With most high-profile public-law litigation in the Second and Ninth Circuits at present, the recent “Venue Wars” have cooled off, but venue disputes persist. In In re Trubridge, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found no clear abuse of discretion in denying a transfer motion, even though a forum-selection clause referred to Alabama courts.

The Court concluded the clause was unenforceable because Louisiana has a strong public policy barring forum-selection clauses in contracts with public entities, and the plaintiff here—a Louisiana political subdivision—fell squarely within that protectiion. With no forum-selection clause to trigger the Atlantic Marine framework, the district court proceed under Section 1404(a). The Court held the district court “explicitly considered the convenience of the parties and various public-interest considerations but simply concluded that none warranted transfer ….” No. 5-30727; Jan. 30, 2026.

Trinseo Europe GmBH v. Kellogg Brown & Root reviews several important issues of trade-secret law while affirming a JNOV of a $75 million damages verdict; among them, this basic reminder: “[T]rade secret damages—whether measured by a reasonable royalty or lost profits—must, like patent damages, ‘reflect the value attributable to the infringing features of the product, and no more.'” No. No. 24-20460 (Jan. 21, 2026).

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Based on confidential discovery material about decades-old abuse allegations from the Archdiocese of New Orleans’s internal investigation—concerning a priest not listed on the public “Credibly Accused List” and not named in any proof of claim—an attorney texted a high school principal to confirm the priest still served as chaplain and then emailed a reporter naming the priest, identifying his employment, and urging the reporter to “[k]eep this guy on your radar.”

Enforcing a protective order and affirming the trial courts’ substantial sanction on the attorney, Trahant v. Unofficial Committee holds that even if a person’s name or workplace are publicly knowable, linking that person to non-public abuse allegations learned through discovery is confidential under that order, and may not be disclosed absent consent or a court order. Emphasizing the protective order’s specified mechanism for challenging confidentiality designations, the Court rejected the notion that perceived “over-classification” permits unilateral disclosure, noting the proper course is to seek declassification from the court before dissemination.

As to remedy, the Court afirmed a compensatory fee award under Rule 37(b)(2) as a proportionate remedy tailored to the expenses caused by the violation. The amount was supported by invoices and a trustee report that the bankruptcy court expressly considered, and the award reflected a roughly 50% reduction from the total costs to ensure the sanction was no more severe than necessary to deter and redress the misconduct. No. 23-30466, Jan. 2, 2026.

The ghost of Edward Young (right) inspired a vigorous debate about the scope of the doctrine named for him in La Union del Pueblo v. Nelson (and two consolidated, related cases). A Ffth Circuit panel majority held that it had collateral-order jurisdiction to review the denial of sovereign immunity in a dispute about a Texas election law, concluding that  the Secretary of State may be sued as to provisions that she directly operationalizes (such as the DPS data-matching and registrar sanction regime, and the official forms and tools that local officials must use for mail voting and voter assistance). It barred suits against the Secretary for provisions enforced by local actors or dependent on prosecutorial discretion. Standing was satisfied for the surviving claims because the Secretary’s form-setting and registrar-sanction roles are causally connected to the alleged injuries and judicial relief would redress them at least in part.

A dissent would have dismissed the entire case, arguing the Court’s Ex parte Young jurisprudence has become a “No Nexus Rule” that dispenses with any enforcement connection between the named defendant and the plaintiff. No. 22-50775 (Dec. 31, 2025).

Emboldened by the Supreme Court upholding age verification for adult sites in Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, 606 U.S. 461 (2025),Texas chose to impose age-verification requirements for online app purchases. A district court enjoined that law and its ruling is now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.

Specifically, in Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n v. Paxton, the district court held thatTexas’s SB 2420 is a content-based regulation of speech subject to strict scrutiny. The court noted that the statute’s coverage turns on what speech is provided by an app—exempting, for example, nonprofit apps offering emergency services or standardized testing—and thus “defin[es] regulated speech by particular subject matter.” It distinguished the adult-entertainment law by describing SB 2420’s sweeping restrictions across virtually all apps, including ones involving constitutionally protected news, education, and entertainment.

Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the statute is overbroad and underinclusive—blocking minors from virtually all apps, even while the same content remains available through preloaded browsers or offline channels—and Texas offered no evidence that most covered apps cause the harms the State invoked. The court also noted less speech-restrictive alternatives, such as education and voluntary tools, rather than mandating universal age verification and individualized parental consent for all downloads and in-app purchases. No. 1:25-cv-01660-RP (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2025.

In Ramirez v. Granado, a Fifth Circuit panel reversed a summary judgment on qualified immunity in a police-shooting case, producing a vigorous dispute between a concurrence and dissent.

The majority found genuine issues for trial, reasoning that a jury could infer that the decedent posed no immediate threat when the fatal shots were fired as he fled with his back turned. It highlighted that, after an initial miss, the officer fired six more rounds “without warning,” four striking “the back of [the decedent’s] head and shoulders,” and then asked, “did he have a gun?”—evidence a jury could use to reject a claim of an imminent threat. erception..

The dissent read the relevant videos and radio traffic as yielding one, dispositive narrative: “Here are the undisputed (and indisputable) facts,” including a 120‑mph chase into a residential area, an “armed and dangerous” advisory, the suspect “holding a gun,” and an eight‑second window from “he has a gun!” to the final shot—concluding that denying qualified immunity is “wrong.” It deemed the “did he have a gun?” remark “astonishingly irrelevant” because the officer learned the occupants were armed and dangerous and nothing “suggest[s] Officer Granado was lying.”

Legally, the majority (and concurrence) emphasize the “totality of the circumstances,” the predominance of the threat‑of‑harm factor once deadly force is used, and that a jury could find the justification had “ceased” by the time shots were fired at a suspect running away. The concurrence added that the dissent’s “mile‑wide” citations involve “overt‑threat” or “furtive‑reach” cases that don’t fit this record, when viewed favorably to the plaintiff (as it saw the record, showing continuous visual contact, no commands to disarm, no pointing, and back‑to‑front wound paths).

The dissent, based on its view of the video/radio evidence, reasoned that qualified immunity applies absent a case “that squarely governs” these “specific facts”: “It is the majority, the concurrence, and [the plaintiff’s] job to point to a case that squarely governs this one. It is not mine.” The dissent cited two Fifth Circuit opinions about firearms that it saw as “materially indistinguishable” from the facts of this case.

En banc review seems likely; serious consideration of en banc review, a certainty. No. 24-10755; Dec. 10, 2025.