The Texas Package Sales Association, a trade association of alcohol sellers, moved for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) from a longstanding injunction against the enforcement of a residency requirement for sales permits. The Fifth Circuit concluded:
- While not a plaintiff in the original litigation, TPSA had intervened in it, and could challenge the permanent injunction; and
- TPSA had standing as an organization to sue about the requirement; but
- Subsequent Supreme Court opinions about the Commerce Clause did not create an intervening change in the law that would justify Rule 60(b) relief original litigation; and
- TPSA had not adequately placed at issue the alternative ground for the injunction, based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
A dissent would not have found that TPSA had standing to sue, characterizing its suit as an effort “to substitute itself . . for the state authorities” with jurisdiction over the applicable law. Cooper v. TABC, No. 14-51343 (April 21, 2016).
Plaintiffs, “waste haulers that operate throughout the City of San Antonio and its surrounding counties,” claimed that a fee imposed by San Antonio for a waste collection permit violated the Commerce Clause. Cibolo Waste, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, No. 12-50153 (May 15, 2013). Examining their standing, the Fifth Circuit found that they showed an injury-in-fact because the fee increased their cost of doing business. The plaintiffs, could not, however, show that they fell within zone of interest protected by the dormant Commerce Clause, since “[t]heir business is purely intrastate,” and “the only parties that have standing to bring a dormant Commerce Clause challenge are those who both engage in interstate commerce and can show that the ordinance at issue has adversely affected their commerce.”
In an antitrust suit about fees for a golf voucher program, the defendant successfully moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had not alleged an effect on interstate commerce. Substantively, the Court acknowledged that while it has “limited the reach of the Commerce Clause with respect to non-economic activity,” (Op. at 7, citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)), “the conduct alleged here . . . bringing out-of-state tourists to play golf–falls squarely within the Supreme Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence. Procedurally, the Court reviewed the plaintiff’s allegations about the effect of the fees on “out-of-state residents” in light of Twombly and Iqbal and concluded that, while “sparse,” those allegations sufficed to allege an effect on interstate commerce. The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Association v. Mississippi Gulf Coast Golf Course Association