At issue in Asarco v. Baker Botts. L.L.P. was a fee enhancement associated with an exceptional recovery in fraudulent transfer litigation for a bankruptcy estate. No. 12-40997 (April 30, 2014). The Fifth Circuit credited the bankruptcy court’s detailed findings about the quality of the law firms’ work and the “rare and extraordinary” result. In so doing, the Court reminded that “[b]ecause this court, like the Supreme Court, has not held that reasonable attorneys’ fees in federal court have been ‘nationalized,’ the bankruptcy court’s charts comparing general hourly rates of out-of-state firms and rates charged in cases pending in other circuits are not relevant.” The Court rejected the firms’ request for compensation from the estate for defending their fee applications, reasoning that the Code had sufficient protections against vexatious litigation, and declining to further expand the American Rule about defendants’ fees.
1. The Fifth Circuit vacated its panel opinion in Sawyer v. duPont to certify two questions to the Texas Supreme Court — paraphrased slightly, they were (1) whether an at-will employee can sue for fraud for loss of employment, and (2) whether a 60-day “cancellation-upon-notice” collective bargaining agreement would change a “no” answer to (1). The Texas Supreme Court has now answered those questions: “no” as to the basic question about a fraud claim arising from at-will employment, and “in the situation presented, no” to the second question about the effect of the CBA. “The Employees argue that it would contravene public policy to allow an employer to benefit from its duplicity, but public policy is not better served by allowing contracting parties to circumvent their agreement.” No. 12-0626 (Tex. April 25, 2014). (The Fifth Circuit formally adopted that reasoning and affirmed on June 11, 2014).
2. Similarly, the Court vacated its panel opinion in Ewing Construction v. Amerisure Insurance Corp. to certify the question whether a CGL policy’s “Contractual Liability Exclusion” would reach a contract in which a contractor commits to work in a “good and workmanlike manner.” The Texas Supreme Court answered “no”: “[A] general contractor who agrees to perform its construction work in a good and workmanlike manner, without more, does not enlarge its duty to exercise ordinary care in fulfilling its contract, thus it does not ‘assume liability’ for damages arising out its defective work so as to trigger the Contractual Liability Exclusion.” No. 12-0661 (Tex. Jan. 17, 2014). The opinion has been called a “significant reassurance” to policyholders in the construction business.
In the recent case of French v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 13-50417 (April 29, 2014, unpublished), these allegations were deemed to “reference[] the FDCPA by way of asserting a cause of action under this federal statute,” and thus allowing removal:
“V. ILLEGAL MORTGAGE SERVICING AND DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES.
. . .
Specifically in collection calls and notices, monthly statements, payoff statements, foreclosure notices, and otherwise, EMC routinely makes misrepresentations to borrowers about their loans, including: [6 topics]
. . .
Plaintiffs submit that Defendant EMC’s conduct in this matter is in direct violation of the Texas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the above referenced stipulated injunction.”
This case rested on Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2001), in which the following allegations did not create federal question jurisdiction, because “[f]rom its context, it appears that Howery’s mention of federal law merely served to describe types of conduct that violated the DTPA, not to allege a separate cause of action under the FCRA”:
The acts, omissions, and other wrongful conduct of Allstate complained of in this petition constituted unconscionable conduct or unconscionable course of conduct, and false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices. As such, Allstate violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Sections 17.46, et seq., and the Texas Insurance Code, including articles 21.21, 21.21-1, 21.55, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, specifically including 28 TAC Section 21.3, et seq. and 21.203.
…
Allstate’s destruction of [Howery’s] file … constituted a further violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, for which plaintiff sues for recovery. Allstate also engaged in conduct in violation of the Federal Trade Commission rules, regulations, and statutes by obtaining Plaintiff’s credit report in a prohibited manner, a further violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act….
While these holdings are consistent, the line between them is only a few words in a lengthy pleading. They underscore the importance of detail in considering whether removal is appropriate.
The dispute presented by the petition for a writ of mandamus in In re Times-Picayune, LLC was a criminal defendant’s ability to have identifying information about online commentators on the defendant’s case produced for in camera review; the defendant contending that the commentators were federal prosecutors. No. 14-30298 (April 8, 2014, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, reasoning: “Here, we are not persuaded that the district court’s (1) balancing of the speech rights of anonymous commenters against the due process interests of [defendant] and (2) ordering the Times-Picayune to turn over information for in camera review was clearly and indisputably erroneous. As an initial matter, there is little case law illuminating how the competing interests in situations comparable to this one should be balanced. . . . Even in the absence of precedent, however, we cannot say that the district court here clearly reached the wrong decision.” [The short opinion is worth comparing to the concurrence in All Plaintiffs v. Transocean Offshore from 2013, about the availability of mandamus relief for discovery matters.] And subsequently, the district court concluded that the commentator at issue was not a prosecutor.
The plaintiffs in Singha v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP alleged a number of foreclosure-related claims, most of which were resolved by recent Fifth Circuit precedent. Among them was a claim for unfair debt collection based on the common situation of failed negotiations about a loan modification. As to that issue, the Court observed: “We do not announce a rule that modification discussions may never be debt collection activities. We do conclude, though, that the [Plaintiffs’] particular factual allegations here – allegations of what occurred during the course of what they describe as more than fifty phone calls and other contacts during a protracted loan modification process – are not communications in connection with collection of a debt.” (emphasis in original). No. 13-40061 (April 17, 2014, unpublished).
The plaintiff in Jonibach Management Trust v. Wartburg Enterprises sued the defendant for breach of an oral contract; specifically, an agreement to exclusively market the plaintiff’s products in the US. No. 13-20308 (April 24, 2014). The defendant made three counterclaims, two of which were dismissed because they relied on an additional oral modification to the contract and could not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The third survived before the Fifth Circuit, however, as it was essentially the mirror image of the plaintiff’s claim — contending that the plaintiff wrongfully supplied goods to other distributors. Among other reasons for that conclusion, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s “pleadings and testimony regarding the initial contract . . . constitute judicial admissions,” and reviewed the elements of such an admission.
In Aviles v. Russell Stover Candies, the Fifth Circuit again engaged the issue of whether the unilateral power to change an arbitration clause makes it illusory and unenforceable. No. 12-11227 (April 4, 2014, unpublished). This time, however, the Court observed that the agreement subjected to arbitration “any and all claims challenging the validity or enforceability of the [Waiver and Arbitration] Agreement.” Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of her case in favor of arbitration, but vacated the magistrate judge’s resolution of the enforceability issue because it “should have declined to decide either of those two issues.”
The plaintiff in Sanders v. Flanders alleged legal malpractice arising from the handling of patent applications. The Fifth Circuit did not engage the question whether he had shown lost profits with reasonable certainty, noting: “[C]ounsel admitted during oral argument that [Plaintiff] did not make any offer of proof concerning the lost-profit evidence that he would have otherwise presented but for the district court’s hearsay ruling.” No. 13-50235 (April 22, 2014, unpublished).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court “must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, attachments thereto,” and “may also consider documents attached to either a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims.” Brand Coupon Network LLC v. Catalina Marketing Corp., No. 13-30756 (April 8, 2014). Here, without converting the Rule 12 motion into a summary judgment motion, the district court considered an affidavit “signed . . . a day before [plaintiff] filed its opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and weeks after the filing of the petition.” Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed a dismissal under Rule 12 on limitations grounds.
Compare Sigaran v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 13–20367 (April 30, 2014, unpublished): “The district court, however, did not rely on those documents in making its ruling. The additional documents were relevant to the merits of the Sigarans’ claims under the Texas Constitution, but the district court did not reach the merits of those claims and instead dismissed them as barred under the statute of limitations. The mere presence of those documents in the record, absent any indication that the district court relied on them, does not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
At issue in Hess Management Firm, LLC v. Bankston were the damages arising from the termination of a contract about the operation of a gravel pit (sadly, not a magical gravel pit of rule-against-perpetuities lore). No. 12-31016 (April 18, 2014). The dispute was whether damages were capped at 180 days — the contract term for adequate notice of closure — or whether the closure of the pit was post-breach activity that is not relevant to damage calculation. The Fifth Circuit sided with the bankruptcy court and reversed the district court’s enlargement of the damages, concluding: “A contrary result would defeat the maxim of placing a non-breaching party in the same position they would have been had breach not occurred, and award [plaintiff] more than their expectation interest.”
1. Defendants’ Rule 59 motion was filed a day late, “therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.”
2. Post-verdict, the defendant did not renew, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), an earlier Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) motion that challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the plaintiff’s mental anguish claims. The Court “decline[d] to review” the issue, noting that the Fifth Circuit’s cases “are not entirely uniform” as to whether this oversight was a waiver or allows review under a plain error standard.
3. The Court found no plain error from the plaintiff’s closing argument, including the lawyer’s “odd tactic of handing his business card to the jury during argument, especially in light of the court’s curative instructions and [defendant’s] failure to move for a mistrial.” McLendon v. Big Lots Stores No. 13-20338 (April 14, 2014, unpublished).
Class actions were filed about the effects of an explosion at a chemical plant. The Fifth Circuit agreed that CAFA jurisdiction had not been established. Citing Berniard v. Dow Chem. Co., 481 F. App’x 859 (5th Cir. 2010), the Court held: “[D]efendants ‘overstate the reach of the plaintiffs’ petitions by improperly equating the geographic areas in which potential plaintiffs might reside with the population of the plaintiff class itself. Further, the comparisons that the Defendants-Appellants make to damage recovery in similar cases is too attenuated to satisfy their burden.'” Perritt v. Westlake Vinyls Company, L.P., No. 14-30145 (April 14, 2014, unpublished). The Court also noted: “Bald exposure extrapolations are insufficient to establish the likely number of persons affected by the release or, for those affected, the severity of their harm.”
The parties’ letter agreement incorporated “AIA Document B51” with respect to “the services provided . . . under this Agreement.” That document states that all claims shall be adopted under the AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. Those Rules state that “the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction.” The Fifth Circuit found the agreement’s incorporation of the other documents to be effective, and accordingly the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine arbitrability — including, whether the parties’ dispute involved “services.” RW Development, LLC v. Cunningham Group Architecture, P.A., 13-60010 (April 11, 2014, unpublished).
Congress amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act to have a limitations period of “2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability.” The plaintiff in Mack v. Equable Ascent Financial, LLC argued that this amendment meant that “he could not have ‘discovered’ the violation until he had researched the statute.” No. 13-40128 (April 11, 2014). The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that the amendment was made to equalize the treatment of different types of claims, and that the plaintiff’s reading “would indefinitely extend the limitations period.”
Several operators of drug stores sued pharmacy chains for misappropriating confidential information. The defendants successfully compelled arbitration and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Crawford Professional Drugs v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.
2014). Specifically (applying Arizona law), the Court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently invoked the terms of a contract that contained an arbitration agreement, allowing arbitration to be compelled against nonsignatories on an equitable estoppel theory. The Court went on to reject the plaintiffs’ argument that the contract, and its arbitration clause, were procedurally unconscionable contracts of adhesion. It also found insufficient evidence to support their argument that the clause imposed substantively unconscionable litigation costs. (The Court recently revisited this topic in Muecke Co. v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 14-41213 (Aug. 25, 2015)).
The unfortunate plaintiff in Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores LLC argued that her state court petition referenced a $23,500 medical bill, which was in fact only $235. No. 12-41411 (April 9, 2014, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of her motion to remand, reminding: “If at the time of removal it is facially apparent from the state-court petition that he amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, a plaintiff’s subsequent request to amend her petition to ‘clarify’ the amount in controversy cannot divest jurisdiction.” The Court also observed: “In addition, prior to removal, Wal-Mart proposed to Robinson that she stipulate to no more than $75,000 in damages in exchange for not removing the case to federal court,” and that the plaintiff had declined to make that stipulation.
In Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s RESPA claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and remanded them to state court. No. 12-20806 (April 9, 2014). Appellees argued that “because this judgment remanded the remaining state claims to the state court without addressing their respective merits, it is not a final disposition of all claims in the case, and therefore not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that “as a practical matter, remands end federal litigation and leave the district court with nothing else to do.” (applying Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996)).
Payne sued Progressive Financial for violations of fair debt collection statutes, seeking statutory damages, actual damages, attorneys fees, and costs. Payne v. Progressive Financial Services, No. 13-10381 (April 7, 2014). Progressive made a Rule 68 offer of $1,001 in damages and fees to the date of the offer, to which Payne did not respond. The district court reasoned that Payne had not pleaded a basis to recover actual damages, and that the unaccepted offer mooted her claim for statutory damages because it exceeded the amount she could recover. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court’s analysis of the actual damages claim conflated jurisdiction with resolution of the merits; accordingly, Progressive’s offer was incomplete because it did not address actual damages. A footnote reminds that a complete Rule 68 offer can moot a case, and that the Court did not reach the argument that the offer was incomplete because it did not include post-offer fees and costs.
The stark facts of Bierwith v. Countrywide Bank, FSB are: “[A[ppellant’s] notice of appeal was filed on August 16, 2013, thirty-one days after the district court’s entry of final judgment on July 16, 2013. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 provides that a notice of appeal ‘must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.’ As the Supreme Court has made clear, a party’s failure to take an appeal within the prescribed time precludes our jurisdiction. Accordingly, [Appellants’] appeal is DISMISSED.” No. 13-50755 (April 3, 2014, unpublished) (footnotes omitted).
The State of Louisiana sued several insurers, alleging it was the beneficiary of assignments made by the insured in return for help rebuilding after Hurricane Katrina. The insurers removed to federal court under CAFA. After extensive proceedings, the district courts ultimately severed the actions by individual policy and ordered remand to state court. State of Louisiana v. American National Property & Casualty Co., No. 14-30071 (March 26, 2014). The Fifth Circuit reversed because “at the time of removal, these claims clearly possessed original federal jurisdiction as an integrated part of the CAFA class action.” Noting language in Honeywell International v. Phillips Petroleum that “a severed action must have an independent jurisdictional basis,” 415 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2005), the Court limited that language as “appl[ying] only to severed claims that are based on supplemental jurisdiction.”
- How close does Twombly come to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)? Consider Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Coxwell, affirming the dismissal of a pleading: “The complaint did not specify what court issued the order, when it was issued, or to whom it was directed; [and] the complaint did not describe what the order required . . . .” No. 13-60368 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2014, unpublished).
- Credibility questions create fact issues. See Vaughan v. Carlock Nissan of Tupelo, No. 12-60568 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 2014, unpublished) (reversing a summary judgment about a manager’s “bad faith,” noting credibility questions about his claimed justifications for a firing, ambiguity in other statements, and the timing of the termination).
- Forum non conveniens factors – the “availability of witnesses” factor is reviewed by Royal Ten Cate USA, Inc. v. TT Investors, Ltd. No. 13-50106 (5th Cir. March 25, 2014, unpublished), and Indusoft, Inc. v. Taccolini, No. 13-50042 (March 19, 2014, unpublished).
- Conflicting documents about arbitration are harmonized in Lizalde v. Vista Quality Markets, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. March 25, 2014) (enforcing an arbitration agreement despite a benefit plan with a broad termination right, noting that both agreements’ termination provisions “clearly demarcate their respective applications”).
- Settlement efforts as prerequisite for arbitration. This language — “the parties agree to negotiate in good faith toward resolution of the issues, and to escalate the dispute to senior management personnel in the event that the dispute cannot be resolved at the operational level” — does not create a requirement of negotiation by senior management before arbitration is invoked. 21st Century Financial Services v. Manchester Financial, ___ F.3d ____ (5th Cir. March 31, 2014).
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This language — “the parties agree to negotiate in good faith toward resolution of the issues, and to escalate the dispute to senior management personnel in the event that the dispute cannot be resolved at the operational level” — does not create (1) a requirement of negotiation by senior management before arbitration is invoked, or (2) a condition that any senior management negotiation fail before arbitratation is invoked. It simply requires negotiation at the operational level. 21st Century Financial Services v. Manchester Financial, No. 13-50389 (March 31, 2014).
The district court granted a dismissal in favor of New Zealand, on forum non conveniens grounds, in Royal Ten Cate USA, inc. v. TT Investors, Ltd. No. 13-50106 (March 25, 2014, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit remanded for further consideration of what it saw as a key private-interest factor — “whether two key witnesses who reside in Texas would be amenable to process in New Zealand.” The witnesses in question were former party employees living in Texas, and the parties disputed whether those individuals’ employment contracts obligated them to cooperate with litigation after their employment. Their importance was heightened because they were particularly significant to one side, while the other side did not appear to have comparable problems with its likely witnesses. The Court did not express an opinion about the proper result on remand, and noted that “[t]he decision regarding whether or not to take additional evidence is one that we leave to the sound discretion of the district court.”
A law firm appealed the disposition of its fee application. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court in part, vacated in part, and remanded for the firm to make another fee request that provided more necessary information. Okin Adams & Kilmer v. Hill, No. 13-20035 (March 24, 2014). The firm appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which concluded it had no appellate jurisdiction because the order was not final: “Given that the bankruptcy court must perform additional fact-finding and exercise discretion when determining an appropriate attorney’s fee award, the district court’s order requires the bankruptcy court to perform judicial functions upon remand.” A detailed dissent concluded that, while the district court’s order required “more than a mechanical entry of judgment,” “it also involves only mechanical and computational tasks that are ‘unlikely to affect the issue that the disappointed party wants to raise on appeal.'” Accordingly, it warned that “refusing to hear this appeal undermines the long-recognized, salutary purpose of allowing appeals in discrete issues well before a final order in bankruptcy.”
In Lizalde v. Vista Quality Markets, the Fifth Circuit revisited the recurring issue of whether an arbitration agreement becomes illusory because of an employer’s right to amend the terms of employment. No. 13-50015 (March 25, 2014).The parties’ Arbitration Agreement gave the employer the power to terminate that agreement after following several procedural prerequisites, which made that agreement non-illusory. In contrast, the parties’ Benefit Plan had a “completely unrestrained” termination power. And, the Arbitration Agreement acknowledged: “this Agreement is presented in connection with the Company’s [Benefit Plan]. Payments made under the [Benefit Plan] also constitute consideration for this Agreement.” The district court found the arbitration agreement illusory, based on that connection. The Fifth Circuit reversed, nothing that both agreements’ termination provisions were limited to “this Agreement” and “this Plan” respectively and thus “clearly demarcate their respective applications.”
The plaintiffs in Moran v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC ran afoul of the holding in Priester v. JP Morgan Chase, 708 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2013), that “liens that are contrary to the requirements of § 50(a) [of the Texas Constitution] are voidable rather than void from the start.” No. 13-20242 (March 24, 2014, unpublished). They sought certification to the Texas Supreme Court to correct what they contended was an erroneous holding in Priester. The Fifth Circuit gave two valuable general reminders in this area. First: “It is a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en banc court.” Second, “While the Texas Constitution allows this court to certify questions to the Texas Supreme Court, certification is not a proper avenue to change our binding precedent.”
Indusoft sued in the Southern District of Texas alleging theft of intellectual property. Two defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens (under Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), not 1404(a)). The Court affirmed dismissal, finding no error in (1) presuming that Brazil was an adequate alternate forum, (2) concluding that certain electronic data was more likely to be preserved in Brazil, (3) discounting the importance of one witness for whom compulsory process would not be available in Brazil, and (4) analyzing the interplay between the Texas case and related litigation in Brazil. Indusoft, Inc. v. Taccolini, No. 13-50042 (March 19, 2014, unpublished). The Court reversed dismissal of the other defendants’ counterclaims, finding that it was erroneous to do so sua sponte (citing Lozano v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)).
After the Supreme Court’s reversal of the Fifth Circuit in Mississippi v. AU Optronics, which held that the case was not a “mass action” under CAFA, AU Optronics argued that federal courts still had jurisdiction over the matter as a “class action.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that it had addressed and rejected that argument in its prior panel opinion. Mississippi v. AU Optronics, No. 12-60704 (March 19, 2014, unpublished). Its treatment of the issue was not dicta because it was “an explication of the governing rules of law” that received the Court’s “full and careful consideration.” Because that analysis “was a proper holding, the law-of-the-case doctrine forbids its reconsideration.” Alternatively, the point was waived when AU Optronics did not appeal it to the Supreme Court. (While the distinction between holding and dicta is fundamental to the common law, much less appellate practice, a formal definition such as this is rare. A detailed analysis appears in Loud Rules, an article in the Pepperdine Law Review by this blog’s author and Professor Wendy Couture of the University of Idaho Law School.)
While a host of opinions have addressed basic problems with common plaintiffs’ theories in mortgage servicing cases, the recent case of Williams v. Wells Fargo is a useful guide to a wide range of them in a single opinion, including the statute of frauds and its exceptions, waiver, and basic TDCPA and RESPA violations. The Court also reminded that a good contract pleading should identify the specific ways in which a contract has been breached, and found waiver when the grounds were not sufficiently detailed until the appellate level.
Even by the standards of tax cases, BNSF Railway Co. v. United States is arcane, but the underlying statutory analysis is of broad general interest. No. 13-10014 (March 13, 2014). The first issue — the taxability of certain stock options — turned on whether a Treasury regulation about the meaning of the term “compensation” was entitled to Chevron deference. The Fifth Circuit held that it was — as to the first Chevron factor, the Court found the term ambiguous, noting (1) the lack of a similar statute using the term, (2) variation among dictionary definitions, and (3) ambiguity in business usage, such as there was, at the time the relevant statute was passed in the 1920s-40s. [Unintentional capitalist wit appears in footnote 63, which refers to the “Rand House Dictionary” rather than the “Random House Dictionary” in a citation about “capital or finance.”] The Court then found the regulation reasonable, noting its general consistency with the goals and structure of the statute and its legislative history. A second holding illustrates the application of the “specific-general canon” and “the rule against superfluities.”
A law firm argued that the Texas “anti-SLAPP” statute protected its efforts to solicit former patients of a dental clinic as clients. NCDR, LLC v. Mauze & Bagby PLLC, No. 12-41243 (March 11, 2014). (This statute has led to a great deal of litigation about communication-related disputes, often in areas that the Legislature may not have fully anticipated — this blog’s sister details such litigation in the Dallas Court of Appeals.) In a detailed analysis, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the district court’s ruling against the firm was appealable as a collateral order. The Court then sidestepped an issue as to whether the anti-SLAPP statute was procedural and thus inapplicable in federal court, finding it had not been adequately raised below. Finally, on the merits, the Court affirmed the ruling that the law firm’s activity fell within the “commercial speech” exception to the statute: “Ultimately, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that M&B’s ads and other client solicitation are exempted from the TCPA’s protection because M&B’s speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer.”
Taylor sued his employer in state court for violations of Texas law. Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Manufacturing Co., No. 13-10715 (March 10, 2014). Later, he amended his pleading to add federal claims. Defendant removed and moved to dismiss on limitations grounds. Under Texas law, Taylor’s new claims would not relate back because the original state law claims were barred by limitations when suit was filed. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), however, the claims would relate back because they “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out” in the original pleading. Noting that Rule 81(c) says the Federal Rules “apply to a civil action after it is removed,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that they did not “provide for retroactive application to the procedural aspects of a case that occurred in state court prior to removal to federal court.” Accordingly, it affirmed dismissal.
When a homestead is permanently exempted from a bankruptcy estate, are any proceeds from a subsequent sale of the homestead also permanently exempt? Viegelahn v. Frost found they were not. No. 12-50811 (March 5, 2014). Frost argued that In re Zibman, 268 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2001), was distinguishable because he sold his homestead after petitioning for bankruptcy, when the homestead was already exempted, while Zimban concerned homestead proceeds obtained before bankruptcy. The Fifth Circuit found that distinction immaterial, concluding that once a debtor sells his homestead the essential character of the homestead changes from “homestead” to “proceeds,” placing it under a more limited six month exemption. Accordingly, when a debtor does not reinvest the proceeds within that period, they are removed from the protection of Texas law and are no longer exempt from the estate.
In Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC, the Fifth Circuit found that the verdict and resulting judgment in a Jones Act case erroneously included compensation for mental anguish from seeing the death of another person. No. 12-31258 (March 10, 2014). The Court disposed of the case as follows: “[S]erious practical problems would be presented at trial if we were to save some elements of the damage award and retry only other elements of damage. ‘Where, as here, the jury’s findings on questions relating to liability were based on sufficient evidence and made in accordance with law, it is proper to order a new trial only as to damages.’ We therefore retain the jury’s liability finding but order a new trial on damages.” (quoting Hadra v. Herman Blum Consulting Engineers, 632 F.2d 1242, 1246 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Plaintiffs alleged that the members of MERS violated RICO by making fraudulent statements about the legal effect of mortgages nominally recorded in the name of MERS. Welborn v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 13-30103 (March 5, 2014, unpublished). The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that Plaintiffs impermissibly sought to enforce the Trust Indenture Act by way of a RICO action. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs had not pleaded a RICO injury to their “business or property.” The alleged injuries — “loss of recording fees and general damage to the integrity of public records” arose “not . . . from commercial activity, but rather from the provision of a public service — that is, a governmental function.”
BP’s continuing efforts to reduce the scope of its Deepwater Horizon settlement program again produced three separate opinions from a panel in In re Deepwater Horizon (several cause numbers, March 3, 2014). Judge Southwick found that the plan’s requirement of a “certification on the document that the claimant was injured by the Deepwater Horizon disaster” resolved any lingering jurisdictional issues. Judge Dennis concurred in a shorter opinion. Judge Clement dissented, arguing: “This agreement, as implemented, is using the powers of the federal courts to enforce obligations unrelated to actual cases or controversies.”
The Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment on a construction subcontractor’s promissory estoppel claim in MetroplexCore, LLC v. Parsons Transportation, No. 12-20466 (Feb. 28, 2014). The Court noted the specificity of the statements made to it by representatives of the general contractor, the parties’ relationship on an earlier phase of the project, and specific communications describing reliance. The Court relied heavily on the analysis of a similar claim in Fretz Construction Co. v. Southern National Bank of Houston, 626 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1981).
Duoline Technologies v. Polymer Instrumentation presents an unusual appellate review of a discovery order, arising from an ancillary proceeding to enforce a subpoena for a Pennsylvania case. No. 13-50532 (March 5, 2014, unpublished). Plaintiff Duoline sought to depose Joseph Schwalbach, a former employee, about the business dealings between his new company and Defendant Polymer. Among other rulings, the district court limited the document requests and deposition scope to events during Schwalbach’s employment by Duroline. The Fifth Circuit noted that some evidence supported the plaintiff’s theory of a connection between the businesses, and that logically, plaintiff’s theory relied upon events after Schwalbach left his job at Duoline. The Court did not find an explanatory affidavit from Schwalbach to be dispositive.
Several Louisiana parishes sought damages under a state statute for damages arising from the Deepwater Horizon incident. In re Deepwater Horizon, No. 12-30012 (Feb. 24, 2014). Condensing a much more nuanced opinion — the Fifth Circuit held that the claims were preempted by the Clean Water Act under International Paper v. Oulette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), because the pollution arose from a source outside Louisiana. The Court rejected arguments that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (prompted by the Valdez disaster) changed that analysis, and concluded that the Supreme Court ruled consistently with this result in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
Fat Tuesday is March 4; the Krewe of Zulu starts the day’s parades in New Orleans. Celebrate with some traditional red beans and rice.
Rowland Trucking’s insurance policy required that it maintain a fence around the entirety of its property. The fence had gaps on the south and west side. Thieves entered on the east side and stole $350,000 in videogame consoles. The Fifth Circuit affirmed judgment for the insured under the Texas Anti-Technicality Statute, which provides: “Unless the breach or violation contributed to cause the destruction of the property, a breach or violation by the insured of a warranty, condition, or provision of a fire insurance policy or contract of insurance on personal property, or of an application for the policy or contract: (1) does not render the policy or contract void; and (2) is not a defense to a suit for loss.” W.W. Rowland Trucking Co. v. Max America Insurance, No. 13-20341 (Feb. 24, 2014, unpublished). The Court sidestepped an argument that the statute did not reach liability policies, finding that the policy here was a property policy notwithstanding its occasional use of the word “liability.”
Plaintiff Jongh sued “State Farm Lloyds” and Johnson, a local insurance adjuster, relating to the handling of her property insurance claim for storm damage. Jongh v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 13-20174 (Feb. 20, 2014, unpublished). State Farm answered and removed, arguing that (1) Johnson was improperly joined to destroy diversity; (2) Jongh had improperly named Lloyds, a separate entity; and (3) State Farm and Jongh were diverse. The trial court ruled for the defendants after a 1-day bench trial. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiff — who appears to have raised subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal — that “State Farm never became a party in this action. Jongh did not name State Farm as a defendant in her original petition; although it asserted in its answer and notice of removal that Jongh incorrectly named Lloyds as a defendant, State Farm did not move to intervene or otherwise request that the district court substitute it as the proper party in interest.” The Court noted that Plaintiff, the “master of her complaint,” consistently asserted that her claim was against Lloyds and not State Farm. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded.
In Star-Tex Resources, LLC v. Granite State Ins. Co., the parties disputed whether an “auto exclusion” barred coverage in a personal injury case. 553 F. App’x 366 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth Circuit concluded that it was not possible to determine coverage form the plaintiff’s pleading: “The complaint contains only one, brief sentence describing the facts of the accident. Importantly, it contains no description of how Esquivel caused the collision.” Therefore, it was appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence (beyond the “eight corners” of the pleading and policy) that the insured was driving a car at the time of the accident, as it was relevant to coverage and by itself did not go to liability, citing Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523 (2004).
In Grimes v. BNSF Railway, the district court applied collateral estoppel to a Federal Railway Safety Act (“FRSA”) suit, based on a fact finding made by a type of arbitral panel called a Public Law Board (“PLB”) after an investigation and hearing by railroad personnel. No. 13-60382 (Feb. 17, 2014). The Fifth Circuit reversed, noting: (1) the hearing was conducted by the railroad; (2) the plaintiff was represented by the union rather than an attorney; (3) the termination decision was made by a railroad employee, not by “an impartial fact finder such as a judge or jury”; (4) the rules of evidence did not appear to have controlled in the arbitral proceedings; and (5) “most crucially,” the PLB’s affirmance was based solely on the record developed at the hearing administered by the railroad. The Court noted authority that rejects res judicata in this context, but also noted that “estoppel may apply in federal-court litigation to facts found in arbitral proceedings as long as the court considers the ‘federal interests warranting protection.’”
After recent opinions finding that credibility determinations led to fact issues in cases about whether a barge hit a bridge and a prison fight, the Fifth Circuit again so held in Vaughan v. Carlock Nissan of Tupelo, No. 12-60568 (Feb. 4, 2014, unpublished). Vaughan alleged that a car dealership unlawfully terminated her after she reported several irregularities there to Nissan. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the dealership as to Mississippi’s “illegal act” exception to at-will employment, but reversed as to her tortious interference claim against the supervisor who terminated her. That claim requires proof of bad faith, which Vaughan sought to establish by showing that she was not fired until making a complaint that specifically named the supervisor. The supervisor admitted that, at the time of termination, he knew Vaughan had complained to Nissan but said “he did not know the contents of the complaint.” The Fifth Circuit found that credibility issues about his claimed justifications for the firing, coupled with the ambiguity of his statement that Vaughn had “no right to report these things to Nissan,” and the timing of the termination, created a fact issue that made summary judgment unwarranted.
Villanueva worked for a Colombian affiliate of a publicly-traded entity subject to Sarbanes-Oxley. He alleged that he was terminated after reporting a scheme by his employer to understate revenue to Colombian tax authorities. Villanueva v. U.S. Department of Labor, No. 12-60122 (Feb. 12, 2014). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the DOL’s rejection of his claim for whistleblower protection under SOX, concluding: “Villanueva did not provide inforotmation regarding conduct that he reasonably believed violated one of the six provisions of U.S. law enumerated in § 806; rather, he provided information regarding conduct that he reasonably believed violated Colombian law.” (Footnote 1 notes that the Court did not reach the broader issue whether section 806 applies extraterritorially.) Law 360 has reported on the case and collected opinion from both sides of the employment bar.
The Fifth Circuit found that a subcontractor’s CGL carrier had no duty to defend a construction defect claim against the general contractor. Carl E. Woodward LLC v. Acceptance Indemnity Ins. Co., No. 12-60561 (Feb. 11, 2014). The pleading alleged that the general contractor, through its subcontractor, “built the foundation piers in non-conformity with plans and specifications.” An accompanying engineer’s report provided detail about related drainage problems. The Court concluded that the policy language meant that “claims for liability can be brought after ongoing operations are complete, but the underlying liability cannot be due to the ‘completed operations.'” A contrary holding, reasoned the Court, “effectively converts a CGL policy into a performance bond.” Here, “[e]ven accepting the district court’s factual finding that damage had occurred during ongoing operations, the only ‘damage’ supported by allegation is the construction that was not in conformity with plans and specifications,” and “[l]iability for such damages arising out of completed operations . . . .” Law360 has recently published an analysis of this opinion. An opinion denying rehearing elaborates on the role of the engineering report.
Babalola and Adetunmbi alerted authorities to Medicare fraud by the clinic they worked for. Federal authorities investigated and the clinics’ operators, the Sharmas, were indicted and pleaded guilty, accepting a criminal restitution obligation of over $40 million. United States ex rel Babalola v. Sharma, No. 13-20182 (Feb. 14, 2014). During the criminal proceedings, the whistleblowers filed a FCA suit against the Sharmas. The Sharmas asserted an interest in the restitution proceeds, arguing that it was an “alternate remedy” within the meaning of the FCA that would give them “the same rights in such proceeding as [they] would have had if the action had continued under this section.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that other Circuits’ authorities “implicitly recogniz[e] that a qui tam suit must be filed before there is an alternate remedy.” A dissent conceded that this reading of the FCA was correct, but called for Congressional intervention in situations like this where the plaintiffs “took the path of the Good Samaritan and without delay provided the government with the evidence needed to pursue the defrauders.”
The company’s Collective Bargaining Agreement said: “Discharge for a confirmed positive test under the substance abuse policy shall not be subject to grievance or arbitration. However, relative to such discharge the union continues to maintain the right to grieve and arbitrate issues around the integrity of the chain of custody.” The union began an arbitration to challenge an employee’s termination for failing a drug test. ConocoPhillips, Inc. v. Local 13-0555 United Steelworkers Int’l Union, No. 12-31225 (Jan. 30, 2014). The arbitrator concluded that he had jurisdiction over that claim. The company successfully opposed confirmation on the ground that he lacked power to decide jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no provision that “clearly and unmistakably” granted such authority.
The “ART entities” sued the “Clapper entities” for fraud about a real estate transaction, and they countersued for breach of fiduciary duty. A jury found against both sides. The Clapper entities appealed; the Fifth Circuit reversed on a legal issue and remanded for new proceedings on liability and damages. The ART entities then sought to raise the fraud claim again; the district court found it barred by the mandate rule, and on appeal from the second trial, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. ART Midwest Inc. v. Clapper, No. 11-11140 (Feb. 3, 2014). It reasoned: “We hold that the ART entities’ decision not to cross-appeal the jury’s fraud findings in the first district court proceeding prevented them from raising the same rejected fraud claims in the second district court proceeding. Even though they prevailed on many of their claims in the first district court proceeding, the consensus of circuit authority supports that the ART entities could have filed a ‘protective’ or ‘conditional’ cross-appeal of the adverse fraud finding.” The Court otherwise affirmed, reversing as to one issue relating to “double-counting” of damages in light of the parties’ correspondence.
