In the fourth of a series of unrelated cases about mortgages and foreclosures in 2013, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims about the foreclosure on a home used as collateral for a business loan. Water Dynamics v. HSBC Bank, No. 12-10307 (Jan. 30, 2013, unpublished). The holdings included: (1) the foreclosure price exceeded 50 of the claimed value, and was thus not “grossly inadequate” and appellants could not state a wrongful foreclosure claim, (2) appellants’ prior breach of contract foreclosed their contract claims, and the contract modifications they alleged were barred by the Texas statute of frauds, (3) acts of the lender alleged to be inconsistent with the loan documents did not state a waiver claim, especially given the deed of trust’s anti-waiver provision, and (4) “Appellants’ allegations may demonstrate a failure to communicate between themselves and the lender, but they fall far short of . . . [showing] ‘a course of harassment that was willful, wanton, malicious, and intended to inflict mental anguish and bodily harm'” so as to state a claim for unreasonable collection efforts.
Monthly Archives: January 2013
The plaintiff in Akerblom v. Ezra Holdings sued several companies for damages arising from their business dealings. No. 12-20182 (Jan. 28, 2013, unpublished). Federal jurisdiction turned on whether one defendant, called “Subsea” in the opinion, was improperly joined. To determine whether “the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant,” the Court reminded that the focus is on pleadings at the time of removal — any later pleadings or affidavits can only “amplify or clarify facts alleged in the state-court complaint.” Id. at 7. Applying Texas’s “fair and adequate notice” standard for proper pleading, the Court found that the fraud claim against Subsea failed to say that misrepresentation Subsea allegedly made, or who from Subsea allegedly made it. Id. at 10. There were also substantive issues as to whether several alleged representations were actionable. The Court’s focus on “what” and “who” under Texas law echoes recent opinions under the federal Twombly standard.
An expert opined that a railroad crossing was unsafe and required active warning devices. Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad, No. 11-60654 (Jan. 28, 2013). He contended that the crossing had “‘narrow’ pavement, ‘skewed’ angle, ‘rough’ surface and ‘steep’ incline” but did not tie those conclusions to a guideline or publications, relying instead on “education and experience.” He also admitted that visibility at the crossing was adequate under the Transportation Department’s standards. Id. at 7. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s exclusion of his testimony under Daubert, calling it “transparently subjective.” Id. at 8.
In 2011, Antill Pipeline joined a new third-party defendant to a case and obtained a continuance. In 2012, Antill Pipeline had the case consolidated with another lawsuit it had filed, which had the effect of joining two new defendants, and obtained another continuance. In December 2012, the trial court dismissed several defendants, including the three joined by Antill Pipeline. One week before the January 28 trial setting, Antill Pipeline moved to stay the trial and then sought mandamus two business days before the scheduled start date. The Fifth Circuit held: “Antill’s petition, if granted, would further delay a trial that Antill has already caused to be delayed numerous times. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the district court clearly abused or usurped its judicial power . . . .” In re Antill Pipeline Construction Co., No. 13-30102 (Jan. 25, 2013, unpublished).
The defendant in Factory Mutual Insurance v. Alon USA stipulated to liability after an explosion at a waste treatment plant. The remaining issue was whether fair market value of the plant was the cost to replace it (roughly $6 million) or the cost of the plant’s component parts (roughly $900,000). No. 11-11080 (Jan. 23, 2013). Under deferential clear error and abuse-of-discretion standards of review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusions that: (1) the plant system was unique and the cost of its components did not fairly estimate its value (distinguishing Hartford Ins. Co. v. Jiminez, 814 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.)); (2) the plaintiff’s expert “educated and interviewed . . . employees” about a key depreciation issue, and thus “did more than just repeat information gleaned from external sources” (distinguishing U.S. v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008)); and (3) the multiplier used to reflect installation expenses was “entirely reasonable[,]” “[g]iven the lack of useful records and resources pertaining to this particular . . . plant.”
In Ergon-West Virginia, Inc. v. Dynegy Marketing & Trade, the Fifth Circuit found that Dynegy had no duty under two natural gas supply contracts to attempt to get replacement gas after a declaration of force majeure in response to hurricane damage, affirming the district court as to one contract and reversing as to the other. No. 11-60492 (Jan. 22, 2013). The first contract’s force majeure clause required Dynegy to “remed[y] with all reasonable dispatch” the event. The Court found that “reasonable” was not ambiguous but that extrinsic evidence of industry standards (favorable to Dynegy) was properly admitted to give it full meaning (contrasting its approach with the district court’s, which found the term ambiguous and admitted the testimony to resolve the ambiguity). The second contract’s provision had language about “due diligence” by Dynegy. The Court found the term ambiguous as both parties’ readings of it were reasonable, and then held that the district court should have credited the same evidence here as it did for the first contract.
Home foreclosure 101b — no contract, estoppel, “good faith” or fraud claims about failed loan mod
January 18, 2013In the third mortgage servicing opinion of 2013, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of contract, promissory estoppel, and tort claims under Texas law arising from the attempted negotiation of a loan modification during a foreclosure situation. Milton v. U.S. Bank, No. 12-40742 (Jan. 18, 2013, unpublished); see also Gordon v. JP Morgan Chase (contract and estoppel claims under Texas law) and Pennell v. Wells Fargo Bank (negligent misrepresentation claim under Mississippi law). The Court also found that this mortgagor-mortgagee relationship did not create an independently actionable duty of good faith, and that reliance on alleged representations that were inconsistent with the loan documents and foreclosure notice was not reasonable. Id. at 5, 6.
The insured in Jamestown Insurance v. Reeder successfully minimized its liability with a winning appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. No. 12-20437 (Jan. 17, 2013, unpublished). He only gave notice of a claim at that point, however, and despite the result, ran afoul of the concept that “[o]ne of the purposes of a notice provisions . . . is to allow an insurer ‘to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities before it is obligated to pay.'” Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). Because the insurer could have helped influence the trial result, or negotiated a settlement at the appellate level, the “delayed tender thwarted the recognized purposes of the notice provisions” and summary judgment was affirmed for the insurer. Id.
City of New Orleans Employees’ Retirement System v. Hayward affirmed the dismissal, on forum non conveniens grounds, of putative shareholder derivative suits against BP arising from the Deepwater Horizon disaster. No. 12-20019 (Jan. 16, 2013, unpublished). Among other factors discussed, the Fifth Circuit noted and gave weight to the points that: (1) plaintiffs were “phantoms” for FNC purposes because of their attenuated interests in the case, (2) technological advances did not make geographical issues irrelevant in an FNC analysis [key witnesses and documents being located in the UK rather than Louisiana], (3) the UK had a substantial interest in applying its own, relatively new Companies Act, and (4) the BP derivative cases comprised one-third of the U.S. court’s MDL docket.
Plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a school voucher program, alleging it violated a desegregation consent decree. Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, No. 12-31218 (Jan. 14, 2013, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit found an abuse of discretion in denying a stay pending appeal. One reason was Pullman abstention, which arises “when an unsettled area of state law . . . would render a decision on the federal issue unnecessary,” and where the Court said the defendant had a “a strong likelihood of establishing” it in light of pending state litigation about the constitutionality of the law under state law. Another was jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, where the Court said the plaintiffs’ evidence of harm was “based merely on general financial information and speculation.” A dissent further discussed Pullman abstention and advocated outright dismissal of the case. The opinion appears to have been unpublished because of its expedited procedural posture, and a later panel will fully address the merits on a conventional briefing schedule. Id. at 4 n.1
Continuing a theme begun a few days ago in Gordon v. JP Morgan Chase, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a servicer on a negligent misrepresentation claim under Mississippi law based on statements during loan modification discussions. Pennell v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 12-60595 (Jan. 9, 2013, unpublished). The Court saw the statements as unactionable promises of future conduct. In reviewing the relevant cases, the Court distinguished two federal district court cases on their facts, while also diminishing their effect under Erie compared to controlling state court authority.
The district court dismissed a case about the misappropriation of trust assets under the “probate exception” to federal diversity jurisdiction. Curtis v. Brunsting, No. 12-20164 (Jan. 9, 2013) (applying Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006)). The Fifth Circuit stated that “Marshall requires a two-step inquiry into (1) whether the property in dispute is estate property within the custody of the probate court and (2) whether the plaintiff’s claims would require the federal court to assume in rem jurisdiction over that property.” Id. at 5. Finding no evidence that this inter vivos trust was, or even could be, subject to Teas probate administration, the Court reversed and remanded.
The sales agreement for two tugboats provided for $250,000 in liquidated damages if the boat was used in violation of a noncompetition provision. International Marine LLC v. Delta Towing LLC, No. 12-30280 (Jan. 8, 2013). The Fifth Circuit applied federal admiralty law, using section 356 of the Second Restatement of Contracts as the guide, and placing the burden on the party seeking to invalidate the provision as a penalty. The Court quickly concluded that the second factor of that section — difficulty in proving damages — was established by evidence about the nature of the boat charter business to which the clause applied. Id. at 9. The Court also found that the first factor — reasonableness of the estimated anticipated loss — was satisfied by evidence about the range of expected fees and contract duration. Id. at 9-10. (citing Farmers Exp. Co. v. M/V Georgis Prois, 799 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986)). The clause was thus enforceable.
Several aspects of insurance coverage for hurricane damage to a shopping center were addressed in GBP Partners v. Maryland Casualty, No. 11-20912 (Jan. 4, 2013, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the insured: (1) did not establish a “complete interruption” of business activity to trigger coverage for lost income, (2) raised a fact issue as to whether rent abatements were necessary to prevent possible closure of the entire center, (3) did not distinguish repair fees necessary to avoid suspension of operations from other management fees, (4) the insured was responsible for various delays in replacing a damaged roof, and (5) did not allocate window damage between covered and non-covered causes. The Court also found that a summary judgment affiant did not create an impermissible conflict with earlier deposition testimony that described the effect of the storm on business operations. Id. at 6-7 & n.7.
The Fifth Circuit’s 2012 business litigation opinions suggest these five tips for the New Year:
1. Plead key details. While not removing the limits on Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the Court has reminded twice of the importance of “what,” “how,” and “when” in pleading under Twombly and Iqbal. It also reversed a Rule 12 dismissal in a contract case because the plaintiff adequately pleaded an industry custom about the relevant terms.
2. Plead reasonably. The Federal Circuit, applying Fifth Circuit law, reversed the denial of Rule 11 sanctions for what it saw as an objectively unreasonable construction of a patent.
3. Stretch the long arm carefully. Applying recent Supreme Court authority, the Fifth Circuit found no personal jurisdiction over cases about an “off-the-shelf” software contract, a distributorship arrangement based outside the forum state, and an alleged corporate “alter ego” situation.
4. Watch the eight corners. During 2012, the Court reversed once, and then again, to reject exceptions to Texas’s “eight corners” rule about insurance coverage, but also reversed to allow a mistake claim to proceed despite that rule.
5. Don’t count on mandamus. After granting mandamus in a high-profile venue dispute in 2008, the Court has since declined to grant the writ as to the wrongful denial of a remand motion and an alleged error about a forum selection clause.
An employer terminated two employees for safety violations. An arbitrator, appointed under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, ordered them reinstated after a suspension. The district court vacated the award, and the Fifth Circuit reversed and reinstated. Albermarle Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 703 F.3d 821 (2013). The Court found that “explicating broad CBA terms like ’cause,’ when left undefined by contract, is the arbitrator’s charge.” Id. at 7. It distinguished prior cases that left an arbitrator no discretion as to whether certain rule violations required discharge. Id. at 5-6 (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Local 900, 968 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992)). The Court also rejected a challenge to the award on public policy grounds, reminding that “any such public policy must be explicit, well defined, and dominant.” Id. at 10. Cf. Horton Automatics v. Industrial Division of the Communication Workers of America, No. 12-40576 (Jan. 4, 2013, unpublished) (reversing confirmation when labor arbitrator exceeded limited scope).
The appellant in All Plaintiffs v. Transocean Offshore (the MDL relating to Deepwater Horizon) challenged an order requiring him to submit to a psychiatric exam and supply medical records as part of the procedure. No. 12-30237 (Jan. 3, 2013, unpublished). Following Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), the Fifth Circuit held that the collateral order doctrine did not allow appeal of this interlocutory discovery order. Any erroneous effect on the merits of the case could be reviewed on appeal of final judgment, and even if that review was “imperfect[]” to remedy the intrusion on his privacy interest, the harm was not so great as to justify interlocutory review of the entire class of similar orders. A concurrence noted that while mandamus review was theoretically possible, this party had not requested it as an alternative to direct appeal, and had not made a sufficiently specific showing of harm to obtain mandamus relief.
The plaintiff in Gordon v. JP Morgan Chase alleged that a home foreclosure was prevented by the lender′s promises of a permanent loan modification under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (“HAMP”). No. 12-20323 (Jan. 3, 2013, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit agreed with the lender that the Statute of Frauds did not allow such a claim to proceed under Texas contract law. Because the SOF barred the contract claim, promissory estoppel could only arise if the lender orally promised to sign a writing that would satisfy the SOF, and that the writing was in existence at the time of the promise. Statements about future loan papers did not satisfy this rule. While the opinion is unpublished, its analysis has the potential for extensive citation in state and federal cases seeking to stop foreclosures because of statements made in the context of HAMP negotiations.
The district court and Fifth Circuit agreed that fraud claims by dissatisfied consumers of weight loss medicine did not allege “bodily injury” so as to trigger a duty to defend. CSA Nutraceuticals v. Chubb Custom Insurance, No. 12-10137 (Jan. 2, 2013, unpublished): “Failing to achieve weight reduction means the body basically did not change. It does not mean that the body was injured.” The short opinion summarizes and rejects the plaintiff′s arguments for coverage.