CFPB Constitutionality

The ground rules for the administrative state are few, important, and vexingly difficult to apply. The en banc court confronted the structure of Fannie Mae’s regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, in Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), and found it wanting constitutionally. In CFPB v. All American Check Cashing, a panel majority confronted the structure of another Great Recession entity, the Consumer Finance Protection Board, and concluded that “neither the text of the Constitution nor the Supreme Court’s previous decisions support the Appellants’ arguments that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured.” No. 18-60302 (March 3, 2020).

A concurrence elaborated: “The President can remove the CFPB Director only for ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,’ a broad standard repeatedly approved by the Supreme Court. That alone is enough to decide this case. If there is any threat of undue concentration of power, the Office of President is its beneficiary.” A dissent faulted the majority’s reasoning and the judicial process employed: “Collins winds up in the dustbin because two judges say it should. At one time, those judges thought it beyond the pale ‘to rely on strength in numbers rather than sound legal principles in order to reach their desired result in [a] specific case.’ Now, they suddenly discover that stare decisis is for suckers.” (footnotes omitted).