Plaintiffs alleged that the government of Antigua was complicit in Allen Stanford’s fraudulent scheme; it defended under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. With respect to liabilty under the “commercial activity” exception to the Act, the Fifth Circuit found too attenuated a connection to the United States. As to the scheme itself, “[w]hile Antigua may have helped facilitate Stanford’s sale of the fraudulent CDs, Stanford’s criminal activity served as an intervening act interrupting the causal chain between Antigua’s actions and any effect on investors.” And as to a more specific claim based on Antigua’s failure to repay loans to Stanford, “the financial loss in this case was not directly felt by Plaintiffs, who are investors and customers of Stanford . . . The financial loss due to Antigua’s failure to repay the loans was most directly felt by Stanford who was the actual lender in the loan transactions.” Frank v. Commonwealth of Antigua & Barbuda, No. 15-10788 (Nov. 22, 2016).
The receiver for Allen Stanford’s businesses sought to recover the proceeds of large certificates of deposit from two investment entities associated with the Libyan government. The district court dismissed one of the entities pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and allowed the claim against the other to proceed. The Fifth Circuit reversed as to that entity, finding that the instruments at issue “did not require any act in the United States, much less the act of funneling money through the Stanford scheme or any Stanford entities in the United States,” and that the entity’s “commercial activity was limited to its obligations under teh . . . CDs, which . . . did not require any activity in the United States.” Janvey v. Libyan Inv. Auth., Nos. 15-10545 & 10548 (Oct. 26, 2016).
Continuing a theme in cases involving attorney liability (most notably the recent Stanford-related opinion in Troice v. Proskauer Rose, 816 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2015)), the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the law firm involved in a disputed foreclosure: “Under Texas law, the doctrine of qualified immunity has ‘long authorized attorneys to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” Lassberg v. Bank of America, No. 15-40196 (Aug. 23, 2016, unpublished).
Earlier this year, the Fifth Circuit largely affirmed a series of rulings about governmental immunity in litigation about flood damage from Hurricane Katrina, allowing some cases to proceed and finding the government immune as to others. On rehearing, the Court found that the “discretionary-function exemption” to the Federal Tort Claims Act created immunity even if the Flood Control Act did not. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation at 25-26 (Sept. 24, 2012) (“Our construction of the FCA leaves undisturbed the district court’s ruling on that issue. Our application of the DFE, however, completely insulates the government from liability.”).
The Court affirmed almost all of a series of immunity rulings by the district court in the consolidated litigation against the Corps of Engineers arising from Hurricane Katrina. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation (March 2, 2012). While most of the opinion focuses on issues unique to flood control, it provides a crisp summary of the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act as to environmental impact statements, and concludes with a brief summary of the standards for mandamus relief in the federal system. Op. at 27. The Court declined to grant a writ of mandamus to stay an upcoming trial because its opinion affirmed the immunity rulings that the district court would use for that trial. (A subsequent opinion mooted the mandamus issue because it changed the disposition of the merits.)