In Tesla, Inc. v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers Assoc., the Fifth Circuit addressed Tesla’s challenges to Louisiana’s automobile dealership regulations, which prohibit manufacturers from selling directly to consumers and performing warranty services for cars they do not own.

• Due Process. The Court found that Tesla had plausibly alleged a due process violation. The Commission’s composition, with members who are direct competitors of Tesla, created a “possible personal interest” that could bias their decisions, which was sufficient for the Rule 12 stage.
• Antitrust. From there, the Court vacated and remanded the dismissal of Tesla’s antitrust claim, noting that the due process ruling fundamentally altered the grounds on which Tesla’s alleged antitrust injury was based. Tesla’s allegations of exclusion from the market due to the Commission’s actions could constitute a plausible antitrust injury.
• Equal Protection. The Court affirmed dismissal of Tesla’s equal protection claim, concluding that preventing vertical integration and potential abuses of market power were legitimate state interests justifying the regulations.

A dissent saw matters differently, focusing primarily on the due-process claim and its reliance on board structure. No. 23-30480, August 26, 2024.

The plaintiff in Newell-Davis v. Phillips challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana’s “Facility Need Review” for entrants into the respite-care business. The program requires Louisiana regulators to “determine if there is a need for an additional [respite care] provider in the geographic location” before a new business is authorized. The Fifth Circuit found that the program satisfied rational-basis review, noting:

The record supports the State’s assertions that FNR permits enhancement of consumer welfare by “allowing [LDH] to prioritize postlicensure compliance surveys that ensure client health, safety and welfare, over the resource intensive and costly initial licensing surveys.” For example, by limiting the number of providers in the respite care business, the State can focus its resources on a manageable number of providers, which aid it in ensuring that consumers receive the best possible care in their communities.

No. 22-30166 (Dec. 13, 2022).

The Fifth Circuit affirmed a default judgment against the Elephant Group when it “agree[d] with the district court that neither claimed defense suffices. The presentation of meritorious defenses requires ‘definite factual allegations, as opposed to mere legal conclusions.’ Legal conclusions were all that were presented.” Tango Marine v. Elephant Group, No. 21-10068 (Dec. 5, 2021) (citations omitted) (On rehearing in 2022, the Court withdrew this opinion.)

A long-running discovery dispute in Texas state court led to a contempt order, which in turn led to a federal-court habeas action. The Fifth Circuit noted that habeas relief was potentially available under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, under which:

… if an adequate state ‘corrective process’ for raising a claim exists that the petitioner could avail him or herself of, a federal court may only consider the claim if the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. And when the petitioner has done so and the state court has rejected the claim on the merits, federal courts may provide relief only when the state court adjudication was either ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’

(citations omitted). Among other observations, the Court held: “A rule that due process does not permit the use of civil contempt to compel the production of documents that are in the hands of third parties would also overturn longstanding precedents and would likely be unworkable in practice.” Topletz v. Skinner, No. 20-40136 (July 30, 2021).

Louisiana bar owners contended that a state COVID restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Fifth Circuit disagreed:

“Unlike AG-permitted bars whose primary purpose is to serve alcohol, AR-permitted businesses must serve more food than alcohol to meet their monthly revenue requirements. Even if the Bar Closure Order’s classifications are based solely on the premise that venues whose primary purpose and revenue are driven by alcohol sales rather than food sales are more likely to increase the spread of COVID-19, such a rationale, as described by Dr. Billioux and the Governor and credited by both district courts, is sufficiently ‘plausible’ and not ‘irrational.”’ … [T]he Bar Closure Order’s differential treatment of bars operating with AG permits is at least rationally related to reducing the spread of COVID-19 in higher-risk environments.”

Big Tyme Investments, LLC v. Edwards, No. 20-30526 (Jan. 13, 2021) (citations omitted). The panel majority and a concurrence disputed the exact import of archaic-sounding language from Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), but did not find it to materially impact the outcome under traditional Equal Protection principles.

In striking down a regulation of casket-making by a Louisiana monastery, the Fifth Circuit assured: “Nor is the ghost of Lochner lurking about.” St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F. 3d 215, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, that fearsome shade surfaced in Hines v. Quillivan, an equal-protection challenge to Texas’s regulation of telemedicine by veterinarians, only to be banished by the panel majority: “It is not irrational for a state to change in stages its licensing laws to adapt to our new, technology-based economy. If the Texas legislature finds the recently enacted changes on telemedicine successful, it may decide to expand those changes to include veterinarians. It is reasonable to have a trial period rather than to make a hasty policy change. Though we could conceive no rational basis for the law challenged in St. Joseph Abbey, we can conceive many rational bases here.”

A dissent saw matters differently, crediting the plaintiff’s argument that “[i]t simply is not rational to allow telemedicine without a physical examination for babies but deny the same form of  telemedicine for puppies on the ground that puppies cannot speak.” No. 19-40605 (revised Dec. 2, 2020).

The 2016 Presidential election, one of only five since 1824 when the Electoral College winner lost the popular vote, led to nationwide debate about the College, which in turn led to LULAC v. Abbott – a constitutional challenge to the “Winner Take All” law in Texas that assigns all the state’s electoral votes to the candidate who wins that state’s popular vote. The Fifth Circuit rejected a “one-person, one-vote” challenge to WTA based on a 1969 three-judge opinion that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed, and has not overruled or limited since. It also rejected a challenge based on right-of-association grounds, observing: “[A]ny disadvantage they allege is solely a consequence of their lack of electoral success. But ‘the function of the election process is to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates.'” No. 19-50214 (Feb. 26, 2020) (citations omitted). (Above, the unfortunate Samuel Tilden, the only Presidential candidate in history to lose despite receiving an outright majority – not just a plurality – of the popular vote).

Another discovery dispute in litigation about governance of the airport in Jackson, Mississippi (a previous proceeding involved a mandamus proceeding related to the deposition of the governor’s chief of staff) arose from subpoenas to several legislators, who asserted legislative privilege in response. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs lacked standing (“The plaintiffs cite no precedent supporting their theory that Jackson voters have a right to elect officials with the exclusive authority to select municipal airport commissioners”), and that this issue was properly raised even during an interlocutory appeal of a collateral order: “[E]ven nonparty witnesses refusing to comply with a discovery order may challenge standing . . . because ‘the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction.'” Stallworth v. Bryant, No. 18-60587 (Aug. 21, 2019).

“Incentive alignment” is a well-known business concept; in law, various types of fee arrangements are often employed to align the financial motivations of lawyer and client. The law is also wary of incentives for injustice, especially when the finances of the justice system become muddled with court procedure. A recent Fifth Circuit opinion joined the list of the clearest examples of such misalignments:

• Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), which found a due process violation when a “liquor court,” which prosecuted violations of the state Prohibition Act, allowed the mayor to serve as the judge and convict without a jury. If the mayor found the defendant guilty, some of the fine paid would go towards the mayor’s “costs in each case, in addition to his regular salary”; an acquittal, on the other hand, meant no money to the mayor;
• Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981), invalidating the statutory fee system for compensating Mississippi justices of the peace because those judges’ compensation depended on the number of cases filed in their courts (thus incentivizing them to rule for plaintiffs in civil cases and the prosecution in criminal ones to encourage more filings); and now
• Caliste v. Cantrell, No. 18-30954 (Aug. 29, 2019), finding a due process violation “[w]hen a defendant has to buy a commercial surety bond, [and] a portion of the bond’s value goes to a fund for judges’ expenses . . . [so] the more often the magistrate requires a secured money bond as a condition of release, the more money the court has to cover expenses.”

Texas liquor law prohibits a public corporation from holding a “P permit,” which “authorize[s] the sale of liquor, wine, and ale for off-premises consumption.” Wal-Mart successfully challenged this law as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, making these observations, of general interest beyond this specific dispute, on the issue of legislative intent:

• “Under the law of the Fifth Circuit, evidence that legislators intended to ban potential permittees based on company form alone is insufficient to meet the purpose element of a dormant Commerce Clause claim”;
• “An admission that the drafter sought to create a law that would survive a constitutional challenge is not evidence of a discriminatory legislative purpose”;
• “[O]verreliance on ‘post-enactment testimony’ from actual legislatures is problematic, and not ‘the best indicia of the Texas Legislature’s intent'”; and
• “The motivations and lobbying efforts of the [Texas Package Store are not direct evidence of legislative purpose.”

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, No. 18-50299 (Aug. 15, 2019).

In Brackeen v. Bernhardt, an opinion of enormous significance to Indian law, the Fifth Circuit found the Indian Child Welfare Act to be constitutional, reversing a district-court opinion that held otherwise. The Court also affirmed various Bureau of Indian Affairs regulations under the Chevron doctrine, noting, inter alia: “The mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal. Sudden and unexplained change, or change that does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, may be arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion. But if these pitfalls are avoided, change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.” No. 18-11479 (Aug. 9, 2019) (citation omitted). (My colleague Paulette Miniter and I assisted Professor Seth Davis of UC-Berkeley with an amicus brief in this case, in support of the result ultimately reached by the Court.)

The Coston Flare, the first technically and commercially viable maritime flare, was a universal attention-getting sign at sea for many years. Similarly, the “Rule of Orderliness Opinion” attracts en banc review in the Fifth Circuit; the most recent example being a January 17 panel dissent about circuit precedent on the viability of a patient’s implied right of action under the Medicaid Act, which led to a February 5 vote to take the issue en banc. In that spirit, yesterday’s 3-opinion panel resolution of Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co.raises the question whether circuit precedent addresses Title VII’s applicability to discrimination based on sexual orientation. No. 18-20251 (Feb. 6, 2019).

Veritext, a national court reporting service, challenged restrictions on its pricing practices (volume discounts, etc.) imposed by the Louisiana Board of Examiners of Certified Shorthand Reporters. The Fifth Circuit rejected Veritext’s constitutional claims but found that it had stated a viable restraint-of-trade claim under the Sherman Act. The Board claimed Parker antitrust immunity as a state actor, which required it to show “two requirements: first that ‘the challenged restraint . . . be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,’ and second that ‘the policy . . . be actively supervised by the State.’” The Board satisfied the first, as its regulations were clear (thus creating the alleged restraint of trade in the first place), but failed the second: “Nothing in the record indicates that elected or appointed officials oversaw or reviewed the Board’s decisions or modified the Board’s enforcement priorities. And the Board’s argument on this point—that the legislature can amend the law in this area or veto proposed rules under Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act—is unconvincing. State legislatures always possess the power to change the law.”  Veritext Corp. v. Bonin, No. 17-30691 (Aug. 17, 2018) (applying State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015)).

Rehearing motions led to a revised panel opinion and an en banc vote in Mance v. Sessions, a Constitutional challenge to restrictions on handgun sales by an authorized federally-licensed firearm dealer, to a purchaser who lives in a different state from the dealer. The revised opinion affirming the restrictions stood, with the Court voting 9-7 against rehearing en banc. Two of the three dissents from the vote were written by recent nominees of President Trump, with all of his nominees joining the vote in favor of review. Notably, this vote reflects two vacancies at the time it was conducted (one of which has since been filled with the confirmation of Judge Oldham, and other to be filled when a nomination is made to replace Judge Jolly of Mississippi). Assuming the two nominees would join the other new judges in their view of this case, their addition would be outcome-determinative as to its en banc review.

Various ripeness challenges to claims based on the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments were rejected in the face of these remarkably strong facts: “Without prior notice, the City of New Orleans demolished a building along the IH-10 service road that plaintiffs had recently purchased at a tax sale. Yet two days before the demolition, the City actually cancelled the Code Enforcement lien on the property, which it obtained after sending notices only to the owner from 18 years earlier. When the Garretts objected to the demolition, the City added insult to injury by sending them a bill for the costs.”  Archbold-Garrett v. City of New Orleans, No. 17-30692 (June 22, 2018).

Flooded landowners in Houston alleged, inter alia, a violation of substantive due process from the effects of a “Reinvestment Zone” on drainage. Among other problems, that claim foundered on its merits under “rational basis” review: “Here, the government objectives were to improve its tax base and the general welfare. As stated by the plaintiffs in the complaint, the government projects enhanced roads and drainage, though in commercial areas in which the plaintiffs did not desire these improvements. The plaintiffs have also acknowledged in the complaint that ‘[t]he tax base has increased far above projections.’ It is ‘at least debatable’ that a rational relationship exists between the government projects and objectives.” Residents Against Flooding v. Reinvestment Zone No. 17, No. 17-20373 (May 22, 2018, unpublished).

O’Donnell v. Harris County substantially affirmed the district court’s handling of a major civil rights case about Harris County’s pretrial bail system. The key liability holding is of general interest as an important application of equal protection; the key remedy holding is of broader application to any equitable remedy involving a process rather than a substantive result.

As to liability, the Court held: “[T]he essence of the district court’s equal protection analysis can be boiled down to the following: take two misdemeanor arrestees who are identical in every way—same charge, same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, etc.—except that one is wealthy and one is indigent. Applying the County’s current custom and practice, with their lack of individualized assessment and mechanical application of the secured bail schedule, both arrestees would almost certainly receive identical secured bail amounts. One arrestee is able to post bond, and the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less likely to plead guilty, more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less likely to bear the social costs of incarceration. The poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear the brunt of all of these, simply because he has less money than his wealthy counterpart. The district court held that this state of affairs violates the equal protection clause, and we agree.” 

And as to remedy: “There is a significant mismatch between the district court’s procedure-focused legal analysis and the sweeping injunction it implemented. The fundamental source of constitutional deficiency in the due process and equal protection analyses is the same: the County’s mechanical application of the secured bail schedule without regard for the individual arrestee’s personal circumstances. Thus, the equitable remedy necessary to cure the constitutional infirmities arising under both clauses is the same: the County must implement the constitutionally-necessary procedures to engage in a caseby-case evaluation of a given arrestee’s circumstances, taking into account the various factors required by Texas state law (only one of which is ability to pay). These procedures are: notice, an opportunity to be heard and submit evidence within 48 hours of arrest, and a reasoned decision by an impartial decisionmaker. That is not what the preliminary injunction does, however. Rather, it amounts to the outright elimination of secured bail for indigent misdemeanor arrestees.”

No. 17-2033 (Feb. 14, 2018).

While it does not do so every day, or for that matter even every year, Fifth Circuit opinions draw powerful boundary lines around government activity. One recent example is St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013), about the limits that substantive due process places on economic regulation. Another such line-drawing case appeared this month in Jauch v. Choctaw County, which found that qualified immunity did not protect a sheriff from the following violation of due process:

On April 26, 2012, Starkville Police Department officers pulled Jauch over, issued her several traffic tickets, and informed her of an outstanding misdemeanor warrant in Choctaw County. Choctaw County deputies took custody of Jauch and transported her to the Choctaw County Jail where, the next morning, she was served with the misdemeanor warrant and the capias. Jauch cleared the misdemeanor warrant within a few days. She nonetheless
remained detained on the capias, and her requests to be brought before a judge and allowed to post bail were denied. Jail officials informed Jauch that Sheriff Halford had confirmed she could not be taken before a judge until August when the next term of the Circuit Court commenced. When a friend of Jauch’s reached the sheriff on the telephone, he told her the same thing. Jauch’s protestations of innocence were ineffectual.

Ninety-six days after being taken into custody, Jauch’s case moved forward. She received an appointed attorney, waived formal arraignment, had bail set, and had a trial date set. Six days later, on August 6, 2012, she posted bail. Before the end of the month, the prosecutor reviewed the evidence against Jauch and promptly moved to dismiss the charge. On January 29, 2013, the Circuit Court of Choctaw County entered the dismissal. It is undisputed that Jauch was innocent all along, as she had claimed from behind bars.

No. 16-60690 (Oct. 24, 2017).

In Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos Pipeline LLC, an effort to enjoin state-court eminent domain proceedings in federal court: “Boerschig contend[ed] that by ceding condemnation power to a private company, Texas eminent domain law offends due process. His argument principally relies on the private nondelegation doctrine, a nook of Fourteenth Amendment law long recognized but seldom invoked.” That obscure but important doctrine provides that “when private parties have the unrestrained ability to decide whether another citizen’s property rights can be restricted, any resulting deprivation happens without ‘process of law.'” Unfortunately for Boehrschig: “The Texas scheme allowing gas pipelines to condemn property does not appear to suffer from either of the twin ills that doomed these zoning and wagesetting laws. It imposes a standard to guide the pipeline companies—that the taking is necessary for “public use”—and provides judicial review of that determination that prevents the company from having the final say.” The Court also rejected a mootness challenge based on the construction of the relevant pipeline, observing that it could still “order that Trans-Pecos return Boerschig’s land to its precondemnation state.” No. 16-50931-CV (Oct. 3, 2017).

In St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit struck down a state-law restriction on the sale of funeral caskets by a monastery, finding that the state had no rational basis for that restriction. Cautious about encouraging similar challenges to economic regulation, the Court warned: “Nor is the ghost of Lochner lurking about. . . . We insist only that Louisiana’s regulation not be irrational—the outer-most limits of due process and equal protection . . . . ”

The recent case of Reyes v. North Texas Tollway Authority confiirms that if the ghost of Lochner chooses to lurk on Dallas-area tollways, it will have to pay its toll charges timely. It found that the NTTA’s system for charging late fees has a rational basis in both its legitimate need to recover collection costs and desire to encourage the use of TollTags, and concluded: “The Zip Cash system with its challenged fees is the type of novel policymaking for which the limited scrutiny of rational basis review is most justified. . . . The political process may continue to fine tune toll collection, but that is not the Due Process Clause’s role to play.”

In so doing, the Court clarified a sometimes-confusing principle about the legal standard: “[G]overnment action that applies broadly gets rational basis [review]; government action that is individualized to one of a few plaintiffs gets [‘]shocks the conscience[‘] review.” No. 16-10767 (June 27, 2017).

In Harris v. Hahn, the Fifth Circuit addressed a challenge to a “residence requirement” – a common feature of public benefit and employment programs, not often challenged in court. This challenge addressed “the constitutionality of the residency requirements in the Hazlewood Act, which provides tuition waivers at public universities for certain Texas veterans who enlisted in Texas or were residents of Texas at the time they enlisted.” The Fifth Circuit found that Texas had rational reasons for the requirement, in that “the prospective benefit advances two interests—education and security—by offering a benefit to residents considering enlistment.” It noted in particular that this benefit was prospective, rather than retroactive; distinguishing it from some other situations that had been more problematic. The Court also found no impermissible restriction on the right to travel, noting that the program affected a relatively small percentage of the population and did not impose a penalty. No. 15-20105 (June 23, 2016).

Dr. Barrash, a member of a professional association of neurosurgeons, testified against Dr. Oishi, who was also a group member.  Dr. Oishi settled his case and filed a complaint with the association about Dr. Barrash, alleging (among other claims) that Dr. Barrash failed to review all relevant records.  The association censured Dr. Barrash, who then sued the association, claiming a denial of due process and a breach of the association’s contract with its members.

The district court found a denial of due process as to part of the censure, which the association did not appeal.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Rule 12 dismissal of the rest of Dr. Barrash’s claims: “Dr. Barrash received sufficient due process, including notice, a hearing, and multiple levels of appeal, before he was censured for failing to review all pertinent and available records prior to testifying. Because the district court found only one basis of the censure to be unsupported by due process, the district court was correct in setting aside only that portion of the censure. Furthermore, no Texas court has recognized a breach of contract challenge to a private association’s disciplinary process.”  Barrash v. American Association of Neurological Surgeons, No. 14-20764 (Feb. 3, 2016).

The district court in Naranjo v. Thompson found that Naranjo, a prisoner in the Reeves County Detention Center, had shown “exceptional circumstances” that warranted the appointment of counsel to pursue his civil rights claims about the conditions of his incarceration.  (Foremost among them was the prisoner’s inability to review a number of documents that were filed under seal due to security concerns.)  The court went on to conclude, however, that no local attorneys were available and that it lacked the power to make a compulsory appointment.  The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that a district court has the inherent power to make such an appointment, but reminding that “this is a power of last resort” and that “[i]nherent powers ‘must be used with great restraint and caution.'” Accordingly, the Court reversed a summary judgment for the defendants and remanded for proceedings consistent with its ruling about inherent power.

In St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a substantive due process challenge to a state law that stopped a group of monks from making funeral caskets. The Court explained the limits of that holding and noted: “Nor is the ghost of Lochner lurking about.”  712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013). Confirming that such a phantom still does not haunt the Circuit, the Court rejected First Amendment and due process challenges to a Texas law that requires a veterinarian to physically examine an animal before treating it (and which thus prohibits “distance” treatment via the Internet.) The Court found a rational connection between the law and quality animal care, and noted: “The idea that content-neutral regulation of the professional-client relationship does not violate the First Amendment has deep roots, and has been embraced by many circuits.”  Hines v. Alldredge, No. 14-40403 (March 27, 2015).

The plaintiff in RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio sought damages after the City of San Antonio razed a property without providing prior notice.  No. 11-50626 (April 23, 2013).  After a jury trial it recovered $27,500 in damages.  The Fifth Circuit found that a key jury instruction on the City’s defenses “improperly cast the central factual dispute as whether or not the Structure posed an immediate danger to the public, when the issue should have been whether the City acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion in determining that the Structure presented an immediate danger.”  Accordingly, “[b]ecause this error in the instructions misled the jury as to the central factual question in the case,” the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.   The Court’s analysis summarizes how federal courts address the issue of harm in erroneous jury instructions that the Texas Supreme Court has engaged in the Casteel line of cases.

In a rare but classical exercise of judicial review of a state law’s “rational basis,” the Fifth Circuit found a Louisiana economic regulation unconstitutional.  The Associated Press and the Times-Picayune provide some initial commentary.  The Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors barred an abbey of Benedictine monks from selling caskets.  In late 2012, the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court about the Board’s authority, which that court declined to answer.  The Fifth Circuit then reviewed the Board’s actions and agreed with the district court that the regulation was not rationally related to the state’s claimed interests in consumer protection or public health, affirming an injunction against its enforcement.  St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30757 (March 20, 2013).  The Court emphasized both the limited role of “rational basis” review and its importance when it does apply: “The deference we owe expresses mighty principles of federalism and judicial roles.  The principle we protect from the hand of the State today protects an equally vital core principle — the taking of wealth and handing it to others . . . as ‘economic’ protection of the rulemakers’ pockets.”

“The thirty-eight monks of St. Joseph Abbey,” unable to earn income from the abbey’s timberland after Hurricane Katrina, began to sell handmade funeral caskets at a price significantly lower than that offered by funeral homes.  The Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors contended that these sales violated state regulations, and the monks sought relief under the 14th Amendment, arguing that the regulations had no rational basis as applied to them.  St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, No. 11-30756 (rev’d Nov. 21, 2012).  After an exceptionally thorough review of due process principles in the context of “rational basis review” of economic regulation (which Judge Haynes declined to join as unnecessary), the Court certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court about the scope of the relevant enabling statute.