A REIT sued the City of College Station, alleging that its zoning decisions were unconstitutionally irrational and unfair.  The City’s CGL policy covered liability arising from “wrongful act[s]” of city officials, with an exclusion for liability arising from eminent domain or condemnation proceedings.  City of College Station v. Star Insurance, No. 12-20746 (Nov. 14, 2013).  The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer and the Fifth Circuit reversed: “As [the REIT’s] constitutional and tortious interference claims may produce liablity that does not ‘arise out of’ [its] inverse condemnation action, [the insurer] is liable for the City’s defense costs.”

Twenty-four plaintiffs sued Citgo for alleged violations of the overtime pay laws.  The court’s second discovery order warned against destruction of personal emails by the plaintiff.  Then, after two evidentiary hearings, the court dismissed the claims of seventeen plaintiffs for violating that order (but not of an eighteenth), entering specific factual findings for each plaintiff.  Four more were then dismissed after another hearing and sets of findings.  Moore v. Citgo Refining & Chemicals Co., Nos. 12-41175 and 12-41292 (Nov. 12, 2013, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion, noting the clarity of the discovery order, the hearing of live testimony, and prejudice to Citgo (loss of the ability to show that the plaintiffs were sending personal emails “on the clock,” which had proven relevant in one of the cases that was not dismissed).  The Court also reversed and rendered for $50,000 in costs, finding that the district court’s reduction of taxable costs to $5,000 because of Citgo’s size and resources was not grounded in the applicable rule.

A classic problem in restitution law involves how to disgorge profits that result in part from wrongful conduct (i.e., taking a client) and in part from lawful action (i.e., doing quality work for that stolen client).  In Gulf & Mississippi River Transp. Co. v. BP Oil Pipeline Co., the Fifth Circuit addressed the profits of a pumping station located on a disputed tract of land. No. 12-30741 (Sept. 18, 2013).   Under the distinctive terminology of Louisiana law, the landowner argued that the profits were the “civil fruit” of the tract, and the pump operator argued that they came solely from the operation of the pumping business.  The Fifth Circuit remanded for clarification of “whether [the district court] was referring to natural fruits, civil fruits, or both” in its analysis of this point.  The discussion of the civil law in this area is difficult to follow because of the unusual vocabulary, but it provides an interesting perspective on a recurring remedies issue.

Plaintiffs sued Blackburn for breach of contract with respect to three promissory notes and for fraud in a stock transaction.  Highground, Inc. v. Blackburn, No. 13-30248 (Sept. 25, 2013, unpublished).  Plaintiffs recovered on the notes but not the fraud claim, and the bankruptcy court awarded $25,000 as a “fair fee” for that result.  Plaintiffs appealed, seeking fees for the fraud claim as well, arguing that their litigation was “inextricably intertwined” with the note claims.  Applying Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006), the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court: “Appellants prevailed on the notes claim because Blackburn signed the notes without authority to do so, not because of the allegations of fraud relating to other aspects of the purchase agreement . . . .”  The case presents a clean example of claims against the same party that are nevertheless not “inextricably intertwined” for purposes of an attorneys fee award.  (For thorough review of this principle, and other key points about fee awards, please consult the book “How to Recover Attorneys Fees in Texas” by my colleagues Trey Cox and Jason Dennis.)

A zealous borrower filed successive lawsuits against U.S. Bank, its attorneys, and MERS arising from a foreclosure.  Maxwell v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,13-20113 (Oct. 30, 2013, unpublished).  While MERS was not a party to the first two cases, it asserted res judicata, based on their dismissal, arguing that it was in privity with the defendants.  The Fifth Circuit cited Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), which described how res judicata reaches “a variety of pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment,” including “preceeding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor” as well as other relationships described as “privity.”  Here, the mortgage documents identified MERS as “nominee for” U.S. Bank, which satisfied Taylor.

A subcontractor’s policy excluded “property damage” to “your work.”  An endorsement added the general contractor as an additional insured “only with respect to liability for . . . ‘property damage’ . . . caused, in whole or in part, by . . . [y]our acts or omissions.”  “The policy defined “you” and “your” with reference to the subcontractor and the endorsement did not purport to modify that definition.  State Farm Auto Ins. v. Harrison County, No. 13-60001 (Sept. 16, 2013, unpublished).  The insurer argued that the additional insured could only “stand[] in shoes no larger than those worn by the primary policyholder.”  The Fifth Circuit did not disagree, but found that this specific endorsement created ambiguity when read along with the original policy, and thus affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of coverage.

In an unpublished opinion that happened to come out the same day as the slightly-revised “robosigning” opinion of Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank, the Fifth Circuit briefly reviewed the requirements for a summary judgment affidavit in a note case.  RBC Real Estate Finance, Inc. v. Partners Land Development, Ltd., No. 12-20692 (Oct. 30, 2013, unpublished).  As to foundation, the affidavit purported to be based on personal knowledge, and said that “[a]s an account manager at RBC[, the witness] is responsible for monitoring and collecting the . . . Notes.” “Therefore, [he] is competent to testify on the amounts due . . . .”  As to sufficiency, the Court quoted Texas intermediate appellate case law: “A lender need not file detailed proof reflecting the calculations reflecting the balance due on a note; an affidavit by a bank employee which sets forth the total balance due on a note is sufficient to sustain an award of summary judgment.”

The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s False Claims Act case on October 31, 2012. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and motion to extend time on December 5, 2012 — 35 days later.  King v. University of Texas Health Science Center-Houston, No. 12-20795 (Nov. 4, 2013, unpublished).  Plaintiff argued that her attorneys (1) mistakenly believed there was a 60-day deadline, reasoning that the U.S. was the real party in interest, and (2) had busy trial dockets in November that kept them from noticing the error in time.  The district court granted the extension and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The Court applied Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 385 (1993) and Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 1998), and Court noted that while an attorney’s legal error or scheduling problems could constitute inexcusable neglect, here the defendant was not prejudiced and the rule at issue was ambiguous.  The Court also noted a distinction between review of a district court’s finding of excusable neglect and a finding that neglect was not excusable.

The Fifth Circuit has voted to rehear en banc the case of Department of Texas, VFW v. Texas Lottery Commission.  Texas allows charitable bingo if the sponsoring organization does not use the proceeds for political advocacy and several charities challenge that restriction on First Amendment grounds.  The case presents the challenging question whether this limitation violates the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.

CHS Inc. v. Plaquemines Holdings LLC presented the interaction of the Bankruptcy Code and an old section of the Louisiana Civil Code (involving cases from 1849, 1828, and 1913).  No. 13-30028 revised (Nov. 26, 2013).  The Louisiana Code provision provides: “When a litigious right is assigned, the debtor may extinguish his obligation by paying to the assignee the price the assignee paid for the assignment, with interest from the time of the assignment.”  As the Fifth Circuit noted: “The law is aimed at preventing unnecessary litigation by reducing the ability of third parties to buy and sell legal claims for profit.”   CHS, part owner of a tract of land along with a bankrupt company, attempted to redeem that company’s interest after it was sold as part of a dissolution case required by the bankruptcy.  The Court found that the sale, conducted pursuant to bankruptcy court orders, fell within a “judicial sale” exception to the Code provision that prevented CHS from using it here.  

On October 29, the Fifth Circuit released a revised opinion in Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank, N.A., 722 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2013), which rejected a borrower’s claims about alleged “robosigning” (and in the process, discussed the “show-me-the-note” argument under Texas law, for the sole purpose of adding a footnote to acknowledge Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 722 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2013), which expressly addressed and rejected that argument.

“What does Judge X think about my issue?”  If Judge X has served on the Fifth Circuit for some time, his or her votes in two cases can provide good insight: (1) the denial of en banc rehearing in Huss v. Gayden, 585 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 2009), a difficult Daubert case, and (2) the en banc opinion of In re Volkswagen,  545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008), which granted mandamus relief for the denial of a 1404 venue transfer motion from the Eastern District of Texas. A third case has now joined that list — the recent 7-8 vote to deny en banc rehearing for In re Radmax, 730 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2013).  The Radmax panel granted mandamus relief to compel an intra-district transfer under section 1404.  Judge Higginson, who dissented from the panel, also dissented from the en banc vote, pinpointing the issue as whether the ruling “propounds appellate mandamus power over district judges which the Supreme Court has said we do not have.”  The votes in Huss, Volkswagen, and Radmax signal much about a judge’s philosophy as to the power and role of a district judge.

Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov’t was a section 1983 case brought by former and current police officers against leaders of the Lafayette Police Department.  No. 13-30332 (Sept. 30, 2013).  “[T]he Officers communicated with the media concerning the case and maintained a website, www.realcopsvcraft.com (the “Website”), which contained: an image of the Lafayette Police Chief, a party in this suit; excerpts of critical statements made in the media concerning the Lafayette PD Defendants; certain voice recordings of conversations between the Officers and members of the Lafayette Police Department; and other accounts of the Lafayette PD Defendants’ alleged failings.” Acknowledging both the district court’s discretion to issue gag orders about such communications, and the powerful First Amendment protection against prior restraints, the Fifth Circuit found an abuse of discretion in ordering the shutdown of the entire website.  It remanded for consideration of a more narrowly-tailored order.

Employer sought to enforce two arbitration agreements in an employee handbook, which also gave Employer the right to unilaterally “supersede, modify, or eliminate existing policies.”  Scuderio v. Radio One of Texas II, LLC, No. 13-20114 (Oct. 24, 2013, unpublished).  Applying In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 2010), the Fifth Circuit noted a distinction between an arbitration clause that is in a separate instrument from a handbook with such a provision, and a clause that is part of the handbook.  Here, “because the arbitration provision is in the handbook that contains the language allowing the employer to unilaterally revise the handbook, the agreement to arbitrate is illusory and unenforceable.”  See also Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, 669 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding another arbitration provision illusory in an employment setting).

The plaintiff in Delahoussaye v. Performance Energy Services LLC suffered back injuries while working on a drilling platform when a handrail fell on him.  No. 12-31222 (Oct. 24, 2013).  The district awarded general damages of $200,000, noting that the plaintiff had exaggerated his complaints of pain and was able to return to work.  The award was reviewed for clear error.  The Fifth Circuit reviewed prior awards in comparable cases and concluded that $200,000 was excessive in light of the district court’s other fact findings. Reviewing precedent that established a “maximum recovery” guideline based on 133% of the highest previous recovery for a similar injury, the Court remitted the damages to $86,450 (133 percent of $65,000, the highest comparable recovery found by the Court).  The plaintiff could accept the remitted award or have a new trial on damages.

The machinery of justice needs fuel to function.  An eloquent letter by the Judicial Conference of the United States summarizes today’s serious situation about the funding of the federal courts.  Please speak out.

A builder obtained a 6-figure judgment against an architect, for cost overruns and lost profits, resulting from the architect’s negligence.  Garrison Realty LP v. Fouse Architecture & Interiors, PC, No. 12-40764 (Oct. 21, 2013, unpublished).  The jury awarded distinct sums for negligence and negligent misrepresentation.  The Fifth Circuit found that the causes of action were duplicative in this context and reversed as to the inclusion of the smaller award in the final judgment. The Court also held that the defendant had waived an argument for a partial offset as a result of a prior lawsuit, finding that offset had not been pleaded as a defense, and that the plaintiff was prejudiced because it could have changed its trial proof had the issue been raised earlier.  (On the pleading issue, the Court noted that the defendant had alleged offset, but only claimed it was a bar “in whole” rather than “in whole or in part.”)

The plaintiff in a personal injury case was found to be judicially estopped from asserting the claim because it was not properly disclosed in her personal bankruptcy, even though it arose post-petition.  Flugence v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co., No. 13-30073 (Oct. 4, 2013).  The trustee, however, could pursue the claim and its counsel could recover professional fees. Accordingly, the Court declined to declare that the trustee’s recovery was capped at the amount owing to creditors.  (applying Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).

In one of the many unpublished cases dismissing “split-the-note” cases after Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 722 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit addressed a foreclosure sale that had taken place while a TRO purported to stop it.  Hall v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, No. 12-41023 (Oct. 7, 2013, unpublished).  Because the TRO did not state why it was granted without notice, the Court concluded that it “did not meet the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 680,” making it “void under Texas law” and “a mere nullity.”  Accordingly, it could not support a wrongful foreclosure claim.

The plaintiff in Bradberry v. Jefferson County, Texas alleged that he was terminated from his job as a county corrections officer, in violation of federal law, because he was called to service in the Army Reserve during Hurricane Ike.  No. 12-41040 (Oct. 17, 2013).  A key issue was whether a county administrative proceeding about his termination had collateral estoppel effect on his later federal lawsuit.  The Fifth Circuit, noting that administrative proceedings can create collateral estoppel if state law would allow it, held that the questions were different and no estoppel arose: “We conclude that a finding that Bradberry was discharged due to a disagreement about military service is not the equivalent of a finding that the County was motivated by his military status to discharge him.” While analogical reasoning from this fact-specific holding may pose challenges, it still provides a clearly-stated example of when issues become “identical” for purposes of issue preclusion.

Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) failed; Chase took over its mortgage operations from the FDIC.  In the meantime, borrower Dixon (after receiving notice from Chase that it was replacing WaMu as mortgagee and servicer) obtained a default judgment in state court against WaMu for $2.8 million and a declaration that all liens were cancelled.  A year later, Chase foreclosed on the property and obtained title at a foreclosure sale.  Chase sued in federal court to quiet the cloud on title created by the recordation of the default judgment.  JP Morgan Chase Bank NA v. Dixon, No. 12-40590 (Oct. 7, 2013, unpublished).  The district court granted summary judgment to Chase.  Dixon argued that this ruling violated the Rooker/Feldman doctrine about federal review of state court judgments.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, noting that the federal ruling did not technically “nullify” the state court judgment, and that Chase was not a party to the state proceedings and thus Rooker/Feldman was not implicated.

Devon Enterprises was not re-approved as a charter bus operator for the Arlington schools after the 2010 bid process.  Devon Enterprises v. Arlington ISD, No. 13-10028 (Oct. 8, 2013, unpublished).  Devon argued that it was rejected solely because of its bankruptcy filing in violation of federal law; in response, the district cited safety issues and insurance problems.  An email by the superintendent said “[Alliance] was the company that [AISD] did not award a bid to for charter bus services because they are currently in bankruptcy.”  Calling this email “some, albeit weak, evidence” that the filing was the sole reason for the decision, the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for the school district.

Moore sued PPG Industries and several local parties for injuries at a chemical complex; the defendants removed, arguing fraudulent joinder.  After some jurisdictional discovery, Moore sought to add three more local parties, and the district court denied him leave to do so.  Moore v. Manns, No. 12-31265 (Oct. 8, 2013). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, first reminding; “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court”; accordingly, a district court should review such a proposed amendment “more closely than an ordinary amendment.”  Factors include the extent to which the amendment is solely for jurisdictional purposes, whether plaintiff was dilatory, and potential harm to plaintiff of not allowing the amendment.  Here, the Court agreed that the “general responsibilit[y]” for safety under which the new parties were sued did not trigger personal fault under Louisiana law, making the amendment tactical and impermissible.

Auto Parts Manufacturing Mississippi hired Noatex to build a manufacturing facility.  Noatex subcontracted with King Construction.  Noatex then questioned some bills sent by King. King responded with a “Lien and Stop Notice” that trapped roughly $260,000.  Noatex v. King Construction, Nos. 12-60385 & 12-60586 (Oct. 10, 2013).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Mississippi lien statute was unconstitutional, concluding: “The Stop Notice statute is profound in its lack of procedural safeguards.  It provides for no pre-deprivation notice or hearing of any kind . . . The statute even fails to require any affidavit or attestation setting out the facts of the dispute and the legal rationale for the attachment.”  The court rejected an argument that post-attachment penalties for a false filing could save the statute, as well as an argument based on the importance of the interest in “promotion of the health of the construction industry,” noting that no governmental official was involved in the attachment process.

In a straightforward analysis of “conflict preemption,” the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Federal Power Act (the enabling statute for FERC) “preempts property damage claims under state law where the claim alleges negligence for failing to act in a manner FERC expressly declined to mandate while operating a FERC-licensed project.”  Simmons v. Sabine River Authority, No. 12-30494 (Oct. 9, 2013).  Here, plaintiffs claimed damages from flooding after spillway gates along the Sabine River were opened in late 2009; the Court concluded that the claims “infringe on FERC’s operational control” because “FERC, not state tort law, must set the appropriate duty of care for dam operators.”

In Serna v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka, P.C., the plaintiff alleged that a debt collector had sued him in an impermissible venue under the FDCPA .  No. 12-20529 (Oct. 7, 2013). The defendants obtained summary judgment on limitations; the question was whether the offending act under the FDCPA — to “bring such action” — was filing of the suit or service. The Fifth Circuit found that the term “bring” is ambiguous in this context, which justifies consideration of the statute’s history and purpose.  It then concluded that “the FDCPA’s remedial nature compels the conclusion that a violation includes both filing and notice,” and reversed.  A dissent argued that the term was not ambiguous, since the term “brought” refers only to filing in another provision of the statute.

In Vinewood Capital LLC v. Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami Trust, “[t]he only evidence offered by Vinewood in support of the alleged oral contract between Vinewood and DMI for DMI to invest $100 million in real estate [was] Conrad’s deposition testimony and affidavit.”  No. 12-11103 (Oct. 8, 2013, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit reminded: “[A] party’s uncorroborated self-serving testimony cannot prevent summary judgment, particularly if the overwhelming documentary evidence supports the opposite scenario.” (citing Vais Arms, Inc. v. Vais, 383 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2004)).Therefore, “[a]s the district court concluded, Conrad’s self-serving testimony is belied by the parties’ contemporaneous written communications and written agreements and is therefore insufficient to create an issue of fact.”

The district court awarded attorneys fees for a lawsuit filed in breach of a release, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Dallas Gas Partners v. Prospect Energy Corp., No. 12-20496 (Oct. 7, 2013).  Among other arguments, appellants contended that even if they were bound by the release, they did not breach it because they were not named plaintiffs in the offending action.  Admitting that they funded the lawsuit, and directed the plaintiff entity to bring the suit, they argued that those actions did not violate the agreement not to “institute, maintain or prosecute any action . . . ”  The Court found that “maintain” meant financial support.

Attorneys filed fee applications in a bankruptcy and the debtor responded with tort counterclaims.  Frazin v. Haynes and Boone, No. 11-10403 (Oct. 1, 2013).  The bankruptcy court entered judgment for the attorneys.  The Fifth Circuit found a lack of jurisdiction over the DTPA counterclaim and remanded.  It reasoned that Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), had overruled prior circuit precedent saying that bankruptcy courts could enter final judgments in all “core” proceedings.  Applying Stern to these claims, the Court reasoned (1) the malpractice claim was intertwined with the fee application, (2) the fiduciary duty action was as well, as it sought fee forfeiture, but (3) “it was not necessary to decide the DTPA claim to rule on the Attorneys’ fee applications” (including whether the claim was an impermissible “fracturing” of a professional negligence claim under Texas law)  The court noted that the district court may have jurisdiction to enter final judgment on the claim.  A dissent would not remand “because no harm is done, at least in this case, and the district court will no doubt simply dismiss whatever has been remanded.”

John Doe, a 13-year-old member of the Choctaw Indian tribe, had an internship at a Dollar General store on the Mississippi Choctaw reservation.  He was sexually molested in the store and sued the company for damages in tribal court.  Dolgencorp Inc. v. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 12-060668 (Oct. 3, 2013).  After losing jurisdictional challenges in the tribal system, the company sued in federal court to enjoin the prosecution of the case.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal in favor of Choctaw jurisdiction. Reviewing the Supreme Court authority in the area, it concluded: “[T]he ability to regulate the working conditions (particularly as pertains to health and safety) of tribe members employed on reservation land is plainly central to the tribe’s power of self-government.” (discussing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).  A strongly-worded dissent criticized “[t]he majority’s alarming and unprecedented holding,” arguing that it “profoundly upsets the careful balance that the Supreme Court has struck” in the area. Over another dissent, the full Court denied en banc review in 2014.

The district court handling the Deepwater Horizon litigation rebuffed BP’s complaints that the agreed-upon claims processing formula was not working correctly.  Lake Eugenie Land & Development v. BP Exploration & Production, No. 13-30315 (Oct. 2, 2013).  A fractured opinion from the Fifth Circuit reversed in substantial part.  It required remand for further development of the record on how the agreement was intended to handle several accounting issues about claimed losses.  The Court then imposed a “tailored stay” on further payments to “allow[] the time necessary for deliberate reconsideration of these significant issues on remand.”  Judge Clement wrote the plurality, which Judge Southwick joined on the foregoing grounds.  Her opinion went on to note that, for standing reasons, a court lacked jurisdiction to administer a settlement “that included [class] members that had not sustained losses at all, or had sustained losses unrelated to the oil spill . . . .” Judge Dennis dissented as to the reasons for remand and disagreed with the standing analysis.

In Meyers v. Textron Inc., the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Rule 12 dismissal of a complaint on res judicata grounds.  No.13-10023 (Oct. 2, 2013, unpublished).  .Noting that res judicata is ordinarily an affirmative defense, the Court reminded: “When all relevant facts are shown by the court’s own records, of which the court takes notice, the defense [of res
judicata] may be upheld on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without requiring an answer.” On the merits, the Court found no dispute that the plaintiffs in two cases were in privity given the control one had over the other.

While nominally about a limited issue of workers compensation law,  Austin v. Kroger Texas LP analyzes basic issues of an “Erie guess,” Texas premises liability law, and the types of negligence claims available in Texas.  No. 12-10772 (Sept. 27, 2013).  Austin, a Kroger employee, slipped while cleaning an oily liquid with a mop.  Contrary to store policy, a product called “Spill Magic” was not available to him that day.   After a thorough discussion of the interplay between the common law of premises liability and the Texas workers compensation statutes (Kroger being a non-subscriber), the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for Kroger that was based on Austin’s subjective awareness of the spill.  “Section 406.033(a) of the Texas Labor Code takes the employee’s own negligence off of the table for a non-subscriber like Kroger . . . ”  The Court went on to find fact issues about Kroger’s negligence in not having Spill Magic available, and about Kroger’s knowledge of the spill.  The Court affirmed dismissal of the gross negligence claim, and in the remand, asked the district court to consider the specific type of negligence claim that Austin asserted under Texas law.

A borrower claimed that a mortgage servicer was unjustly enriched when it obtained an expensive “force-placed” insurance policy on the property.  Baxter v. PNC Bank, No. 12-51181 (Sept. 26, 2013, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit reminded that a remedy based on restitution or unjust enrichment is not ordinarily available when an express contract deals with the same subject matter.  Here, the deed not only allowed the purchase of force-placed insurance, but warned that the ” “cost of the [forced-placed] insurance might significantly exceed the cost of insurance that [Baxter] could have obtained.”

Plaintiffs sued for defamation, based on critical comments about their role in the Chinese drywall MDL that ended up on the “Above the Law” website.  Herman v. Cataphora, Inc., No.12-30966 (Sept. 17, 2013).  The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that Louisiana had no jurisdiction over the defendants because that state was not the “focal point” of the statements, citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) and Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2010).  It took issue, however, with the district court granting the motion to dismiss and then ordering a transfer.  It noted that a district court has authority to transfer (under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)) if it determines that it lacks personal jurisdiction, and therefore vacated the dismissal order and remanded with instructions to order transfer.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of several mortgage-related claims by a borrower against JP Morgan, based on the reasoning of the Court’s opinions in the area in 2013. Hudson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, No. 13-50407 (Sept. 23, 2013, unpublished).  After the district court ruled, the Bank of New York (who had been sued but not served) entered an appearance in the case, and asked the Fifth Circuit to dismiss the claims against it as well.  Finding that BONY was not a party at the time of the district court’s dismissal ruling, the Court dismissed that request for lack of jurisdiction.

Happy birthday today to 600camp.com.  The year had many great stories — courageous monks, generations of chickens, an itinerant ice-shaving machine and the travels of the M/V OCEAN SHANGHAI (presently on the high seas and out of range). Thanks to all readers and the author’s colleagues at Lynn Tillotson Pinker & Cox.  Please celebrate with some authentic shrimp remoulade from Galatoire’s in New Orleans.

The unpublished opinion of Wiley v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. affirms the Rule 12 dismissal of borrwers’ wrongful foreclosure claims, summarizing the 2013 cases from the Fifth Circuit about the “split-the-note” argument against the validity of a MERS assignment. No. 12-51039 (Sept. 16, 2013, unpublished).  The opinion reminds that while some borrowers’ claims have survived appellate scrutiny in 2013, a pleading that appears to rehash discredited arguments will not satisfy Twombly and Iqbal.  Other unpublished opinions to the same effect are Kramer v. Fannie Mae, No. 12-51171 (Sept. 19, 2013, unpublished), and Epstein v. U.S. Bank NA, No. 13-50047 (Sept. 25, 2013, unpublished).

The insured estimated loss from a hailstorm at a shopping center at close to $1 million; the insurer estimated $17,000.  TMM Investments v. Ohio Casualty Insurance, No. 12-40635 (Sept. 17, 2013).  The insurer invoked its contractual right for an appraisal, which came in around $50,000.  The insured sued, alleging that the appraisal improperly excluded damages to the HVAC system and that the panel exceeded its authority by considering causation issues.  Applying State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009), the Fifth Circuit agreed on the HVAC issue, but did not see that as a reason to invalidate the entire award, and reasoned that the appraisers were within their authority when they “merely distinguished damage caused by pre-existing conditions from damage caused by the storm . . . .”

Davis, a Louisiana prisoner, was attacked and injured by another inmate, Anderson.  Davis sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that several prison officials and guards were “deliberately indifferent” to a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his safety.  Davis v. LeBlanc, No. 12-30756 (Sept. 12, 2013, unpublished).  Similar cases are filed frequently, summary judgment for the defense is common, and affirmance is near-universal under the demanding legal standards for such claims.  Here, Davis offered a sworn declaration from another inmate who spoke to a guard defendant shortly before the attack, and was told by that guard that Anderson was going to “‘whip that [expletive] Davis in the cell next to him’ and ‘that [expletive] needs a good [expletive] whipping and it is worth the paperwork for him to get it.'”  Summary judgment for that guard was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.   Whatever happens to Davis’s claims, this opinion provides a clear — if graphic — example of how to create a fact issue, and reminds that the Fifth Circuit does in fact review the record in the many prisoner cases presented to it.

This blog’s author is happy to have won third place in this year’s Twitter Brief contest, sponsored by the State Bar of Texas Appellate Section.  The entry was:

“Plaintiff slipped on #macaronisalad.  Too bad for her but #equalinference.   #reverseandrender  #cityofkeller”

Two employees entered a series of unauthorized loan transactions on behalf of their employer and took the proceeds.  BJ Services v. Great American Insurance Co., No. 12-20527 (Sept. 6, 2013, unpublished).  The employer’s carrier denied coverage, arguing that the losses did not “directly” result from employee dishonesty, in part because the company never actually got the money.  The district court agreed but the Fifth Circuit reversed, noting that the employees had “apparent” authority to enter the transactions, even if they did not have “actual” authority, and thus created binding contracts on behalf of their employer that made the losses “direct” within the meaning of the policy.

As part of a complicated battle about arbitrability and arbitrator selection, a district court ruled: “Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed for resolution by arbitration.”  Later, the district court rejected a challenge to the arbitrator selection process.  Adam Technologies Int’l v. Sutherland Global Services, No. 12-10760 (Sept. 5, 2013).  The panel divided over how to apply Kokkonen v. Guardian Life, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), which held that a court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to hear a dispute about the enforcement of a settlement provision in a dismissed action.  The majority reasoned: “The judgment dismissing [plaintiff’s] initial lawsuit operated, in all practical effect, as the functional equivalent of an order compelling arbitration between these parties.  We conclude that ancillary jurisdiction existed to allow the district court later to evaluate whether the dismissal that allowed the dispute to be taken to arbitration was being thwarted.”  The dissent did not read the district court’s ruling as retaining jurisdiction.    

A case about Medicare reimbursement for a “mobile stander” wheelchair became moot on appeal when the state agency found it was not medically necessary.  The Fifth Circuit dismissed the case and also vacated the district court opinion and judgment, noting legal errors in the opinion and discrepancy between the opinion and judgment.  In light of all the circumstances, the Court concluded that vacatur was in “the public interest.”  Koenning v. Janek, 12-41187 (Aug. 20, 2013, unpublished).

The Fifth Circuit addressed several important business litigation topics in May-August of 2013:

1.       Borrowers survive.  Mortgage servicers still won many cases, including a published opinion rejecting claims of “robosigning.”   Three times, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed Rule 12 dismissal of borrowers’ pleadings.

2       Personal jurisdiction.  The Fifth Circuit applied for the first time  a 2011 Supreme Court opinion about the “stream of commerce,” finding jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer, but noting that the opinion may affect older Circuit cases suggesting that a general intent to sell in the US could create jurisdiction in a specific state.

3.       Extrinsic evidence.  The proper handling of extrinsic evidence is a recurring challenge in contract litigation.  A recent case reminds of the importance of evidence about course of performance, even for an unambiguous contrac

4.       Venue.  The Court granted mandamus to compel an intra-district transfer from East Texas’s Marshall Division to its Tyler Division.

5.       Jury deference.  In Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, LLP, the Court affirmed a $44 million jury verdict, reminding: “Had we sat in the jury box, we may have decided otherwise.”  Three other published opinions substantially affirm jury awards.

BONUS: Where is the M/V OCEAN SHANGHAI?  An admiralty appeal was recently found moot, in part because the “ship had sailed” from the Fifth Circuit.  Modern technology lets blog readers follow the SHANGHAI to non-Fifth Circuit locations around the globe.

Persons upset about posts on the Mississippi blog “slabbed.org” sued for defamation in Nova Scotia (some of the content related to a lodge owned there by a Mississippi resident).  After obtaining a default judgment, they sought to domesticate it in Mississippi; the defendant removed and resisted domestication under the SPEECH Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4102.  Trout Point Lodge v. Handshoe, No. 13-60002 (Sept. 5, 2013).  That law, enacted in 2010, intends to prevent “libel tourism” by plaintiffs who obtain judgments in jurisdictions with less protection of speech than the First Amendment. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet its burden under the Act to prove either (1) that Canadian law (which allocates the burden to prove falsity differently than American law) offers as much free speech protection as Mississippi, or (2) a Mississippi court reviewing the allegations of the pleading would have found liability for defamation.  The Court found some of the pleading’s allegations conclusory and that others involved language that “[t]hough offensive . . . are not actionable . . . .”

In a high-profile “data breach” case, the district court dismissed several banks’ claims against a credit card processor after hackers entered its system and stole confidential information.  Lone Star National Bank v. Heartland Payment Systems, No. 12-20648 (Sept. 3, 2013).  The banks did not have a contract with the processor.  They sought money damages for the cost of replacing compromised credit cards and reimbursing customers for wrongful charges.  Applying New Jersey law, the Fifth Circuit found that the economic loss rule did not bar a negligence claim on these facts at the Rule 12 stage.  These banks were an “identifiable class,” Heartland’s liability would not be “boundless” but run only to the banks, and the banks would otherwise have no remedy.  The Court also noted that it was not clear whether the risk could have been allocated by contract.  The Court declined to affirm dismissal on several other grounds such as choice-of-law and collateral estoppel, “as they are better addressed by the district court in the first instance.”

Plaintiff asserted personal jurisdiction under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), alleging that a receiver’s purported misconduct would forseeably damage investors in Texas. Bustos v. Lennon, No. 12-50765 (August 16, 2013, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the alleged misconduct was not intentionally aimed at Texas, and that jurisdiction did not comport with “fair play and substantial justice” given the status of related litigation in another state.

The plaintiffs in Young v. United States alleged that the Interior Department negligently prepared two studies which led to flooding along Interstate 12 in Louisiana, bringing federal litigation in 2008 when the last major flood was in 1983.  No. 13-30094 (August 21, 2013).  Plaintiff argued that the “continuing tort” doctrine saved the claim from limitations because the improperly-designed highway remained in place. The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting two controlling Louisiana Supreme Court cases.  The first, Hogg v. Chevron, involved leaking underground gasoline storage tanks and “rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the failure to contain or remediate the leakage constituted a continuing wrong, suspending the commencement of the running of prescription . . . [explaining] that ‘the breach of a duty to right an initial wrong simply cannot be a continuing wrong that suspends the running of prescription, as that is the purpose of every lawsuit and the obligation of every tortfeasor.'” 45 So.3d 991 (La. 2010).  Similarly, the second held: “[T]he actual digging of the canal was the operating cause of the injury[, and t]he continued presence of the canal and the consequent diversion of water from the ox-bow [were] simply the continuing ill effects arising from a single tortious act.”  Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 737 So.2d 720 (La. 1999).

On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its original opinion and substituted a certification request to the Texas Supreme Court in Ranger Insurance v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., No. 12-30230 (Aug. 29, 2013).  The request asks for guidance about Evanston Ins. Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochems., Inc., 256 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2008), and whether (1) it compels coverage for BP under the language of umbrella insurance policies if contractual “additional insured” and indemnity provisions are “separate and independent,” and (2) whether the contra proferentem doctrine would apply to the contract containing those provisions.  Thanks to Don Cruse’s SCOTX blog for picking this up, and that blog will be following the handling of the request in the state court.