed summary judgment and a potential trial even further.”

Belcher complained about the FDIC’s power to take his deposition. The parties, and the panel majority, agreed that his lawsuit did not become moot even after the challenged deposition occurred: ‘Because the district court on remand can ‘fashion some form of meaningful relief,’ appeal is not moot. Exactly what that relief might entail is beyond the scope of our concern. However, it is undisputed by the parties that the district court could strike Belcher’s deposition testimony before the FDIC.”  The majority also noted that the district court could address the FDIC’s sharing of the transcript. A dissent observed: “I see no reason to override what common sense suggests: the appeal of an order requiring a deposition is moot once the deposition is over.”  FDIC v. Belcher, No. 19-31023 (Oct. 26, 2020).

The parties’ arbitration agreement adopted certain AAA rules; among them, Rule 52(e) says: “Parties to an arbitration under these rules may not call the arbitrator . . . as a witness in litigation or any other proceeding relating to the arbitration” and that an arbitrator is “not competent to testify as [a] witness[] in such proceeding.”

The appellant in Vantage Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras, facing an award of close to $700 million, sought the deposition of the dissenter on a 3-judge panel, noting his unusual statement that “the entire arbitration, ‘the prehearing, hearing, and posthearing processes,’ denied Petrobras ‘fundamental fairness and due process protections.'” 

The Fifth Circuit held otherwise: “We have not discovered any court of appeals decision holding that a district court abused its discretion in denying discovery from an arbitrator about the substance of the award. We see nothing in this record to cause us to be the first.”  No. 19-20435 (July 16, 2020).

The Fifth Circuit allowed a “John Doe” summons to proceed, requiring a law firm to disclose certain client entities. After reviewing authority nationwide about such warrants, the Court concluded: “[D]isclosure of the Does’ identities would inform the IRS that the Does participated in at least one of the numerous transactions described in the John Doe summons issued to the Firm, but ‘[i]t is less than clear . . . as to what motive, or other confidential communication of [legal] advice, can be inferred from that information alone.’ Consequently, the Firm’s clients’ identities are not ‘connected inextricably with a privileged communication,’ and, therefore, the ‘narrow exception’ to the general rule that client identities are not protected by the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable.” Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States, No. 19-50506 (April 24, 2020).

Paine Snider v. L-3 Communications involved a company’s legal malpractice claim against a firm that represented it in corporate matters, when a firm partner helped a company employee with a discrimination case against the company. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of most of the malpractice claim on limitations grounds, observing:

L-3 knew in 2007 that . . . [i]t had access to emails between Edwards and Paine Snider reflecting that Edwards participated in drafting a detailed written internal complaint document cataloging the facts and incidents supporting Paine Snider’s claims. L-3 contacted Edwards and Elizabeth Quick, both partners at Womble, and expressly asserted that Edwards had a conflict of interest. L-3 failed to follow up with the Womble firm after it was apprised in writing by Bill Raper of that firm that he would investigate IT material, and subsequently, that he had investigated and was ready to talk to the general counsel of L-3’s parent company about Edwards’s involvement with Paine Snider’s claims against L-3.

. . .

We also know that when, late in 2011, L-3 subpoenaed documents from the Womble firm, the “new” information was somewhat more salacious and provided additional evidentiary support. But the nature of and essential facts supporting L-3’s claims against Edwards and Womble remained unchanged since 2007.

No. 16-60731 (Dec. 31, 2019).

Another discovery dispute in litigation about governance of the airport in Jackson, Mississippi (a previous proceeding involved a mandamus proceeding related to the deposition of the governor’s chief of staff) arose from subpoenas to several legislators, who asserted legislative privilege in response. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs lacked standing (“The plaintiffs cite no precedent supporting their theory that Jackson voters have a right to elect officials with the exclusive authority to select municipal airport commissioners”), and that this issue was properly raised even during an interlocutory appeal of a collateral order: “[E]ven nonparty witnesses refusing to comply with a discovery order may challenge standing . . . because ‘the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction.'” Stallworth v. Bryant, No. 18-60587 (Aug. 21, 2019).

The Fifth Circuit confirmed a district judge’s broad discretion over discovery in JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Datatreasury, a dispute about the scope of postjudgment discovery in a licensing dispute won by Chase. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in:

• Setting a time period for relevant information, considering the scope of the judgment and the pertinent licensing agreement;
• Focusing the relevant information by reference to the judgment itself rather than the broader definition of a “creditor” under the fraudulent-transfer statutes; and
• Evaluating the “proportionality” of the requested information in light of the expense associated with older records.

No. 18-40043 (Aug. 23, 2019).

A non-party appealed a discovery issue, complaining about confidentiality protection for documents it produced under subpoena in a complicated antitrust case. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue as a collateral order in Vantage Health Plan, Inc. v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, No. 17-30867 (Jan. 9, 2019). Unfortunately for the movant, that review identified three problems with its position: “First, the bald assertion of competitive harm is insufficient, and Humana was repeatedly unable to articulate a specific harm that would be caused by the disclosure of the documents. Second, Humana ignores the fact that any documents not placed into the record will remain subject to the district court’s protective order and are restricted to ‘attorney’s eyes only.’ . . . Third, those documents that are ultimately filed on the record are still subject to the court’s redaction requirements, which cover all [specific numeric information rates and percentages].”

The mandamus petition in In re: Bryant, No. 18-60703 (Nov. 30, 2018, unpublished) arose from a dispute about governance of the airport in Jackson, Mississippi; the Governor sought to quash a court-ordered deposition of his chief of staff. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition – nominally – but essentially invited a return trip if the magistrate judge’s analysis was not sharpened on four key points:

We therefore deny the petition for writ of mandamus, but we do so without prejudice to the renewal of the petition, if needed, after the magistrate judge adequately addresses:

a) whether the information desired can be sought from alternative witnesses or must exclusively come from the Chief of Staff;

 

b) whether the legislators involved in the communications can be deposed;

c) whether the information desired can be obtained in another form; and

 

d) if it cannot be obtained in another form, whether the scope of the inquiry can be more closely tailored to target only the specific questions raised at the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.

By denying the petition without prejudice in this manner, the Bryant case presents a new variation on a long-running theme in Fifth Circuit mandamus opinions. See In re DuPuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 870 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding “the MDL court clearly abused any discretion it might have had and, in doing so, reached a ‘patently erroneous’ result,” but concluding: “[P]etitioners have the usual and adequate remedy of ordinary appeal. In fact, they have taken advantage of that remedy by appealing the judgment in the third bellwether trial on personal-jurisdiction grounds.”). In re: Crystal Power Co., 641 F.3d 82 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We confess puzzlement over why respondents insist on litigating this case in federal court even though . . . any judgment issued by the district court will surely be reversed . . . . “); In re: Trinity Industries, 872 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 2014) (“The court is compelled to note, however, that this is a close case.”)

The Fifth Circuit reversed a defense summary judgment in a trade secrets dispute in Brand Services LLC v. Irex Corp., noting inter alia –

• Discovery. In its summary judgment analysis, the district court should have addressed a  discovery motion filed by the non-movant: “Brand Services claims it moved to compel immediately after discovering the responsive documents in the Pennsylvania litigation. There is some indication that Brand Services could not have reasonably discovered these documents sooner: Irex’s initial blanket objections to Brand Services’s discovery request were grossly improper, and thereafter Irex did little to comply with Brand Services’s requests. Therefore, Brand Services was arguably diligent in seeking these documents even though it did not discover them until after the discovery deadline had passed. At a minimum, Irex’s conduct in this discovery proceeding is highly questionable and bears further examination in light of the exemplar documents.”
• Damages. “Although Brand Services provided little in the way of detail about its claim that it spent ‘millions’ to design the software allegedly stolen, it has, at a minimum, provided some evidence from which a jury could reasonably estimate unjust enrichment damages. For example, it demonstrated that Irex’s use of the
  allegedly stolen information saved Irex at least two to three days a month in time spent invoicing. Even assuming that Irex’s administrative personnel worked only an eight-hour day for minimum wage during those two to three days saved, this is a reasonable inference of unjust-enrichment damages.”

No. 17-30660 (revised Nov. 21, 2018).

The modern administrative state often requests documents for compliance and enforcement purposes; such a request led to a Fourth Amendment challenge to a subpoena from the Texas Medical Board in Barry v. Freshour. The challenge was made by a doctor who practiced at the facility that received the request. The Fifth Circuit rejected the doctor’s challenge and reversed the district court’s ruling in his favor: “The district court concluded Barry had standing because the records were sought in a proceeding against him and the subpoena was addressed to him personally (though it was also addressed to the records custodian). But the Supreme Court has rejected a ‘target’ approach to Fourth Amendment standing that would look to whether the evidence obtained could be used against the person seeking to challenge the search.” Here, “Barry relies on a list of pure privacy interests in the information the records contain. All but one, as he concedes, are specifically tied to his patients’ privacy interests in their own medical records. To the extent such interests are constitutionally cognizable, they cannot be asserted by Barry.” No. 17-20726 (Oct. 4, 2018).

The Fifth Circuit made a second discovery-related observation in September, in Norman v. Grove Cranes, a products-liability dispute about a safer alternative design for a crane. The trial judge did not allow the plaintiff’s expert to testify on that point; on appeal, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion. Plaintiff said the expert “Perkin was unable to form an opinion regarding safer alternative design because Grove failed to produce the documents requested, i.e., the ‘draft design drawings related to the prior design of the crane at issue and similar Grove cranes.’.” The district court disagreed, “pointing out that Norman knew at least 83 days prior to the close of discovery that Perkin needed additional documents to form his expert opinion on safer alternative design but failed to file a motion to compel until a month after the close of discovery,” and noting that the plaintiff’s “failure to seek Court intervention via a motion to compel before the end of discovery shows a lack of diligence in seeking documents [he] now claims are indispensable to his expert’s ability to render a required opinion.” No. 17-20631 (Sept. 10, 2018, unpublished).

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau – the subject of ongoing litigation about the constitutionality of its structure, which has been at issue in the recent Kavanaugh hearings – lost a challenge to a civil investigative demand in CFPB v. The Source for Public Data: “The CFPB did not comply with 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(2) when it issued this CID to Public Data. First, it did not state the ‘conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under investigation.’ According to its Notification of Purpose, the CFPB is investigating ‘unlawful acts and practices in connection with the provision or use of public records information.’ Simply put, this Notification of Purpose does not identify what conduct, it believes, constitutes an alleged violation. . . . Moreover, this CID does not identify ‘the provision of law applicable to such violation.’ As discussed, the CID never identifies an alleged violation, so it is unsurprising that it fails to identify a relevant provision of law.” No. 17-10732 (Sept. 6, 2018).

An emotionally-charged lawsuit about the disposal of embryonic and fetal tissue led to an unfortunately-timed subpoena (during Holy Week) to the Texas Conference of Catholic Bishops, which in turn led to emergency appellate proceedings. The Fifth Circuit’s panel majority found the order was appealable as an interlocutory order notwithstanding Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009), noting the importance of the First Amendment issues involved and that “Mohawk does not speak to the predicament of third parties, whose claims to reasonable protection from the courts have often been met with respect.” A dissenting opinion would not have accepted the interlocutory appeal, noting that mandamus was also available (although requiring a “clear and indisputable” right rather than simply a substantial question), and observing that the movants’ “failure to object to the in camera inspection [at issue] certainly forfeits an appellate challenge to it, and the affirmative act of producing the documents likely amounts to full-scale waiver.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, No. 18-50484 (revised July 17, 2018).

Among other holdings in In re DePuy Orthopaedics, the Fifth Circuit observed: “Suppose we did believe [counsel]’s various and independent explanations for why he could pay his expert before and after trial without ever compromising the witness’s non-retained status. An opinion countenancing his behavior would read like a blueprint on how to evade Rule 26 with impunity. Parties could pay experts ‘for their time’ before trial and later exchange compelling ‘pro bono’ testimony for sizable, post-trial ‘thank you’ checks.” No. 16-11051 et seq. (April 25, 2018) (emphasis in original).

In Stevens v. Belhaven University, the Fifth Circuit described a set of findings that justified a $500 sanctions award on a client and $100 on a lawyer (adding numbers and headings for ease of reference):

(1. Preservation letter) The court explained that counsel had received a letter demanding him to “preserve and sequester” the phone.

 

(2. Failure to preserve) The defendant “was therefore sur-prised to learn . . . that the phone had broken and was no longer in [plaintiff’s] possession [but] had been taken . . . to a local AT&T store [where] she pur-chased a new phone.”

 

(3. Lack of explanation) “In her deposition, [plaintiff] could not explain how some of the text messages were deleted from her phone before they were shared with the EEOC.”

 

(4. Actual relevance of material at issue.) “When [she] did search her iCloud, moreover―. . . she identified new, material, and important evidence.

 

(5. In addition to (3), inconsistent explanation.)  That . . . directly contradicts [her] ear-lier sworn statement that she had produced everything to [the defendant].”

No. 17-60652 (April 2, 2018, unpublished).

The Fifth Circuit recently “walked back” its May opinion in EEOC v. BDO USA, which identified three problems with a privilege log. A revised opinion removed that discussion, in favor of a shorter, more general observation about there being “no presumption that a company’s communications with counsel are privileged.” The new opinion observed: “Given the ‘broad’ and ‘considerable discretion’ district courts have in discovery matters, we will not analyze the privilege logs in the first instance.” EEOC v. BDO USA, No. 16-20314 (revised Nov. 16, 2017).

Two basic reminders about evidence appear in Eaton-Stephens v. Grapevine Colleyville ISD, an employment dispute involving a school counselor:

1. “Eaton-Stephens also argues she should have received a spoliation inference because her computer’s contents were erased, and that, because the School District’s policy and rules required retention of the contents for several years, the only conclusion was that the action was taken in bad faith. Our cases indicate a violation of a rule or regulation pertaining to document retention is not per se bad faith and Eaton-Stephens cites no authority in support of such a per se bad faith rule.”
2. “We agree that the district court unduly discredited some of Eaton-Stephens’s deposition testimony as conclusory. ‘A party’s own testimony is often “self-serving,” but we do not exclude it as incompetent for that reason alone.’ Even if self-serving, a party’s own affidavit containing factual assertions based on firsthand knowledge is competent summary judgment evidence sufficient to create a fact issue.”

No. 16-11611 (Nov. 13, 2017, unpublished).

For a recent CLE presentation, I prepared the attached one-page chart to summarize the Fifth Circuit’s recent holdings about discovery.

Plaintiff accused defendant (and his employer) of sexual assault while incarcerated at a privately-run detention center. Defense counsel had recordings of calls made by the plaintiff, from the facility, suggesting that the encounters were consensual. Counsel did not identify the recordings in their Rule 26 initial disclosures, and did not make the recordings available until the plaintiff’s deposition, after questioning her about the conversations. The district court sanctioned defense counsel for inadequate disclosure and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that “some evidence serves both substantive and impeachment functions and thus should not be treated as ‘solely’ impeachment evidence” under Rule 26. Olivarez v. GRO Group, Inc., No. 16-50191 (Dec. 12, 2016).

Interlocutory appeal of discovery issues is largely foreclosed under the restrictive view of the “collateral order” doctrine adopted by Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009). Another, rarely-traveled path appears in Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., in which the district court and Fifth Circuit agreed that an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of a difficult discovery issue involving parallel private employment litigation and immigration proceedings. The specific issue address is important but narrow; the procedural holding is notable for how unusual and important a discovery issue must be to come within the ambit of the interlocutory appeal statute. No. 15-60562 (Sept. 27, 2016).

The district court required the plaintiff in an FLSA case to submit her phone to a forensic examiner. It then awarded significant sanctions when the defendants’ “inspection revealed that the text messages in question were not on [Plaintiff’s] phone, that the mobile application allegedly containing such text messages was not on the phone, and that the phone appeared to have been reset or newly activated only three days before the forensic inspection.” The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion; footnote 2 of the opinion details several unsuccessful explanations and counterarguments offered by the plaintiff, which had no traction here but could be of interest in a future e-discovery dispute involving similar issues. Timms v. LZM, LLC, No. 15-20700 (July 5, 2016, unpublished).

Mutual of Omaha obtained a summary judgment against Prospect, who complained under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) that it needed “additional electronic discovery related to allegedly backdated documents produced by Mutual.”  The Fifth Circuit declined to enter that wild kingdom, observing: “[T]he magistrate judge denied Prospect’s motion to compel that electronic discovery, and Prospect did not object to the denial. That means that the electronic discovery was not ‘susceptible of collection within a reasonable time frame’ —Prospect was never
going to get it—so it cannot support Prospect’s Rule 56(d) motion.”  Prospect Capital v. Mutual of Omaha, No. 15-20345 (April 13, 2016).

Guzman sued Celadon Trucking for personal injuries.  On May 9, 2011, Celadon’s counsel asked him to undergo an independent medical exam.  On May 27, Guzman said in his deposition that he intended to undergo back surgery. Celadon later contended that his surgery constituted spoliation of evidence, and requested an adverse jury instruction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed its denial, noting: “After [Celadon’s counsel] received this disclosure in the deposition, they made no request to be informed of his surgery date, nor did they ask that he delay surgery pending his examination. Only after the examination was completed did [they] assert that the surgery had meaningfully altered evidence.  While the timing of Guzman’s surgery may seem strange, there is no evidence to suggest that he acted in a manner intended to deceive [Celadon] or that he undertook the surgery with the intent of destroying or altering evidence.”  Guzman v. Jones, No. 15-40007 (Oct. 22, 2015).

The plaintiffs/relators in United States ex rel Rigsby v. State Farm contended that, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm improperly skewed its claims handling process in favor of finding flood damage, as “wind policy claims were paid out of the company’s own pocket while flood policy claims were paid with government funds.”  They won at trial and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that – notwithstanding earlier investigations – they were “paradigmatic . . . whistleblowing insiders” as to this specific claim who qualified as “original sources.”  The Court went on to find sufficient evidence of falsity and scienter, and reversed a discovery ruling that would not have allowed the plaintiffs to investigate the facts of other potentially false claims. ” 794 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed on an issue about violation of the FCA’s sealing requirement.

Defendants claimed that a foreclosure sale produced an unfair windfall for Fannie Mae on a substantial commercial property.  They alleged that Fannie Mae had a practice of making unfairly low bids on Gulf Coast properties.  The Fifth Circuit observed: “As the district court held, evidence regarding Fannie Mae’s other foreclosure practices throughout the Gulf Coast region would not impact whether the subject property was sold for the amount at which it would have changed hands between a willing buyer and seller having knowledge of the relevant facts. At most, such evidence might have suggested that Fannie Mae’s conduct throughout the region affected the fair market value of the subject property. So long as the property was sold for fair market value, however, evidence of the various market forces influencing that value is not relevant to this case.” Fannie Mae v. Lynch, No. 14-60864 (June 2, 2015, unpublished).

Waste Management sued Kattler, a former employee, for misappropriating confidential information and other related claims.  A dispute about what information Kattler had in is possession expanded to include a contempt finding against Kattler’s attorney, Moore.  Waste Management v. Kattler, No. 13-20356 (Jan. 15, 2015).  The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning as follows:

1.  The order setting a hearing referenced a motion, by Pacer docket number, that only sought relief against Kattler and not the attorney.  It was not an adequate “show-cause order naming [both] Moore and Kattler as alleged contemnors[.]”

2.  On the merits, the Court found that Kattler had misled Moore as to the existence of a particular “San Disk thumb drive,” that Moore had acted prudently in consulting ethics counsel and withdrawing after he learned of the untruthfulness, and that new counsel made a prompt disclosure about the drive that avoided unfair prejudice.  This part of the opinion reviews Circuit authority about the failure to correct incorrect court filings.

3.  Also on the merits, “while Moore clearly failed to comply with the terms of the December 20 preliminary injunction by not producing the iPad image directly to [Waste Management] by December 22, this failure is excusable because the order required Moore to violate the attorney-client privilege.”  Further, the relevant order only “required Kattler to produce an image of the device only, not the device itself,” which created a “degree of confusion” that excused the decision not to produce the actual iPad.

Law360 has also reported on this decision, and an expanded version of this article appears in the Texas Lawbook.

Menendez complained about his employer’s accounting practices to the SEC.  The employer received a letter from the SEC asking for retention of certain documents.  The employer then emailed Menendez’s colleagues, “instructing them to start retaining certain documents because ‘the SEC has opened an inquiry into the allegations of Mr. Menendez.'”  Relations with his co-workers deteriorated and he ultimately resigned.  In a detailed opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a $30,000 damages award to Menendez on his claim for retaliation: “The undesirable consequences, from a whistleblower’s perspective, of the whistleblower’s supervisor telling the whistleblower’s colleagues that he reported them to authorities for what are allegedly fraudulent practices, thus resulting in an official investigation, are obvious.”  Halliburton, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 13-60323 (Nov. 12, 2014).  The case has received considerable attention in employment and compliance circles; the Wall Street Journal‘s coverage is a short example.

The concept of “proportionality” in discovery began its modern ascendance in  Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, with observations such as these: “Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.”  127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968 (2007).

Over time, the “proportionality” concept has moved from the discovery rules to pervade the entire system of federal procedure.  Consider Advisory Committee Note to revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 (approved by the Judicial Conference in September 2014 and now before the Supreme Court): “Effective advocacy is consistent with — and indeed depends upon — cooperative and proportional use of procedure.”

While arising under state law rather than the Federal Rules, the recent Texas Supreme Court of In re National Lloyds Ins. Co. illustrates the concept of proportionality in a highly practical context. The plaintiff in an insurance bad faith case sought evidence about similar claim denials, arguing “that the trial court’s discovery order was (1) limited in time, because it compelled only production of evidence relating to the two storms at issue, and (2) limited by location, because it involved only properties in Cedar Hill.”  ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 13-0761 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2014) (per curiam).

That Court disagreed: “Scouring claim files in hopes of finding similarly situated claimants whose claims were evaluated differently from [plaintiff’s] is at best an ‘impermissible fishing expedition.’ . . . [Plaintiff] is correct that discovery must be reasonably limited in time and geographic scope.   But such limits in and of themselves do not render the underlying information discoverable.”   It concluded that there were still too many likely differences between this set of claims and the plaintiff’s case to justify the discovery request.

The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board served administrative subpoenas on Transocean in connection with the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  United States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc., No. 13-20243 (Sept. 18, 2014).  Transocean contended that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the ill-fated rig was not a “stationary source” within the meaning of the Board’s enabling statute; the majority disagreed, concluding that at the time of the accident, the rig “was physically connected (though not anchored) at that site and maintained a fixed position.”

Transocean also contended that this sentence deprived the Board of jurisidiction: “The Board shall not be authorized to investigate marine oil spills, which the National Transportation Safety Board is authorized to investigate.”  After a foray into the grammatical thicket of “which” v. “that,” the majority concluded that the Board was not categorically barred from investigating oil spills in light of the “overall regulatory scheme.”

A dissent disagreed with both conclusions, reminded that “[f]or the sake of maintaining limited government under the rule of law, courts must be vigilant to sanction improper administrative overreach,” and noted that at least 17 other investigations were conducted into the accident.

The plaintiff in McKay v. Novartis, Inc. challenged the dismissal on preemption grounds, by an MDL court in Tennessee, of products liability claims about drugs made by Novartis. No. 13-50404 (May 27, 2014).  The Fifth Circuit rejected an argument about inadequate time to get certain medical records, noting that the plaintiffs “sought formal discovery of evidence that was available to them through informal means” (citing other cases from the Court on that general topic), and also observing that two years passed from the filing of suit until Novartis sought summary judgment.  The Court also affirmed the MDL court’s grant of summary judgment on Texas state law grounds about a breach of warranty claim, finding inadequate notice; as an Erie matter: “the majority of Texas intermediate courts have held that a buyer must notify both the intermediate seller and the manufacturer.”

The dispute presented by the petition for a writ of mandamus in In re Times-Picayune, LLC was a criminal defendant’s ability to have identifying information about online commentators on the defendant’s case produced for in camera review; the defendant contending that the commentators were federal prosecutors.  No. 14-30298 (April 8, 2014, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, reasoning: “Here, we are not persuaded that the district court’s (1) balancing of the speech rights of anonymous commenters against the due process interests of [defendant] and (2) ordering the Times-Picayune to turn over information for in camera review was clearly and indisputably erroneous. As an initial matter, there is little case law illuminating how the competing interests in situations comparable to this one should be balanced. . . . Even in the absence of precedent, however, we cannot say that the district court here clearly reached the wrong decision.”   [The short opinion is worth comparing to the concurrence in All Plaintiffs v. Transocean Offshore from 2013, about the availability of mandamus relief for discovery matters.]  And subsequently, the district court concluded that the commentator at issue was not a prosecutor.

The district court granted a dismissal in favor of New Zealand, on forum non conveniens grounds, in Royal Ten Cate USA, inc. v. TT Investors, Ltd.  No. 13-50106 (March 25, 2014, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit remanded for further consideration of what it saw as a key private-interest factor — “whether two key witnesses who reside in Texas would be amenable to process in New Zealand.”   The witnesses in question were former party employees living in Texas, and the parties disputed whether those individuals’ employment contracts obligated them to cooperate with litigation after their employment.  Their importance was heightened because they were particularly significant to one side, while the other side did not appear to have comparable problems with its likely witnesses.  The Court did not express an opinion about the proper result on remand, and noted that “[t]he decision regarding whether or not to take additional evidence is one that we leave to the sound discretion of the district court.”

Duoline Technologies v. Polymer Instrumentation presents an unusual appellate review of a discovery order, arising from an ancillary proceeding to enforce a subpoena for a Pennsylvania case.  No. 13-50532 (March 5, 2014, unpublished).  Plaintiff Duoline sought to depose Joseph Schwalbach, a former employee, about the business dealings between his new company and Defendant Polymer.  Among other rulings, the district court limited the document requests and deposition scope to events during Schwalbach’s employment by Duroline.  The Fifth Circuit noted that some evidence supported the plaintiff’s theory of a connection between the businesses, and that logically, plaintiff’s theory relied upon events after Schwalbach left his job at Duoline.  The Court did not find an explanatory affidavit from Schwalbach to be dispositive.

Waltner v. Aurora Loan Services LLC welcomes the New Year with three bread-and-butter issues in business litigation.  No. 12-50929 (Dec. 31, 2013, unpublished).  First, a party’s failure to answer on time does not require the “drastic remedy” of a default judgment, especially when a plaintiff shows no prejudice from the failure to timely answer.  The granting of a default judgment is a discretionary ruling by the district court.  Second, damages for lost use of property are not reliance damages that can be recovered with a promissory estoppel claim.  Rather, they are consequential losses — a form of expectation damages.  Finally, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2) says that a court “must strike” unsigned discovery responses “unless a signature is promptly supplied” after the error is identified, the district court has discretion in determining what is “prompt” and in what weight to give the lack of prejudice to the opposing party.

Twenty-four plaintiffs sued Citgo for alleged violations of the overtime pay laws.  The court’s second discovery order warned against destruction of personal emails by the plaintiff.  Then, after two evidentiary hearings, the court dismissed the claims of seventeen plaintiffs for violating that order (but not of an eighteenth), entering specific factual findings for each plaintiff.  Four more were then dismissed after another hearing and sets of findings.  Moore v. Citgo Refining & Chemicals Co., Nos. 12-41175 and 12-41292 (Nov. 12, 2013, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion, noting the clarity of the discovery order, the hearing of live testimony, and prejudice to Citgo (loss of the ability to show that the plaintiffs were sending personal emails “on the clock,” which had proven relevant in one of the cases that was not dismissed).  The Court also reversed and rendered for $50,000 in costs, finding that the district court’s reduction of taxable costs to $5,000 because of Citgo’s size and resources was not grounded in the applicable rule.

In Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State University, the defendant sought interlocutory review of an order requiring it to appear for a deposition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).  No. 12-41393.  The Fifth Circuit found the appeal moot because the depositions had already taken place.  The defendant argued that the appeal was not moot because the depositions may be used at an upcoming trial.  The Court responded: “This court does not have jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions regarding decisions of the district court that have not been made at a trial that has not been held.”

The defendant in Bowles v. Ranger Land Systems did not have a bank account, registered agent, or office in Texas.  No. 12-51255 (June 16, 2013, unpublished).  As a defense contractor, the company had a handful of employees at three Army bases in Texas, but that presence was not substantial enough to create general jurisdiction.  (citing Johnston v. Multidata Systems Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 612-13 (5th Cir. 2008) (presence of two employees, who reported to out-of-state supervisor, was “certainly a regular contact with Texas” but was “not substantial enough to create a general business presence in Texas”)).  The Fifth Circuit also found no abuse of discretion in denying further jurisdictional discovery based on these allegations.

The plaintiffs in AFLAC v. Biles sued in state court, alleging that AFLAC paid death benefits to the wrong person, and that the signature on the policy application was forged.  No. 12-60235 (April 30, 2013).  AFLAC moved to compel arbitration in the state court case and simultaneously filed a new federal action to compel arbitration. The state court judge denied AFLAC’s motion without prejudice to refiling after discovery on the issue of the signatures’ validity.  In the meantime, the federal court granted AFLAC’s summary judgment motion and compelled arbitration after hearing expert testimony from both sides on the forgery issue.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Colorado River abstention in favor of the state case was not required, and that the order compelling arbitration was allowed by the Anti-Injunction Act because it was “necessary to protect or effectuate [the federal] order compelling arbitration.”  The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the respondents’ FRCP 56(e) motion, since it sought testimony that would only be relevant if the witness admitted outright to forgery.

The parties in Silver Dream LLC v. 3MC Inc. settled a copyright dispute about jewelry sales “by agreeing, among other things, that the [individual defendants] would provide affidavits disclosing details of the infringing items.”  No. 11-30968 (March 18, 2013, unpublished).  The defendants warranted the affidavits would be “true, complete, and exact” but the agreement allowed termination only if the affidavits were discovered to be false within a year.  The plaintiff took issue with the “qualified nature” of the affidavits as a reason to terminate the settlement, but the district court and Fifth Circuit stressed that the cancellation right was limited to a “false” statement. The plaintiff’s proof of alleged affirmative falsehoods in the affidavits was found to lack specificity.  The Fifth Circuit also found no abuse of discretion in denying a motion for continuance to depose the individual defendants, noting delay in the request and a lack of specificity about what the plaintiff planned to establish.

The judgment debtors in Seven Arts Pictures v. Jonesfilm were found in civil contempt for failure to answer postjudgment discovery and other issues about enforcement of a judgment.  No. 11-31124 (Feb. 18, 2013, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had general personal jurisdiction over the debtors, that the debtors had waived arguments about the orders by not timely and properly objecting below, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $21 thousand in attorneys fees.  While the holdings on jurisdiction, waiver, and attorneys fees draw heavily from the specific facts of the case, the legal framework used is of broad applicability.  Footnote 7 acknowledges the unusual procedural posture of the jurisdiction issue, which had not been raised until after the notice of appeal was filed.

In long-running litigation and arbitration about alleged environmental contamination in Ecuador, Chevron obtained discovery from U.S. courts several times under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 on the basis that a “foreign or international tribunal” was involved.  Republic of Ecuador v. Connor, No. 12-20122 (Feb. 13, 2013).  Chevron then successfully resisted a § 1782 application on the ground that the arbitration was not an “international tribunal.”   The Fifth Circuit applied judicial estoppel and reversed, asking: “Why shouldn’t sauce for Chevron’s goose be sauce for the Ecuador gander as well?  The Court dismissed a jurisdictional issue by characterizing § 1782 as a grant of administrative authority.  It then rejected Chevron’s arguments that judicial estoppel could not apply to legal issues and that reliance by earlier courts on Chevron’s position had not been shown.  The opinion reminds that: “Because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, courts may apply it flexibly to achieve substantial justice.”  (quoting Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc), and citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 752 (2001)).  (The “goose-and-gander” saying traces to an early collection of English proverbs.)

The appellant in All Plaintiffs v. Transocean Offshore (the MDL relating to Deepwater Horizon) challenged an order requiring him to submit to a psychiatric exam and supply medical records as part of the procedure.  No. 12-30237 (Jan. 3, 2013, unpublished).  Following Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), the Fifth Circuit held that the collateral order doctrine did not allow appeal of this interlocutory discovery order.  Any erroneous effect on the merits of the case could be reviewed on appeal of final judgment, and even if that review was “imperfect[]” to remedy the intrusion on his privacy interest, the harm was not so great as to justify interlocutory review of the entire class of similar orders.  A concurrence noted that while mandamus review was theoretically possible, this party had not requested it as an alternative to direct appeal, and had not made a sufficiently specific showing of harm to obtain mandamus relief.

Denied enforcement of a $26 million arbitration award in China’s Fujian Province (that court finding the award invalid because an arbitrator was imprisoned during the proceedings), the plaintiff sought recognition in the Eastern District of Louisiana.  First Investment Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding,  No. 12-30377 (Dec. 21, 2012, revised Jan. 17, 2013). The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction with three holdings: (1) the recent case of Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011), removed doubt as to whether foreign corporations could invoke due process protection about jurisdiction; (2) the New York Convention did not abrogate those rights; and (3) no “alter ego” relationship among the relevant companies was shown that could give rise to jurisdiction.  In a companion case, the Court affirmed a ruling that denied jurisdictional discovery based on “sparse allegations” of alter ego.    Covington Marine v. Xiamen Shipbuilding, No. 12-30383 (Dec. 21, 2012); cf.Blake Box v. Dallas Mexican Consulate, No. 11-10126 (Aug. 21, 2012) (reversing jurisdictional discovery ruling).

Texas Keystone v. Prime Natural Resources began as an application for U.S. discovery in support of an English court case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782.  After review of that statute and its relationship with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 once discovery is ordered, the Court found an abuse of discretion when the trial court granted the respondents’ Motion to Quash without a response from the party requesting discovery.  Id. at 10-13 (citing Sandsend Financial Consultants v. FLHBB, 878 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1989) and Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 392 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 2004)).  The Court’s analysis of section 1782, intended to guide the district court on remand, also provides general background for future discovery requests in the Circuit under that statute.