The case of LHC Nashua Partnership Ltd. v. PDNED Sagamore Nashua LLC presented several liability and damages issues in a contract case arising from a real estate development project.  While nominally applying New Hampshire law, the Court addressed Texas law because it did not materially differ on the key points.  Op. at 8.  The Court’s holdings included these: a promissory estoppel claim was not actionable given the scope of the parties’ written contract, op. at 9-10; the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of justifiable reliance on alleged misrepresentations, op. at 11-13; and a merger clause in the parties’ agreement did not foreclose the misrepresentation claim, op. at 13-14.  The Court’s analysis of the merger clause focused on the recent Texas Supreme Court case of Italian Cowboy Partners v. Prudential, which substantially clarified Texas law in that area.  The Court affirmed an award of reliance damages but reversed an award of $25 million in lost profits, stating that the contract induced by fraud “contemplated a future closing transaction”; therefore, “[Plaintiff] cannot recover lost profits flowing from an agreement to purchase property that never closed due to the failure of that agrement’s express conditions.”  Op. at 21-23.

In an antitrust suit about fees for a golf voucher program, the defendant successfully moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had not alleged an effect on interstate commerce.  Substantively, the Court acknowledged that while it has “limited the reach of the Commerce Clause with respect to non-economic activity,” (Op. at 7, citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)), “the conduct alleged here . . . bringing out-of-state tourists to play golf–falls squarely within the Supreme Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence.  Procedurally, the Court reviewed the plaintiff’s allegations about the effect of the fees on “out-of-state residents” in light of Twombly and Iqbal and concluded that, while “sparse,” those allegations sufficed to allege an effect on interstate commerce.  The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.  Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Association v. Mississippi Gulf Coast Golf Course Association

The case of Klier v. Elf Atochem presented this challenge: “When modern, large-scale class actions are resolved via settlement, money often remains in the settlement fund even after initial distributions to class members have been made because some class members either cannot be located or decline to file a claim.”  Op. at 6.  The Court reviewed the district court’s decision to make a cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds from a tort settlement to various charities.  The Court began its analysis by reminding that the Rules Enabling Act and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 “define the first –and often the last–arena of analysis,” Op. at 8, limiting cy pres distributions “only to rescue the objectives of the settlement when the agreement fails to do so.”  Op. at 10.  Noting that the parties’ settlement did not provide for a cy pres distribution, and that it had a clause allowing the district court to change the distribution protocol “for the benefit of the Settlement Class Members,” Op. at 11-12, the Court concluded that the unused funds were to be used for the benefit of another settlement subclass rather than as the district court had ordered.  The Court went on to review several features of the parties’ agreement, reminding that the cases in this area “have necessarily taken case-specific approaches . . . .”  Op. at 14.  Chief Judge Jones wrote a concurrence that focused on situations when it would be appropriate to return unused funds to the settling defendant.

In Friends of St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Church v. FEMA, a nonprofit association challenged several acts of FEMA in dealing with a historic church property.  The Court analyzed the association’s standing, beginning by noting that as a jurisdictional matter, the issue can be examined for the first time on appeal.   Op. at 8.  To establish standing, “[t]he plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate . . . ”  Op. at 9.  The Court found that the association lacked a sufficient “geographical nexus” as to FEMA’s activities in the Ninth Ward and did not suffer “concrete injury” from alleged deficiencies in FEMA’s review processes.  Op. at 12.  The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.

In Young v. Merrill Lynch, the Court addressed a technical dispute under New York law about the appropriate deference to decisions of Merrill Lynch’s Compensation Committee.  Judge DeMoss dissented from the per curiam opinion.  Full text of both opinions here. 

In Williams v. Homeland Insurance, a discretionary appeal accepted under the Class Action Fairness Act, the Court affirmed the denial of a motion to remand, concluding that the “local controversy” exception to CAFA jurisdiction had been satisfied.  The opinion reminds that “[t]he parties moving for remand bear the burden of proof that they fall within an exception to CAFA jurisdiction.”  Op. at 3.  In this challenge to discounts made by a PPO program, the Court concluded that adding a claims administrator as a new party did not change the fact that “significant relief” was still sought from the in-state entity that operated the PPO network, thus satisfying that element of the local controversy exception.  Op. at 6.   The Court went on to state that “a class arbitration is not a class action,” and that as a result, a prior arbitration did not implicate the requirement of the exception that no other class action have been filed against a defendant in the previous three years.  Op. at 7.