For a recent CLE presentation, I prepared the attached one-page chart to summarize the Fifth Circuit’s recent holdings about discovery.
Plaintiff accused defendant (and his employer) of sexual assault while incarcerated at a privately-run detention center. Defense counsel had recordings of calls made by the plaintiff, from the facility, suggesting that the encounters were consensual. Counsel did not identify the recordings in their Rule 26 initial disclosures, and did not make the recordings available until the plaintiff’s deposition, after questioning her about the conversations. The district court sanctioned defense counsel for inadequate disclosure and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that “some evidence serves both substantive and impeachment functions and thus should not be treated as ‘solely’ impeachment evidence” under Rule 26. Olivarez v. GRO Group, Inc., No. 16-50191 (Dec. 12, 2016).
Interlocutory appeal of discovery issues is largely foreclosed under the restrictive view of the “collateral order” doctrine adopted by Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009). Another, rarely-traveled path appears in Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., in which the district court and Fifth Circuit agreed that an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of a difficult discovery issue involving parallel private employment litigation and immigration proceedings. The specific issue address is important but narrow; the procedural holding is notable for how unusual and important a discovery issue must be to come within the ambit of the interlocutory appeal statute. No. 15-60562 (Sept. 27, 2016).
The district court required the plaintiff in an FLSA case to submit her phone to a forensic examiner. It then awarded significant sanctions when the defendants’ “inspection revealed that the text messages in question were not on [Plaintiff’s] phone, that the mobile application allegedly containing such text messages was not on the phone, and that the phone appeared to have been reset or newly activated only three days before the forensic inspection.” The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion; footnote 2 of the opinion details several unsuccessful explanations and counterarguments offered by the plaintiff, which had no traction here but could be of interest in a future e-discovery dispute involving similar issues. Timms v. LZM, LLC, No. 15-20700 (July 5, 2016, unpublished).
Mutual of Omaha obtained a summary judgment against Prospect, who complained under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) that it needed “additional electronic discovery related to allegedly backdated documents produced by Mutual.” The Fifth Circuit declined to enter that wild kingdom, observing: “[T]he magistrate judge denied Prospect’s motion to compel that electronic discovery, and Prospect did not object to the denial. That means that the electronic discovery was not ‘susceptible of collection within a reasonable time frame’ —Prospect was never
going to get it—so it cannot support Prospect’s Rule 56(d) motion.” Prospect Capital v. Mutual of Omaha, No. 15-20345 (April 13, 2016).
Guzman sued Celadon Trucking for personal injuries. On May 9, 2011, Celadon’s counsel asked him to undergo an independent medical exam. On May 27, Guzman said in his deposition that he intended to undergo back surgery. Celadon later contended that his surgery constituted spoliation of evidence, and requested an adverse jury instruction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed its denial, noting: “After [Celadon’s counsel] received this disclosure in the deposition, they made no request to be informed of his surgery date, nor did they ask that he delay surgery pending his examination. Only after the examination was completed did [they] assert that the surgery had meaningfully altered evidence. While the timing of Guzman’s surgery may seem strange, there is no evidence to suggest that he acted in a manner intended to deceive [Celadon] or that he undertook the surgery with the intent of destroying or altering evidence.” Guzman v. Jones, No. 15-40007 (Oct. 22, 2015).
The plaintiffs/relators in United States ex rel Rigsby v. State Farm contended that, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm improperly skewed its claims handling process in favor of finding flood damage, as “wind policy claims were paid out of the company’s own pocket while flood policy claims were paid with government funds.” They won at trial and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that – notwithstanding earlier investigations – they were “paradigmatic . . . whistleblowing insiders” as to this specific claim who qualified as “original sources.” The Court went on to find sufficient evidence of falsity and scienter, and reversed a discovery ruling that would not have allowed the plaintiffs to investigate the facts of other potentially false claims. ” 794 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed on an issue about violation of the FCA’s sealing requirement.
Defendants claimed that a foreclosure sale produced an unfair windfall for Fannie Mae on a substantial commercial property. They alleged that Fannie Mae had a practice of making unfairly low bids on Gulf Coast properties. The Fifth Circuit observed: “As the district court held, evidence regarding Fannie Mae’s other foreclosure practices throughout the Gulf Coast region would not impact whether the subject property was sold for the amount at which it would have changed hands between a willing buyer and seller having knowledge of the relevant facts. At most, such evidence might have suggested that Fannie Mae’s conduct throughout the region affected the fair market value of the subject property. So long as the property was sold for fair market value, however, evidence of the various market forces influencing that value is not relevant to this case.” Fannie Mae v. Lynch, No. 14-60864 (June 2, 2015, unpublished).
Waste Management sued Kattler, a former employee, for misappropriating confidential information and other related claims. A dispute about what information Kattler had in is possession expanded to include a contempt finding against Kattler’s attorney, Moore. Waste Management v. Kattler, No. 13-20356 (Jan. 15, 2015). The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning as follows:
1. The order setting a hearing referenced a motion, by Pacer docket number, that only sought relief against Kattler and not the attorney. It was not an adequate “show-cause order naming [both] Moore and Kattler as alleged contemnors[.]”
2. On the merits, the Court found that Kattler had misled Moore as to the existence of a particular “San Disk thumb drive,” that Moore had acted prudently in consulting ethics counsel and withdrawing after he learned of the untruthfulness, and that new counsel made a prompt disclosure about the drive that avoided unfair prejudice. This part of the opinion reviews Circuit authority about the failure to correct incorrect court filings.
3. Also on the merits, “while Moore clearly failed to comply with the terms of the December 20 preliminary injunction by not producing the iPad image directly to [Waste Management] by December 22, this failure is excusable because the order required Moore to violate the attorney-client privilege.” Further, the relevant order only “required Kattler to produce an image of the device only, not the device itself,” which created a “degree of confusion” that excused the decision not to produce the actual iPad.
Menendez complained about his employer’s accounting practices to the SEC. The employer received a letter from the SEC asking for retention of certain documents. The employer then emailed Menendez’s colleagues, “instructing them to start retaining certain documents because ‘the SEC has opened an inquiry into the allegations of Mr. Menendez.'” Relations with his co-workers deteriorated and he ultimately resigned. In a detailed opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a $30,000 damages award to Menendez on his claim for retaliation: “The undesirable consequences, from a whistleblower’s perspective, of the whistleblower’s supervisor telling the whistleblower’s colleagues that he reported them to authorities for what are allegedly fraudulent practices, thus resulting in an official investigation, are obvious.” Halliburton, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 13-60323 (Nov. 12, 2014). The case has received considerable attention in employment and compliance circles; the Wall Street Journal‘s coverage is a short example.
The concept of “proportionality” in discovery began its modern ascendance in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, with observations such as these: “Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.” 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968 (2007).
Over time, the “proportionality” concept has moved from the discovery rules to pervade the entire system of federal procedure. Consider Advisory Committee Note to revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 (approved by the Judicial Conference in September 2014 and now before the Supreme Court): “Effective advocacy is consistent with — and indeed depends upon — cooperative and proportional use of procedure.”
While arising under state law rather than the Federal Rules, the recent Texas Supreme Court of In re National Lloyds Ins. Co. illustrates the concept of proportionality in a highly practical context. The plaintiff in an insurance bad faith case sought evidence about similar claim denials, arguing “that the trial court’s discovery order was (1) limited in time, because it compelled only production of evidence relating to the two storms at issue, and (2) limited by location, because it involved only properties in Cedar Hill.” ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 13-0761 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2014) (per curiam).
That Court disagreed: “Scouring claim files in hopes of finding similarly situated claimants whose claims were evaluated differently from [plaintiff’s] is at best an ‘impermissible fishing expedition.’ . . . [Plaintiff] is correct that discovery must be reasonably limited in time and geographic scope. But such limits in and of themselves do not render the underlying information discoverable.” It concluded that there were still too many likely differences between this set of claims and the plaintiff’s case to justify the discovery request.
The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board served administrative subpoenas on Transocean in connection with the Deepwater Horizon disaster. United States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc., No. 13-20243 (Sept. 18, 2014). Transocean contended that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the ill-fated rig was not a “stationary source” within the meaning of the Board’s enabling statute; the majority disagreed, concluding that at the time of the accident, the rig “was physically connected (though not anchored) at that site and maintained a fixed position.”
Transocean also contended that this sentence deprived the Board of jurisidiction: “The Board shall not be authorized to investigate marine oil spills, which the National Transportation Safety Board is authorized to investigate.” After a foray into the grammatical thicket of “which” v. “that,” the majority concluded that the Board was not categorically barred from investigating oil spills in light of the “overall regulatory scheme.”
A dissent disagreed with both conclusions, reminded that “[f]or the sake of maintaining limited government under the rule of law, courts must be vigilant to sanction improper administrative overreach,” and noted that at least 17 other investigations were conducted into the accident.
The plaintiff in McKay v. Novartis, Inc. challenged the dismissal on preemption grounds, by an MDL court in Tennessee, of products liability claims about drugs made by Novartis. No. 13-50404 (May 27, 2014). The Fifth Circuit rejected an argument about inadequate time to get certain medical records, noting that the plaintiffs “sought formal discovery of evidence that was available to them through informal means” (citing other cases from the Court on that general topic), and also observing that two years passed from the filing of suit until Novartis sought summary judgment. The Court also affirmed the MDL court’s grant of summary judgment on Texas state law grounds about a breach of warranty claim, finding inadequate notice; as an Erie matter: “the majority of Texas intermediate courts have held that a buyer must notify both the intermediate seller and the manufacturer.”
The dispute presented by the petition for a writ of mandamus in In re Times-Picayune, LLC was a criminal defendant’s ability to have identifying information about online commentators on the defendant’s case produced for in camera review; the defendant contending that the commentators were federal prosecutors. No. 14-30298 (April 8, 2014, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, reasoning: “Here, we are not persuaded that the district court’s (1) balancing of the speech rights of anonymous commenters against the due process interests of [defendant] and (2) ordering the Times-Picayune to turn over information for in camera review was clearly and indisputably erroneous. As an initial matter, there is little case law illuminating how the competing interests in situations comparable to this one should be balanced. . . . Even in the absence of precedent, however, we cannot say that the district court here clearly reached the wrong decision.” [The short opinion is worth comparing to the concurrence in All Plaintiffs v. Transocean Offshore from 2013, about the availability of mandamus relief for discovery matters.] And subsequently, the district court concluded that the commentator at issue was not a prosecutor.
The district court granted a dismissal in favor of New Zealand, on forum non conveniens grounds, in Royal Ten Cate USA, inc. v. TT Investors, Ltd. No. 13-50106 (March 25, 2014, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit remanded for further consideration of what it saw as a key private-interest factor — “whether two key witnesses who reside in Texas would be amenable to process in New Zealand.” The witnesses in question were former party employees living in Texas, and the parties disputed whether those individuals’ employment contracts obligated them to cooperate with litigation after their employment. Their importance was heightened because they were particularly significant to one side, while the other side did not appear to have comparable problems with its likely witnesses. The Court did not express an opinion about the proper result on remand, and noted that “[t]he decision regarding whether or not to take additional evidence is one that we leave to the sound discretion of the district court.”
Duoline Technologies v. Polymer Instrumentation presents an unusual appellate review of a discovery order, arising from an ancillary proceeding to enforce a subpoena for a Pennsylvania case. No. 13-50532 (March 5, 2014, unpublished). Plaintiff Duoline sought to depose Joseph Schwalbach, a former employee, about the business dealings between his new company and Defendant Polymer. Among other rulings, the district court limited the document requests and deposition scope to events during Schwalbach’s employment by Duroline. The Fifth Circuit noted that some evidence supported the plaintiff’s theory of a connection between the businesses, and that logically, plaintiff’s theory relied upon events after Schwalbach left his job at Duoline. The Court did not find an explanatory affidavit from Schwalbach to be dispositive.
Waltner v. Aurora Loan Services LLC welcomes the New Year with three bread-and-butter issues in business litigation. No. 12-50929 (Dec. 31, 2013, unpublished). First, a party’s failure to answer on time does not require the “drastic remedy” of a default judgment, especially when a plaintiff shows no prejudice from the failure to timely answer. The granting of a default judgment is a discretionary ruling by the district court. Second, damages for lost use of property are not reliance damages that can be recovered with a promissory estoppel claim. Rather, they are consequential losses — a form of expectation damages. Finally, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2) says that a court “must strike” unsigned discovery responses “unless a signature is promptly supplied” after the error is identified, the district court has discretion in determining what is “prompt” and in what weight to give the lack of prejudice to the opposing party.
Twenty-four plaintiffs sued Citgo for alleged violations of the overtime pay laws. The court’s second discovery order warned against destruction of personal emails by the plaintiff. Then, after two evidentiary hearings, the court dismissed the claims of seventeen plaintiffs for violating that order (but not of an eighteenth), entering specific factual findings for each plaintiff. Four more were then dismissed after another hearing and sets of findings. Moore v. Citgo Refining & Chemicals Co., Nos. 12-41175 and 12-41292 (Nov. 12, 2013, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion, noting the clarity of the discovery order, the hearing of live testimony, and prejudice to Citgo (loss of the ability to show that the plaintiffs were sending personal emails “on the clock,” which had proven relevant in one of the cases that was not dismissed). The Court also reversed and rendered for $50,000 in costs, finding that the district court’s reduction of taxable costs to $5,000 because of Citgo’s size and resources was not grounded in the applicable rule.
In Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State University, the defendant sought interlocutory review of an order requiring it to appear for a deposition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). No. 12-41393. The Fifth Circuit found the appeal moot because the depositions had already taken place. The defendant argued that the appeal was not moot because the depositions may be used at an upcoming trial. The Court responded: “This court does not have jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions regarding decisions of the district court that have not been made at a trial that has not been held.”
The defendant in Bowles v. Ranger Land Systems did not have a bank account, registered agent, or office in Texas. No. 12-51255 (June 16, 2013, unpublished). As a defense contractor, the company had a handful of employees at three Army bases in Texas, but that presence was not substantial enough to create general jurisdiction. (citing Johnston v. Multidata Systems Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 612-13 (5th Cir. 2008) (presence of two employees, who reported to out-of-state supervisor, was “certainly a regular contact with Texas” but was “not substantial enough to create a general business presence in Texas”)). The Fifth Circuit also found no abuse of discretion in denying further jurisdictional discovery based on these allegations.
The plaintiffs in AFLAC v. Biles sued in state court, alleging that AFLAC paid death benefits to the wrong person, and that the signature on the policy application was forged. No. 12-60235 (April 30, 2013). AFLAC moved to compel arbitration in the state court case and simultaneously filed a new federal action to compel arbitration. The state court judge denied AFLAC’s motion without prejudice to refiling after discovery on the issue of the signatures’ validity. In the meantime, the federal court granted AFLAC’s summary judgment motion and compelled arbitration after hearing expert testimony from both sides on the forgery issue. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Colorado River abstention in favor of the state case was not required, and that the order compelling arbitration was allowed by the Anti-Injunction Act because it was “necessary to protect or effectuate [the federal] order compelling arbitration.” The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the respondents’ FRCP 56(e) motion, since it sought testimony that would only be relevant if the witness admitted outright to forgery.
The parties in Silver Dream LLC v. 3MC Inc. settled a copyright dispute about jewelry sales “by agreeing, among other things, that the [individual defendants] would provide affidavits disclosing details of the infringing items.” No. 11-30968 (March 18, 2013, unpublished). The defendants warranted the affidavits would be “true, complete, and exact” but the agreement allowed termination only if the affidavits were discovered to be false within a year. The plaintiff took issue with the “qualified nature” of the affidavits as a reason to terminate the settlement, but the district court and Fifth Circuit stressed that the cancellation right was limited to a “false” statement. The plaintiff’s proof of alleged affirmative falsehoods in the affidavits was found to lack specificity. The Fifth Circuit also found no abuse of discretion in denying a motion for continuance to depose the individual defendants, noting delay in the request and a lack of specificity about what the plaintiff planned to establish.
The judgment debtors in Seven Arts Pictures v. Jonesfilm were found in civil contempt for failure to answer postjudgment discovery and other issues about enforcement of a judgment. No. 11-31124 (Feb. 18, 2013, unpublished). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had general personal jurisdiction over the debtors, that the debtors had waived arguments about the orders by not timely and properly objecting below, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $21 thousand in attorneys fees. While the holdings on jurisdiction, waiver, and attorneys fees draw heavily from the specific facts of the case, the legal framework used is of broad applicability. Footnote 7 acknowledges the unusual procedural posture of the jurisdiction issue, which had not been raised until after the notice of appeal was filed.
In long-running litigation and arbitration about alleged environmental contamination in Ecuador, Chevron obtained discovery from U.S. courts several times under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 on the basis that a “foreign or international tribunal” was involved. Republic of Ecuador v. Connor, No. 12-20122 (Feb. 13, 2013). Chevron then successfully resisted a § 1782 application on the ground that the arbitration was not an “international tribunal.” The Fifth Circuit applied judicial estoppel and reversed, asking: “Why shouldn’t sauce for Chevron’s goose be sauce for the Ecuador gander as well? The Court dismissed a jurisdictional issue by characterizing § 1782 as a grant of administrative authority. It then rejected Chevron’s arguments that judicial estoppel could not apply to legal issues and that reliance by earlier courts on Chevron’s position had not been shown. The opinion reminds that: “Because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, courts may apply it flexibly to achieve substantial justice.” (quoting Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc), and citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 752 (2001)). (The “goose-and-gander” saying traces to an early collection of English proverbs.)
The appellant in All Plaintiffs v. Transocean Offshore (the MDL relating to Deepwater Horizon) challenged an order requiring him to submit to a psychiatric exam and supply medical records as part of the procedure. No. 12-30237 (Jan. 3, 2013, unpublished). Following Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), the Fifth Circuit held that the collateral order doctrine did not allow appeal of this interlocutory discovery order. Any erroneous effect on the merits of the case could be reviewed on appeal of final judgment, and even if that review was “imperfect” to remedy the intrusion on his privacy interest, the harm was not so great as to justify interlocutory review of the entire class of similar orders. A concurrence noted that while mandamus review was theoretically possible, this party had not requested it as an alternative to direct appeal, and had not made a sufficiently specific showing of harm to obtain mandamus relief.