The trademark-infringement issue in Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v Beckertime, LLC turned on whether the customary “digits-of-confusion” analysis should have been augmented by additional considerations involving the refurbishment of trademarked products. The Fifh Circuit agreed with the district court’s treatment of the issue:

Champion instructs that a reseller may utilize the trademark of another, so long as it involves nothing more than a restoration to the original condition, and not a new design. In that case, “[f]ull disclosure gives themanufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.”  Here, BeckerTime does more than recondition or repair vintage Rolex watches. As the district court found, BeckerTime produced “modified watches,” with “added diamonds,” “aftermarket bezels,” and aftermarket bracelets or straps. It found that the watches sold by BeckerTime were “materially different than those sold by Rolex.” In fact, the district court found that Rolex has never sold watches matching the descriptions provided by BeckerTime. Unlike the plugs in Champion that “are nevertheless Champion plugs and not those of another make,” BeckerTime’s watches are of another make and cannot properly be called genuine Rolex watches. … Champion’s misnomer exception properly applied to the facts of this case and the district court did not err by conducting a traditional digits of confusion analysis.

No. 22-10866 (Jan. 27, 2024) (citations omitted).

Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v Beckertime, LLC affirmed a finding of infringement, while also affirming the trial court’s finding that laches precluded a disgorgement award:

The district court concluded that at a minimum, Rolex’s agent “should have known about BeckerTime in 2010, ten years prior to the filing of the lawsuit, and no later than 2013 when [a Rolex employee] wrote that BeckerTime watches were junk.” …  On appeal, Rolex offers no justification for the delay, instead arguing that BeckerTime failed to show prejudice. But the record supports that the ten years of permitted sales enabled BeckerTime to build up a successful business that it would not otherwise have invested in absent Rolex’s delay in filing suit. This is clear prejudice.

No. 22-10866 (Jan. 26, 2024).

Rex Real Estate, a commercial real estate broker, sued Rex Exchange, a facilitator of online home sales. The defendant won judgment as a matter of law at trial, after which the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In its opinion, the Court  sought to “unconfuse” its precedent about confusion in trademark-infringement cases, reviewing the holdings of its cases and applying the resulting framework to that aspect of the case:

Plaintiff’s anecdotal proof of confusion does not involve swayed customer purchases or initial interest confusion that can result in swayed business. It also does not involve “potential customer[s] considering whether to transact business with one or the other of the parties.” But it has presented instances of potential customers of each respective company mistakenly contacting the other. . These instances are relevant, but their weight is lessened by Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s high volume of business and extensive advertising. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff has presented some relevant evidence of actual confusion, a reasonable jury could conclude that this digit weighs in its favor.

Rex Real Estate I, LP v. Rex Real Estate Exchange, Inc., No. 22-50405 (Sept. 6, 2023) (citations omitted).

Jack Daniel’s v. VIP presented the question whether a dog toy, with the general appearance of a Jack Daniel’s bottle, infringed the Jack Daniel’s trademarks. The matter reached the Supreme Court because of a dispute over whether to (a) apply the customary likelihood-of-confusion factors under the Lanham Act, or (b) before applying those factors, apply “the Rogers test” that focuses on a First Amendent issue. The Supreme Court chose the simpler path and went straight to the factors:

Without deciding whether Rogers has merit in other contexts, we hold that it does not when an alleged infringer uses a trademark in the way the Lanham Act most cares about: as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods. VIP used the marks derived from Jack Daniel’s in that way, so the infringement claim here rises or falls on likelihood of confusion. But that inquiry is not blind to the expressive aspect of the Bad Spaniels toy that the Ninth Circuit highlighted.

No. 22-148 (U.S. June 8, 2023) (citation omitted).

A long-running trademark dispute involving a New Orleans dining treasure, the Camellia Grill, came to an end in Uptown Grill, LLC v. Cameilla Grill Holdings, Inc. Among other holdings, the Fifth Circuit held that the following permanent injunction about trade dress was not an abuse of discretion “where the district court adhered to our recitation of … eight elements [in a prior opinion in the case], albeit adding the less precise language ‘all or most.'” The Court distinguished “other cases in which injunctions referencing trade dress have been reversed for vagueness, [because] the injunction set forth by the district court here has much more detail than a general prohibition from employing ‘confusingly similar’ trade dress.”

In crafting this injunction, the Court looks specifically to the definition of “trade dress” utilized by the Fifth Circuit in its May 29, 2019 opinion. “Trade dress” is defined as “the total image and overall appearance of a product [that] may include features such as the size, shape, color, color combinations, textures, graphics, and even sales techniques that characterize a particular product.” The alleged elements of trade dress include: (1) the pink and green interior paint scheme, (2) the “U-Shaped” double horseshoe counter design, (3) the stainless steel stemmed stools with green stool cushions, (4) the fluted metal design under the customer side of the counter and above the cooking line, (5) the visible pie cases attached to the rear wall at both ends of the cooking line, (6) the “straw popping” routine, (7) audible order calling routine, and (8) the individual counter checks handed to each customer. The enjoined parties’ utilization of all or most of the above Camellia Grill trade dress elements at any single location will constitute a violation of this injunction.

No. 21-30639 (Aug. 23, 2022).

The plaintiffs in Lee v. Andrew Lawrence Collection LLC sought to register the trademark “THEEILOVE” – a phrase associated with the alma mater of Jackson State University. Then they sued that university’s licensing agent and some licensees.

The defendants successfully moved to dismiss under the infrequently-used combination of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and 12(b)(7), based on the university’s interest in the subject matter, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned:

  • Interest. The university had a non-frivolous interest in the ownership of the mark based on the university’s consistent usage of it, and that interest could be “practically impaired” by a decision on that topic in this case (as distinct from an analysis of whether a judgment would in fact be preclusive). Thus, the university was a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i).
  • Proceed or dismiss? As a state university, Jackson State had sovereign immunity from suit; that interest “is necessarily impaired when plaintiffs try to use the state’s sovereign immunity to lure it into a lawsuit against its will.” That issue alone favored dismissal. The Court noted that the other, practically focused factots in Rule 19(b) also favored dismissal.

No. 20-30796 (Aug. 24, 2022).  (In honor of this fairly rare analysis of Rule 19, here is a link to Paul Hardcastle’s 1985 hit Nineteen.)

The plaintiff in Beatriz Ball, L.L.C. v. Barballago Co. alleged that a competitor’s line of tableware infringed on the plaintiff’s unregistered trade dress for its Organic Pearl, products.

After a 3-day bench trial, the trial court ruled for the defendant. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The key Lanham Act issue was whether the plaintiff’s trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. Of the seven relevant factors, three required additional scrutiny on remand:

  • Volume of sales. “Beatriz Ball offered evidence of the exact volume of sales attributable to the Organic Pearl collection. … [W]hether this multimillion-dollar volume of sales ultimately weighs for or against secondary meaning should be reconsidered. No current circuit precedent expressly addresses a $6.6 million volume, but two cases uphold much higher volumes and one rejects a much lower volume as indicia of secondary meaning.”
  • Nature of use in newspapers and magazines. “In its analysis of the ‘newspaper and magazines’ factor, the district court observed that ‘very few of the advertisements reference the collection by name and just as many advertisements highlight Beatriz Ball pieces from other collections.’ As Beatriz Ball points out, however, ‘[t]his is not a suit over rights to a name; it’s a suit over rights to product designs.'” 
  • Defendant’s intent. “Beatriz Ball’s trade dress claim is not confined to products that include a pearl rim or that might include some distortions in the product’s shape. As described, the trade dress exhibits a unique combination of features pertaining to the individuality of each piece, the irregular and unpredictable size and shape of the pearls, the undulated shape of the body, the metallic shine, and the overall, accurate impression that each piece was handmade with artisanal quality. None of the products presented at trial incorporated these elements holistically like the Pampa Bay products.” 

No. 21-30029 (July 12, 2022).

 

“Springboards to Education” returned to the Fifth Circuit with another unsuccessful trademark-infringement lawsuit against a school district: “One decisive fact remains all the same: sophisticated school-district customers can tell the difference between goods Springboards is selling them and goods and slogans [the [Pharr-San Juan-Alamo  is Independent School District] is not.” (footnote omitted). A 2019 case involving Springboards provides a useful explanation of the different policy interests advanced by different bodies of intellectual-property law.

In one corner, Getagadget LLC, which holds a registered trademark for “BIG BITE” for its beach toy shaped like a shark’s head. In the other, Jet Creations, Inc., which makes the Big Bite Prehistoric T-Rex Pool Float. Held, Getagadget did not establish Texas jurisdiction over its trademark-infringement claim when its counsel ordered a Big Bite Prehistoric T-Rex Pool Float:

“[I]n order to demonstrate that its trademark infringement and unfair competition claims arose out of sales that Jet directed at Texas, Getagadget was required to show that those sales were to customers who could have been potentially deceived by the alleged infringement. Getagadget’s counsel’s transactions will not suffice because counsel ‘knew exactly with whom []he was dealing and knew that defendants were not associated in any way with plaintiff.’ ‘Clearly, [Getagadget and its counsel were] not confused as to the source of the products in question.'”

Getagadget LLC v. Jet Creations, Inc., No. 19-41019 (March 30, 2022) (mem. op.).

The Fifth Circuit reversed the Rule 12 dismissal of a Lanham Act case in which “Plaintiffs allege that Defendants purchased trademark terms as keywords for search-engine advertising, then placed generic advertisements that confused customers as to whether the advertisements belonged to or were affiliated with the Plaintiffs.” Adler v. McNeil Consultants, No. 20-10936 (Aug. 10, 2021) (LPHS represented the appellee in this matter).

In one corner, there is “Metchup”: “Mr. Dennis Perry makes Metchup, which depending on the batch is a blend of either Walmart-brand mayonnaise and ketchup or Walmart-brand mustard and ketchup. Mr. Perry sells Metchup exclusively from the lobby of a nine-room motel adjacent to his used-car dealership in Lacombe, Louisiana. He has registered Metchup as an incontestable trademark. Though he had big plans for Metchup, sales have been slow. Since 2010, Mr. Perry has produced only 50 to 60 bottles of Metchup, which resulted in sales of around $170 and profits of around $50. He owns www.metchup.com but has never sold Metchup online. For better or worse, the market is not covered in Metchup.”

In the other corner, there is Heinz: “Along comes Heinz. It makes Mayochup, which is solely a blend of mayonnaise and ketchup. To promote Mayochup’s United States launch, Heinz held an online naming contest where fans proposed names. A fan submitted Metchup, and Heinz posted a mock-up bottle bearing the name Metchup on its website alongside mock-up bottles for the other proposed names. Heinz never sold a product labeled Metchup.” 

Sadly for Perry’s trademark-infringement claim, the Fifth Circuit concluded: “It would be a coincidence to ever encounter both Mayochup and Metchup in the market, much less get confused about the affiliation, sponsorship, or origin of the two products. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could conclude that Heinz’s use of Metchup in advertising or the sale of its own product, Mayochup, created a likelihood of confusion.” Perry v. H.J. Heinz, No. 20-30418 (April 12, 2021).

A Buddhist group sued for alleged infringement of the mark “Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam” and two others. The Fifth Circuit concluded that of the seven relevant factors about secondary meaning, “only the first factor—the length and manner of use of the Unified Church’s asserted marks—has evidence weighing in favor of the marks having developed protectable secondary meaning.”  On the record presented, that evidence alone was insufficient to justify a finding for the plaintiff, and the Court affirmed a defense summary judgment. The Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam v. Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam – Giao Hoi Phat Giao Viet Nam Thong Nhat, No. 19-20544 (Dec. 14, 2020, unpublished). (Relatedly, the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction in Future Proof Brands v. Molson Coors, based on a review of the “digits of confusion” as developed on that record, No. No. 20-50323 (Dec. 3, 2020, unpublished). Our firm represented the appellant in that matter.)

In Springboards to Education v. Houston ISD, an education-services company sued the Houston school district about a summer reading program. The company’s program, called the “Read a Million Words Campaign,” offered incentives to join the “Millionaire’s Reading Club” and gave prizes when students reached their reading goals. HISD’s program, focused just on summer reading, involved the “Houston ISD Millionaire Club” and similar sorts of goal-related gifts. In affirming a summary judgment for HISD, the Fifth Circuit made two important, general observations about the purposes of trademark law:

  1. Trademark law protects marks – not process. “HISD could have copied the methodologies used in the Read a Million Words campaign step by step, and, whatever other problems that might have engendered, as long as it used clearly distinguishable nomenclature, Springboards would have no argument that HISD violated the Lanham Act in doing so.” The Court noted that a patent could, at least in theory, potentially protect such processes.
  2. Purchaser confusion is the key – not “confusion” generally. The Court noted that confusion about the programs involving HISD students and their parents was relevant – but only to the extent it bore on the test for evaluating confusion by potential purchasers of Springboards’ products. “Looking the digits of confusion for guidance, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion. Springboards’ marks are not widely known and are similar or identical to multiple third-party marks. HISD did not market the Houston ISD Millionaire Club to Springboards’ potential customers—i.e., third-party school districts. There is no evidence of an intent to confuse. And Springboards’ potential customers are sophisticated institutional purchasers that are not easily confused. The only digit pointing unwaveringly in Springboards’ favor is the similarity of the products. But even this does not strongly suggest a likelihood of confusion given the popularity of millionaire-themed literacy programs.” (emphasis added).

No. 18-20119 (revised Feb. 14, 2019).

Monty Python’s famous “Dead Parrot” sketch involved John Cleese and Michael Palin debating whether a dead bird sold by a pet store was, in fact, deceased. In that same spirit, the case of Alliance for Good Government v. Coalition for Better Government addressed whether the Coalition’s bird-based logo infringed the Alliance’s logo:

Alliance won in the trial court, as the birds appear identical, “with the same down-pointed beak, gazing over the same wing (the right), sporting the same number of feathers (forty-three).” Unphased, Coalition argued that its bird was a hawk, while Alliance’s was an eagle, leading to a puzzled exchange with the district judge:

DISTRICT COURT: They look exactly alike to me, the two birds.

COUNSEL: […] [N]o, they really aren’t, your Honor, if you look at the wing span. The wing span of the eagle is different from the hawk. It’s much larger and it fans out, and that’s just the way the hawk looks.

Equally puzzled, the Fifth Circuit affirmed: “To cut to the chase: Alliance and Coalition have the same logo.” No. 17-30859 (Aug. 22, 2018) (emphasis in original).

 

 

After trial of a Lanham Act claim involving the right to use the term “Cowboy” in advertising bourbon, the jury found abandonment of the plaintiff’s alleged mark, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. “As the district court observed, the jury fairly rejected the testimony of Allied’s founder, Marci Palatella, and Allied’s price lists as evidence of intent to resume use. . . .  Garrison Brothers presented evidence undermining Palatella’s contention that Allied specializes in old, rare, and expensive whiskeys; disputing Palatella’s reliance on a bourbon shortage as a reason for Allied’s failure to sell ‘COWBOY LITTLE BARREL’ bourbon after 2009; and highlighting Palatella’s inconsistent testimony concerning Allied’s price lists.” Allied Lomar, Inc. v. Lone Star Distillery LLC,  No. 17-50148 (July 17, 2018, unpublished).

I think the server for this blog is located in Texas, but it could just as easily be on the South Pole – I have no control over (or interest in) how HostGator organizes its business. In the same spirit, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a personal jurisdiction dismissal in a trademark dispute between “greatfence.com” and “agreatfence.com“: “We need not decide today whether a web server’s location alone never suffices to establish personal jurisdiction. We simply hold that it cannot do so here, where there is no allegation, argument, or evidence that the defendants played any role in selecting the server’s location—or that its location was selected with the purpose or intent of facilitating the defendants’ business in the forum.” GreatFence.com v. Bailey, No. 17-20487 (June 13, 2018, unpublished) (emphasis in original).

A Texas restaurateur took steps to open a seafood restaurant called The Krusty Krab. Those plans met choppy seas when Viacom, owner of the “SpongeBob SquarePants” TV show, sued to enforce its trademark rights as to that name (in the show, the undersea restaurant where SpongeBob works). In a textbook example of a Lanham Act claim (Texas common law being identical), the Fifth Circuit held:

  • As a threshold matter, specific elements of a TV show can receive trademark protection (citing Conan the Barbarian, the General Lee, and Kryponite, while noting the less-fortunate case law about the Star Trek franchise’s rights to the term “Romulan”)
  • As to the first element, the mark is legally protectable, especially given the high profile and longevity of the SpongeBob show
  • And as to the second element, despite some uncertainty as to its degree and nature, the likelihood of confusion was still high enough to justify trademark protection.

Viacom Int’l v. IJR Capital Investments, No. 17-20334 (May 22, 2018).

Laney Chiropractic v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. presented a dispute about whether “advertising injury,” covered by insurance, was raised by a complaint about a competitor’s statements about a chiropractic massage technique. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the insurer, finding, inter alia: “[W]hen an insured is accused of using another’s product, they are generally not using another’s ‘advertising idea.’ . . . And that is precisely what the Underlying Complaint alleges. It alleges that Laney unlawfully used a patented product . . . and then advertised the product on its website.” Arguments based on alleged trade dress and slogan infringement failed for similar reasons. No. 16-1183 (July 28, 2017)

Streamline Production Systems v. Streamline Manufacturing involved trademark litigation between businesses with similar names. The Fifth Circuit affirmed theury’s findings about the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark and the likelihood of confusion, observing that the various factors did not all point the same way but “there is not a complete absence of evidence” to support what the jury found. The court reversed on remedy, however, finding that the “reasonable royalty” damages went beyond the scope of the infringement, and that the award of unjust enrichment was not supported by evidence of lost profits or willful action by the defendant. No. 16-20046 (revised April 14, 2017).

Litigation about the intellectual property rights to the name “Communicat-R” (here, applied to a specialized type of whiteboard) led to a jury trial. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in this instruction: “Trademarks can be abandoned through non-use. A trademark is abandoned if it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the use of trademark was discontinued; and (2) an intent not to resume such use.” The Court rejected a request for additional language about “excusable nonuse,” finding that it would either be redundant or not entirely accurate in the context of this case. The Court also rejected sufficiency challenges to liability and damages, illustrating the operation of the federal standard for the grant of a new trial. Vetter v. McAtee, No. 15-20575 (March 1, 2017).

g36Michael Swoboda sued Continental Enterprises, claiming that it conducted an investigation into alleged trademark infringement led to his wrongful discharge. He sought the production of documents that Continental alleged were protected as work product. The district court allowed the discovery and denied the intervention by Heckler & Koch, the gunmaker whose rights about the G36 submachine gun (above) were at issue and had retained Continental.

The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding: “Continental’s work product privilege argument was overruled because Continental is a company that engages in investigative work, and the district court concluded that the discovery that Swoboda sought was produced in Continental’s ordinary course of business, i.e., in the course of a Continental investigation. HK is a gun manufacturer. Investigations are not a part of HK’s ordinary course of business. Some of the discovery that Swoboda sought was, from HK’s perspective, prepared in anticipation of litigation. We have held that an applicant-intervenor should be allowed to intervene when it ‘has a defense not available to the present defendant.’ HK has a defense unavailable to Continental, and it should have been allowed to present that defense in the district court.” Swoboda v. Manders, No. 16-30074 (Oct. 31, 2016, unpublished).

regular_purple_cr_bag_1In trademark and trade dress litigation betexas crown with bag2tween Diageo, the maker of Crown Royal (left) and Mexcor, who makes Texas Crown Club (right), Diageo stipulated that “Mexcor did not infringe its marks until Mexcor sold its very first Texas Crown Club bottle in a bag bearing the Texas Crown Club logo” during the fourth quarter of 2011. Despite this concession, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Mexcor was not entitled to judgment on related issues when it “failed to urge that these counterclaims be presented to the jury after the district court denied its motions for JMOL.” The Court went on to remand the permanent injunction against Mexcor for revisoin, noting that the injunctoin could not extend to a type of bag that Mexcor had established its legal entitledment to use, and observing as to the last, “catch-all” provision of the injunction: “We are hesitant to approve such open-ended language, particularly because in other contexts this court whiskeyhas held that such ‘obey the law’ injunction orders are not permitted.” Diageo North America, Inc. v. Mexcor, Inc., No 15-20630 (Sept. 2, 2016, unpublished). (The opinon also notes TexasBarToday_TopTen_Badge_VectorGraphicthe distinction between “whisky” (distilled in Scotland) and “whiskey” (distilled in the U.S. or Ireland), although none of these countries are the source of the liquor in this case, which the parties spelled “whisky.”)

emerald cityEmerald City Management, d/b/a the band “Downtown Fever,” won a preliminary injunction against another band with the same name.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting the importance of “los[ing] control over the mark’s reputation and goodwill” in establishing irreparable injury, and citing evidence of the plaintiff’s history with the band name, the defendant’s plans to play in the same area, and the defendant’s marketing using that name.  Emerald City Management LLC v. Kahn, No. 14-40856 (Dec. 11, 2015, unpublished) (citing Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2008)).  (In a later skirmish among these parties, the Court reversed a later preliminary injunction about the use of a Facebook page: “neither shutting down a Facebook account nor blocking administrator access to a Facebook account constitutes ‘use in commerce’ of a trademark.”  Emerald City Management LLC v. Kahn, No. 15-40446 (March 8, 2016, unpublished)).

voalogoRobert Namer had a Louisiana business that used the name “Voice of America,” and encountered intellectual property trouble with the Voice of America information service operated by the U.S. Government.   (Incidentally, I recommend some study of the VOA’s “Simple English” programming, which uses a 1,500-word vocabulary, for anyone interested in straightforward writing.)  Namer lost at trial and challenged the VOA’s audience survey on appeal.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed: “It was appropriate for [the VOA’s expert] to survey potential consumers of TexasBarToday_TopTen_Badge_SmallNamer’s website to determine if they might be confused into believing they were viewing the website of the government-run VOA (and 19.1% of them were confused.)”  The Court also rejected a laches argument because Namer did not show prejudice; “[c]ontinued routine use of the website during the time when the Board allegedly sat on its rights is all that Namer has established.”  Namer v. Voice of America, No. 14-31353 (Oct. 26, 2015, unpublished).  The opinion helpfully summarizes recent Circuit authority on both the survey and laches issues.

test-clip-art-cpa-school-testTwo test preparation services sued each other.  The plaintiff sought coverage for a counterclaim under a policy that covered “injury arising out of . . . infringing upon another’s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your advertisement” (in other words, “trade dress” but not “trademark” claims).  .” (emphasis added). Even under the generous standards for determining the duty to defend, the counterclaim’s allegations did not trigger coverage: “The central focus in this coverage dispute, however, is not on the confusion, but on what allegedly is causing the confusion. The alleged confusion in this case stems from the use of a similar service mark (“Testmasters”), and the false
representation that TES offers a similar service (live LSAT courses offered nationwide). None of the allegations possibly states a claim for confusingly similar trade dress.”  Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 14-20473 (June 29, 2015).

An architectural firm sued a former employee and a competitor.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed judgment for the defendants in Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, No. 13-11297 (June 15, 2015).  As to the firm’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the Fifth Circuit found no error in the district court’s finding that “the plans in the AutoCAD files were the same as the physical copies of the plans that [had] already been disseminated by [Plaintiff]” to various homeowners.  A noncompete claim failed for lack of an express promise related to confidential information.  Other claims based on copyright, the Lanham Act, contract, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act failed for similar proof problems.  Particularly as to the elements of a noncompete claim under Texas law, the opinion provides a practical summary of potential claims related to an employee’s departure, as well as several commonly-litigated factual issues related to those claims.

Only in New Orleans.  During Mardi Gras, a form of folk art takes discarded beads and twists them into a dog shape, also known as a “bead dog.”  A seller of king cakes obtained a trademark for its mascot based on that image (below left), and sued a jewelrymaker who sold necklaces and earrings that also drew upon that image (below right).

haydel dog

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the nola dogjewelrymaker, reasoning:

1.  The bakery’s “Mardi Gras Bead Dog” mark was descriptive of its products;

2.  The mark was not inherently distinctive, and thus may be protected only if it had acquired secondary meaning;

3.  Under the applicable seven-factor test, the bakery failed to establish that the mark had acquired secondary meaning; and .

4.  While a dog itself cannot be copyrighted, its distinctive collar could potentially be, but on this record the Court concluded that no reasonable juror could find the collars to be “substantially similar in protectable expression.”

Other related state law claims were also dismissed.  Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enterprises, Inc., No. 13-30918 (April 8, 2015).

pennzoilPennzoil has several well-known trademarks for its motor oil products.  It sued Miller Oil, which operates a quick-stop oil change facility in Houston, for infringing those marks.  Miller defended on the ground that after its original contract with Pennzoil lapsed in 2003, Pennzoil’s dealings with Miller amounted to an acquiescence in Miller’s use of the marks.  The district court agreed but the Fifth Circuit reversed.  Pennzoil-Quaker State Co. v. Miller Oil & Gas Operations, No.  13-20558 (Feb. 23, 2015).

The Court thoroughly reviewed its own, and other Circuits’, approaches to the elements of the acquiescence defense, as well as the relationship of that defense to laches.  The Court concluded that an element of the defense was undue prejudice to the defendant from the plaintiff’s conduct, which usually involves “some form of ‘business building.'” Here, the defendant’s expenses associated with removing Pennzoil’s marks did not imagesatisfy that requirement, because they would not be related to business expansion.  While the defendant’s claim about a “loss of identity” from removing Pennzoil’s marks could qualify, on this record: “Miller Oil does not proffer evidence of, for example, changes in its customer base, higher profits, or new business opportunities it was able to exploit because of the re-brand.”  Accordingly, Miller Oil did not meet its burden of proof.

plasticsEastman Chemical, the manufacturer of a plastic resin used in water bottles and food containers, successfully sued Plastipure under the Lanham Act, alleging that Plastipure falsely advertised that Eastman’s resin contained a dangerous and unhealthy additive. Eastman Chemical Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., No. 13-51087 (Dec. 22, 2014). Relying on ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2013), Plastipure argued that “commercial statements relating to live scientific controversies should be treated as opinions for Lanham Act purposes.”  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, noting that Plastipure made these statements in commercial ads rather than scientific literature, and observing: “Otherwise, the Lanham Act would hardly ever be enforceable — ‘many, if not most, products may be tied to public concerns with the environment, energy, economic policy, or individual health and safety.'”  The Court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions and to the sufficiency of the evidence as to falsity.

wrestlingpicWorld Wrestling Entertainment sought ex parte seizure and temporary restraining orders, against unnamed defendants selling fake WWE merchandise at live events, under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act.  The district judge denied relief, noting concerns about WWE’s ability to prove a likelihood of success against an unknown defendant.  The Fifth Circuit (who reviewed the case because the district court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal) took a different view, noting: “WWE does not license third parties to sell merchandise at live events . . . The resulting confined universe of authorized sellers of WWE merchandise necessarily ‘identifies’ any non-WWE seller as a counterfeiter.”  The opinion also observed that “the very nature of the ‘fly-by-night’ imagebootlegging industry” involves “counterfeiters who, upon detection and notice of suit, disappear without a trace and hide or destroy evidence, only to reappear later at the next WWE event down the road.”  World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Unidentified Parties, No. 14-30489 (Nov. 4, 2014).

In Escamilla v. M2 Technology, the individual owner of a business sued to enforce the “M2” trademark owned by his business.  No. 12-41183 (July 16, 2013, unpublished).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim for failure to join a necessary party, as the individual did not join his company as a party plaintiff, thus exposing the defendant to potential repetitive future litigation.  (This decision appears to have been rooted in avoiding the cost of having counsel appear for the company.)  The Court rejected the individual’s argument that a future suit would be barred by claim preclusion, noting the clear separation in Delaware corporate law between a business entity and its shareholders.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction about pharmaceutical development in Daniels Health Sciences v. Vascular Health Sciences.  No. 12-20599 (March 5, 2013). The opinion offers a practical road map for basic issues in trade secret litigation.  As to likelihood of success on the merits, the Court found adequate findings about damage, specific confidential information, a trade secret arising from a “compilation,” and a confidential relationship between the parties.  As to irreparable injury, the Court found sufficient findings about reputational injury that was not speculative.  While it found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s weighing of public and private interest factors, it did see a “close question” about the overall scope of the injunction in light of the conduct at issue and the defendant’s business plans and suggested that the district court “try to narrow the scope of its injunction on remand.”

Paddle Tramps Manufacturing made wooden paddles with the emblems of several fraternities, a group of 32 fraternities sued to enjoin it for trademark infringement and unfair competition, and the company defended with unclean hands and laches.  Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, No. 12-10525 (revised Feb. 7, 2013).  The district court entered partial injunctive relief after a jury trial found for the company on the defenses.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the instructions given, finding that the appellant’s arguments about unclean hands conflated elements of trademark liability with elements of the defense and that the laches instruction fairly handled the concept of “progressive encroachment.”   The Court also found sufficient evidence to support the “undue prejudice” element of laches, although calling it a “close question,” and found that the district court properly balanced the equities — especially injury to the alleged infringer — in crafting the injunction.  The opinion discusses and distinguishes other cases denying relief in related situations.  Professor Rebecca Tushnet further analyzes the case on her intellectual property blog.

In Gibson v. Texas Department of Insurance, a state regulator sought to prohibit an attorney from using the domain: “texasworkerscomplaw.com.”  No. 11-11136 (Oct. 30, 2012). Even assuming the domain name was only commercial speech, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Texas failed to show that the name was inherently deceptive, and also “made no serious attempt to justify” its regulation as an effort to “prevent misuse of the DWC’s names and symbols.”  Id. at 9-10.  The Court thus reversed and remanded for consideration of the “misuse” issue and to allow Gibson to show that the domain was “ordinary, communicative speech, and not merely . . . commercial speech.”  Its analysis reviewed several cases about trademark issues in the domain name context.  Id. at 8 & n.1.