The plaintiffs’ takings claim failed in Treme v. St. John the Baptist Parish Council, when the relevant mineral lease was “for a period of Three (3) years from the date Lessee procures approval to commence operations frm local, state and federal authorities, as needed ….”  The requirement of government approvals created a “suspensive condition” to the lease’s effectiveness, and “[b]ecuase they have not been obtained, the district court was correct in determining that the lease had not yet become effective.” No. 23-30084 (Feb. 16, 2024).

The contract between Catalyst (a consulting firm) and CBS (an equipment-rental company), required payment of a substantial fee if CBS satisfied the contract’s requirements as to a “Transaction.” The Fifth Circuit held that the contract supplanted the “procuring cause doctrine” recognized by Texas law as a default rule for such business situations, and further held that under the contract, Catalyst had made the required showing to recover its fee. Catalyst Strategic Advisors LLC v. Three Diamond Capital SBC LLC, No. 23-20030 (Feb. 22, 2024).

After the Texas Supreme Court answered a certified question about an arcane Texas limitations-tolling statute, the Fifth Court applied that answer in a later case presenting the same issue, Bullock v. UT-Arlington:

“The state trial court dismissed her case on June 8, 2020, for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal was affirmed by the state appellate court on May 20, 2021. The appellate court’s plenary power expired on July 19, 2021. Under the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 16.064(a)(2), Plaintiff had sixty days from July 19, 2021, in which she could refile her action in a court of proper jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed this instant lawsuit on July 16, 2021, before the state appellate court’s plenary power expired and well within the sixty-day grace period.”

No. 22-10013 (Feb. 15, 2024) (citations omitted).

Shaw v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. carefully describes the unique heritage of Louisiana law, and then reached a holding well known to the common law:

“By Shaw’s own allegations, the alleged contract was conditioned on RH wanting to use the at-issue artisans to produce nonlicensed designs and the outcome of the parties’ future negotiations regarding compensation. Because the at-issue agreement left the terms of potential compensation “wide open” to future negotiation, RH and Shaw never entered into an enforceable contract.”

No. 22-30277 (Feb. 15, 2024).

After a massive computer failure, Southwest sued one of its cyber risk insures about five categories of damages (vouchers, frequent-flier miles, etc. used to mitigate the effects of the outage). The district court ruled against Southwest, describing the losses as arising from “purely discretionary” decisions.

The Fifth Circuit reversed. Acknowledging that the policy covered “all Loss … that in Insured incurs … solely as a result of a System Failure,” the Court reasoned:

Here, Liberty argues that the system failure cannot be the sole cause of Southwest’s claimed costs because the “independent” and “more direct” cause of those losses was Southwest’s decision to incur them. But those decisions can only be independent, sole causes of the costs if they were the precipitating causes of the costs. The decisions, like the infection in Wright or the medical complications in Wells, were not precipitating causes that competed with the system failure, but links in a causal chain that led back to the system failure. 

Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. 22-10942 (Jan. 16, 2024). The Court noted that “[t]he parties concede that there are no cases directly on point in the context of business interruption insurance.”

The “Lyme Wars” are an ongoing medical controversy about the diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease. Absent Supreme Court review, one front in those “wars” ended in Torrey v. Infectious Diseases Society of America, in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of defamation claims related to statements in a medical journal: “[T[he district court did not err in holding that IDSA’s Guidelines statements about chronic Lyme disease constitute nonactionable medical opinions.” No. 22-40728 (Nov. 16, 2023).

During an Erie analysis of a Louisiana-law issue, the Fifth Circuit observed: “We are ‘a strict stare decisis court,’ meaning that a prior panel’s interpretation of state law is ‘no less binding on subsequent panels than are prior interpretations of federal law.'” QBE Syndicate 1036 v. Compass Minerals Louisiana, Inc., No. 23-30076 (Oct. 12, 2023). What distinguishes a “strict stare decisis court” from a less-strict one is not entirely clear, but the application of the “rule of orderliness” to state-law issues is well settled.

Carbon Six Barrels, LLC v. Proof Research, Inc., a state-law trademark case about the design of gun barrels, turned on an Erie conclusion about Louisiana prescription law:

While true that Hogg and Crump arose in the context of damage to real property, we, like the district court, see no reason that the general principle those opinions announced should not apply here. The Louisiana Supreme Court made clear that “[t]he inquiry [as to a continuing tort] is essentially a conduct-based one, asking whether the tortfeasor perpetuates the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts.” … This principle is not confined to the real property context. The district court was correct in stating that the earlier cases Carbon Six cites “are generally inconsistent with the [Louisiana] Supreme Court’s holding in Hogg,” and that “Louisiana law does not support the broad proposition that LUTPA’s prescriptive period is suspended as long as a perpetrator of fraud fails to correct his false statements.” This proposition would transform nearly every business dispute into a continuing tort. 

(citations omitted). Also, I spoke about “AI and the Legal Profession” at the recent annual meeting of the Bar Association of the Fifth Federal Circuit, and used the briefs in this case to illustrate the capabilities (and deficiencies) of generative AI–here is my PowerPoint!

In Self v. BPX Operating Co., the Fifth Circuit confronted a claimed conflict between Louisiana’s forced-pooling laws and a civilian doctrine called “negotiorum gestio,” andi certified (over a dissent) the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. I was unfamiliar with the doctrine and the case offers this summary for the uninformed attorney from a common-law tradition:

On the other hand, negotiorum gestio—or management of affairs—“is a typically civilian institution that derives from the Romanist tradition and is found in all civil codes.” La. Civ. Code art. 2292 cmt. (a). Negotiorum gestio applies when a person, the manager or gestor, acts 1) without authority, 2) to protect the interests of another, and 3) in the reasonable belief that the owner would approve of the action if made aware of the circumstances. La. Civ. Code art. 2292. The gestor must have “undertake[n] the management with the ‘benefit’ of the owner in mind” and not have “act[ed] in [its] own interest or contrary to the actual or presumed intention of the owner.” Id. cmts. (c)-(d) … Only if all these requirements are met does a person qualify as a gestor such that “[t]he owner whose affair has been managed is bound to fulfill the obligations that the manager has undertaken as a prudent administrator and to reimburse the manager for all necessary and useful expenses.” La. Civ. Code art. 2297. Negotiorum gestio is “rooted in altruism,” and its purpose is to “encourage people to assist friends and neighbors in need.”

No. 22-30243 (Sept. 8, 2023).

The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, for problems with party joinder, in PHH Mortgage Co. v. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co.

The key distinction that led to reversal was this: “The [Texas] trespass-to-try-title statute applies only when ‘the claimant is seeking to establish or obtain the claimant’s ownership or possessory right in the land at issue,'” while “a breach of contract claim against a title insurance company ‘invokes the insurer’s obligation to pay the claim or defend title to the property, and this claim is separate and distinct from the claim of ownership.'” No. 22-50930 (citations omitted).

Princeton Excess & Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. A.H.D. Houston, Inc. addresses – coverage – in strip clubs, holding that the clubs are – exposed.

As with Jan Tiffany’s burlesque act of the 1950s (right), matters “largely turn[ed] on whether the … coverage should be viewed as one ‘umbrella’ of coverage or carved into subcategories … .”

The specific issue involved insurance coverage for damages arising from unauthorized use of models’ photos, and turned on construction of the policies’ exclusions to “advertising injury” coverage. A dissent would certify the issue to the Texas Supreme Court.  No. 22-20473 (Aug. 25, 20230.

The quesions in Louisiana Newpack Shrimp Co. v. Longhai Indigo Seafood Partners, Inc. was whether Louisiana Newpack (an importer and seller of seafood) owed $995,188.03 to Longhai (a crabmeat exporter) for three orders of crabmeat.

A properly-instructed jury found that the parties did not have a contract, but did have an enforceable “open account” as recognized by Louisiana law. The district court entered judgent for Longhai, but then amended the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 to award it nothing.

The Fifth Circuit reversed, noting that Rule 59(e) requires the movant to “clearly establish … a manifest error of law or fact.’ Noting “conflicting case law” in Louisiana on the question whether an open-account claim requires the existence of a contract, the Fifth Circuit held “that it was not a manifest error of law to allow Lonhai to recover on its open account claim.” No. 22-30653 (Aug. 17, 2023, unpublished) (emphasis in original).

Hogan v. Southern Methodist University presented, inter alia, the question whether Texas’s Pandemic Liability Protection Act – enacted in 2021 – bars a student’s complaint about SMU moving to an all-virtual learning environment in 2020.

The student argued that this backward-looking application of the law violated the Texas Constitution’s prohibition of “retroactive” laws — a unique feature of that instrument that, like the “open courts” provision, has no counterpart in the U.S. Constitution. SMU, supported by the Texas AG, argued otherwise.

The Fifth Circuit certified this issue to the Texas Supreme Court, noting its importance and the dearth of caselaw on the point to date. No. 20-10433 (July 20, 2023).

Jeanty was arrested, and then released, after Big Bubba’s Bail Bonds posted a surety bond on his behalf. He was then re-arrested after Big Bubba’s complained to the trial court that Jeanty had failed to maintain contact as required by their contract.

Jeanty sued for false imprisonment and Big Bubba’s obtained a Rule 12 dismissal.

Providing a straightforward example of an Erie analsis, the Fifth Circuit reversed. It began with the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals about the relevant statute, continued by reviewing more recent intermediate-court opinions and finding they were consistent with the earlier precedent, and giving little weight to an advisory opinion from the Texas Attorney General.

Jeanty v. Big Bubba’s Bail Bonds, No. 22-40241 (June 29, 2023).

The complex trial-court system in Texas led to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.065, which suspends limitations for 60 days after a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Simple enough, in theory. But in Sanders v. The Boeing Co., the Fifth Circuit showed the deceptive complexity of that statute when it certified these two issues about the statute to the Texas Supreme Court

1)     Does Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.064 apply to this lawsuit where Plaintiffs could have invoked the prior district court’s subject matter jurisdiction with proper pleading?

2)     Did Plaintiffs file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became “final” for purposes of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.064(a)(2)?

(The second issue arose from the specific question “whether Texas law would deem dht flight attendants’ tolling savings-statute deadline as running from the time the district court entered judgment or the time [the Fifth Circuit] affirmed that judgment.”) No. 22-20317 (May 25, 2023).

In Direct Biologics, LLC v. McQueen, a preliminary-injunction case involving a noncompetition agreement, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion when the district court declined to presume irreparableharm. Among other factors reviewed by the Court, it considered:

  • “[I]t is unclear whether federal courts should apply a state-law ‘presumption of irreparable harm’ when determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue in federal court.
  • “The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to presume irreparable injury based on McQueen’s breach of his non-compete covenants. As previously explained, the Employment Agreement broadly prohibited him from providing “similar” services to Vivex that he provided to DB.  The Operating Agreement covenant was even broader. Thus, McQueen could have breached these covenants even without actually using or disclosing DB’s confidential information or trade secrets.
  • “[T]he district court could have found the presumption rebutted by Vivex’s evidence that McQueen was not in fact competing with DB through his work for Vivex.”

No. 22-50442 (April 3, 2023).

Following Pepi Corp. v. Galliford, 254 S.W.3d 457, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied.), the Fifth Circuit summarized when a quantum meruit claim could be pursued even when an express contract applies:

“First, recovery in quantum meruit is allowed when a plaintiff has partially performed an express contract but, because of the defendant’s breach, the plaintiff is prevented from completing the contract. …

Second, “[r]ecovery in quantum meruit is sometimes permitted when a plaintiff partially performs an express contract that is unilateral in nature.” [and]

Third, “a breaching plaintiff in a construction contract can recover the reasonable value of services less any damages suffered by the defendant if the defendant accepts and retains ‘the benefits arising as a direct result of the plaintiff’s partial performance.’”

Credos Indus. Supplies & Rentals, LLC v. Targa Pipeline Mid-Cont. WestTex, LLC, No. 22-20480-CV (March 24, 2023).

Thanks to diversity jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit reviews some fundamental state-law tort issues along with its loftier docket of constitutional disputes.

In Badeaux v. Louisiana-I Gaming, Badeaux sued for damages after he tripped over a sprinkler head at a casino. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the casino because the sprinkler head was “open and obvious,” noting, inter alia: “There are multiple photographs of the scene showing that: (1) there were working lights in the parking lot on the night of Badeaux’s fall; (2) the sprinkler head was located in a grassy, landscaped area that was separated from the parking lot by a raised curb; and (3) the raised curb surrounding the sprinkler head was painted bright yellow.”

No. 21-30129 (Jan. 20, 2023).

 

The main issue in Hanover Ins. Co. v. Binnacle Devel., LLC was the interpretation of a Texas Water Code provision about MUDs (“municipal utility districts”) — yes, “MUDdy waters.” Resolution of that issue led to a short discussion as to whether a key contract provision was a damage-limitation clause or a liquidated damages clause, and the Fifth Circuit said:

The damages clause is entitled “LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR DELAY/ECONOMIC DISINCENTIVE” and expressly provides for “liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500 for each [] calendar day” of delay. This provision does not, in substance, set a mere limitation of liability or delimit damages to “an agreed maximum.” 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:6 (4th ed.). Rather, the clause provides that Hassell is liable for the liquidated damages of $2,500 for every day the Projects are late. Looks like a liquidated-damages provision to us.

No. 21-40662 (Jan. 12, 2023).

The Fifth Circuit and Texas Supreme Court both recently addressed limitations issues in commercial cases:

  • Civelli v. JP Morgan Securities involved an investor’s claim that JP Morgan wrongly transferred certain shares of stock in an oil company. The Fifth Circuit declined to apply the discovery rule, stating: “Any injury incurred from the J.P. Morgan defendants’ alleged negligence in transferring the shares without plaintiffs’ consent arose at the time of the transfer. Because Civelli admits that he knew by February 2014 that they had transferred the funds, the rule of discovery does not apply.” No. 21-20618 (Jan. 11, 2023).
  • Marcus & Millichap v. Triex Texas Holdings LLC was a suit against a real-estate broker about the sale of a gas station. The Texas Supreme Court held: “It is undisputed that Triex knew it was injured in December 2012. The question before us is whether the discovery rule defers accrual of Triex’s cause of action until it knew that Marcus & Millichap caused its injury. We hold that it does not.” No. 21-0913 (Jan. 13, 2023) (per curiam).

Yes, the defendant “intentionally” coded a key record in a certain way. But that “intentional” action did not establish an “intent” to harm the victim of an industrial accident:

“Populars fails to show that Trimac knew it mislabeled the tanker. It is not enough that Trimac intentionally coded into its system that the tanker contained MDI. Doing so may have been reasonable, negligent, or reckless … [but Populars instead needed to demonstrate that Trimac (or a reasonable company in Trimac’s position) knew this designation was wrong, and, therefore, knew that Populars’s injury was inevitable. Despite claiming that ‘Trimac knew it possessed chemicals that would produce a violent exothermic reaction when mixed together,’ Populars points to no evidence to support that assertion.”

Populars v. Trimac Transportation, Inc., No. 22-30413 (Jan. 3, 2023, unpublished) (emphasis in original).

Central Crude, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual confirms that under Louisiana law, a pollution exclusion doesn’t require the insured to have the ultimate fault for the alleged pollution:

Neither the CGL policy nor [the Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Doerr] requires identification of the party at fault for the oil spill in determining whether the total pollution exclusion applies here. The CGL policy’s total pollution exclusion broadly precludes coverage for bodily injury or property damage that “would not have occurred in whole or in part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘pollutants’ at any time.” The provision requires a dispersal of pollutants but makes no requirement that the party responsible for the dispersal be determined. 

No. 21-30707 (Oct. 26, 2022).

Among other issues from an insurance-coverage case arising from a building collapse, in Hudson Specialty Ins. Co. v. Talex Enterprises, LLC, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the expense of fire and police personnel was “maintenance” within the meaning of a policy exclusion. The Court found that term ambiguous as to those expenses, and thus construed it against the insurer:

The City paid for the around-the-clock presence of its fire and police personnel to protect the integrity of the site and keep people out.

On the one hand, it is reasonable to read this police and fire department presence as maintenance. By keeping watch over the site and keeping people out, these public safety officials were “upholding or keeping in being” the property in its current state. This aligns with one of the definitions of maintenance listed above.

On the other hand, the definitions of maintenance as “[t]he action of keeping something in working order” or “[t]he care and work put into property” both imply that actions are taken upon the property to keep it in working order. Keeping watch is an action, but it is not performed upon the property and does not involve putting work into the property. Thus, there are at least two reasonable meanings for the term maintenance—one where these expenses would fall under the exclusion and one where they would not.

No. 21-60794 (Oct. 28, 2022) (paragraph breaks added).

In a COVID-19 coverage case, the appellant in Coleman E. Adler & Sons v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co. tried to avoid earlier Fifth Circuit precedent by pointing to a recent opinion from an intermediate Louisiana appellate court. The Fifth Circuit did not accept the appellant’s argument, noting:

  1. Orderliness. “Our court’s rule of orderliness applies to Erie cases no less than cases interpreting federal law.”
  2. Erie. “[T]here has been ‘neither a clearly contrary subsequent holding of the highest court of [Louisiana] nor a subsequent statutory authority, squarely on point.’ Nor has there been contrary intervening precedent that ‘comprises unanimous or near-unanimous holdings from several—preferably a majority —of the intermediate appellate courts of [Louisiana].’ We have only one subsequent decision from an intermediate state court, and that cannot overcome our rule of orderliness.” (citations omitted).

No. 21-30478 (Sept. 20, 2022).

Henley v. Biloxi H.M.A., L.L.C., No. 20-60991 (Aug. 31, 2022), presented a thorny issue about tort liability for nondisclosure; here, certain information about rates charged by health-care providers. Applying the relevant Restatement provisions, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court’s distinction between “basic” and “material” facts, and reversed the dismissal of the nondisclosure claim under Rule 12(b)(6).No. 20-60991 (Aug. 31, 2022).

On a Texas tort-law question about liability for a brake failure, the Fifth Circuit reasoned:

We do not think this question is close enough to warrant certification to the Supreme Court of Texas. See McMillan v. Amazon.com, 983 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that certification is usually reserved for close questions of state law with “scant on-point precedent”). Certification is appropriate when “consequential state-law ground is to be plowed” and “any Erie guess would involve more divining than discerning.” Id. Our guess today is a safer bet. The Guijarros have not identified a single case cabining Armstrong to the realm of products liability. See Troice v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., 921 F.3d 501, 504–05 (5th Cir. 2019) (declining to certify because multiple intermediate courts had adopted one view of the issue, and the plaintiff had not identified any contrary authority). Nor does such a distinction make sense. Add to the one-sidedness of this issue that neither party requested certification.

       We conclude that Texas law requires plaintiffs alleging a brake defect to put forth “competent expert testimony and objective proof” that the defect caused their injuries.

Guijarro v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., No. 21-40512 (July 5, 2022).

 

A contract involving the acquisition of delinquent debt was not unenforceable for lack of a specific price term in Capio Funding LLC v. Rural/Metro Operating Co., LLC, reversing a district-court ruling to the contrary:

The crucial question is whether the term “additional Accounts” rendered the Forward Flow Amendment unenforceable. AMR urges a Shakespearean take—claiming it was but an indefinite promise to the ear, broken only to Capio’s hope.  Capio counters that “additional Accounts” governed all accounts that met the agreed-upon standards. Capio carries the day for two reasons. First, read in context, the term “additional Accounts” has enforceable meaning. Taken together, the plain meaning of the word “additional,” the contract’s clear architecture, and various settled principles of interpretation reveal that “additional Accounts” refers to all qualifying accounts that accrue quarterly.

No. 20-11218 (May 18, 2022). (The Shakespearean reference is to Act V, Scene 8 of Macbeth, when Macbeth reacts in horror to MacDuff explaining that he was not “of woman born”).

Overstreet v. Allstate, an insurance-coverage case about hail damage, presented an unsettled issue under Texas’ “concurrent causation” doctrine. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit hailed the Texas Supreme Court for assistance, certifying the issue to it for review (a topic where the Fifth Circuit had previously certified the same topic, only for the parties to settle). No. 21-10462 (May 19, 2022). (As is customary for such requests, the Court disclaimed any intention to hale the Texas Supreme Court toward any particular result.)

Making an Erie guess about Louisiana insurance law, the Fifth Circuit held: “Consistent with our decision in Terry Black’s, and the decisions of the unanimous circuit courts, we conclude, pursuant to Louisiana law, that losses caused by civil authority orders closing nonessential businesses in response to the COVID-19 pandemic do not fall within the meaning of ‘direct physical loss of or damage to property.'” Q Clothier v. Twin City Fire Ins., No. 21-30278 (March 22, 2022).

Hess Corp. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. notes an interesting, and seemingly unanswered, question about section 2.608 of the UCC, which says that a “buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it …..” (emphasis added). One side suggested that this phrase should be read in conjunction with section 2.715, which allows a buyer to recover damages “resulting from the seller’s breach,” while another advocated looking to a line of cases that ask whether a contract breach was a “producing cause” of an injury. The Court noted a dearth of Texas authority tying either suggested approach to this specific UCC provision. No. 20-20663 (Feb. 7, 2022).

The Fifth Circuit found that the state-law question about liquor-sale permits presented by Gabriel Inv. Group v. TABC “checks every box” for certification, reasoning:

  1. “The first factor—the closeness of the question and the existence of sufficient sources of state law—weighs in favor of certification. … Both parties have solid textual and structural support for their positions. Likewise, the Commission does not challenge GIG’s contention that the disputes in this case are questions of first impression in any court.”
  2. “The second factor—the degree to which considerations of comity are relevant in light of the particular issue and case to be decided—similarly weighs in favor of certification. The Legislature enacted its general ban on public corporations owning or controlling package store permits in 1995, over 26 years ago. According to the parties, only two public corporations—GIG and Sarro Corp., who is not a party to this case—qualify for Grandfather Clause treatment. That may not seem like many. But when you factor in that GIG and Sarro could control up to 500 package stores between the two of them, it threatens to blow a Texas-sized hole in the careful balance that the Legislature created.” (footnotes omitted).
  3. “The third factor—practical limitations on the certification process—also weighs in favor of certification. The questions that GIG asks are purely legal. And we are untroubled by any potential delay. ‘[B]y long tradition, the Texas Supreme Court graciously accepts and prioritizes certified questions from this circuit.'”

No. 21-50322 (Jan. 28, 2022).

The Marys, landowners in Bienville Parish, Louisiana, complained that a pipeline had exceeded the scope of a servitude over their land, and sought disgorgement of the pipeline’s profits. The Fifth Circuit reviewed “the concepts of accession and fruits under Louisiana property law.” Unfortunately for the Marys, while they had an ownership interest in the intrusive pipeline by “accession,” it was also the case that: “[T]he gas at issue here was not taken from [their] land. It was produced from the Pedro Well, located on the neighbor’s land.” Accordingly, the “gas is not a fruit; it is a product,” and disgorgement was not an available remedy. Mary v. QEP Energy Co., No. 21-30195 (Jan. 18, 2022).

In Newman v. Cypress Env. Mgmnt.:

  • Newman, a pipeline inspector, had an Employment Agreement with Cypress, a business that supplied pipeline inspectors for client projects, and that agreement had an arbitration clause;
  • A Cypress affiliate entered a contract to supply services to Plains, a pipeline company
  • Newman brought an FLSA action against Plains for unpaid overtime, and Plains sought to compel arbitration, citing the provision of the Newman-Cypress contract.

The Fifth Circuit held that Plains was not a third-party beneficiary of that contract and could not enforce it, noting: First, Newman’s incorporated-by-reference Pay Letter [between the Cypress affiliate and Plains] did not clearly and fully spell out that Plains could take legal action if either Newman or Cypress breached its terms. To the extent that it named Plains at all, the Pay Letter merely list ‘Plains-Pipeline’ as the ‘Client.’ … [and] Second, the Employment Agreement itself did not clearly and fully spell out that Plains could take legal action if Newman decided to breach its other terms.” No. 21-5023 (Jan. 7, 2022) (emphasis in original).

Terry Black’s Barbecue provides outstanding Texas barbecue from its location in Dallas’s Deep Ellum neighborhood; it also experienced business interruptions from complying with various stay-at-home orders issued during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Terry Black’s did not have business-interruption coverage because it did not suffer a direct physical loss of property at its restaurants. The Court reasoned:

…  A “physical loss of property” cannot mean something as broad as the “loss of use of property for its intended purpose.” None of those words fall within the plain meaning of physical, loss, or property. And that phrase has an entirely different meaning from the language in the BI/EE provision. “Physical loss of property” is not synonymous with “loss of use of property for its intended purpose.”
We conclude the Texas Supreme Court would interpret a direct physical loss of property to require a tangible alteration or deprivation of property. Because the civil authority orders prohibiting dine-in services at restaurants did not tangibly alter TBB’s restaurants, and TBB having failed to allege any other tangible alteration or deprivation of its property, the policy does not provide coverage for TBB’s claimed losses.

Terry Black’s Barbecue BBQ, LLC v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., No. 21-50078 (Jan. 5, 2022).

Under Wyoming law, an indemnity agreement related to an oil-field injury could not be enforced; under Texas law, it could be. Applying the Restatement’s choice-of-law framework, the Fifth Circuit concluded:

  1. More significant relationship. “The section 188 contacts rack up points for Wyoming. Cannon started negotiations by contacting KLX’s Wyoming office, and the parties executed the agreements in Wyoming and West Virginia. These place-of-negotiation-and-contracting contacts favor Wyoming and overwhelmingly disfavor Texas. … The only debatable section 188 contact is the principal place of business. Cannon leans on this contact, arguing that it favors Texas because the agreement was drafted by a Texas-based company. But although KLX’s principal place of business is in Texas, its Texas presence is negated by Cannon’s Wyoming domicile.”
  2. Materially greater interest. “Wyoming’s interest in promoting worker safety in its oilfields is at its zenith on these facts. The underlying state court proceeding—in which a Wyoming resident was injured in Wyoming by the alleged negligence of a Wyoming oil company—implicates Wyoming’s policy with precision. Enforcing the indemnity provision would discourage what Wyoming hopes to encourage Cannon’s taking steps to avoid injuries in its oilfield operations. On the other side of the scale, Texas’s interest in this dispute is more attenuated. Its interest in enforcing the contract of one of its businesses is lessened when the contract was not negotiated, drafted, or performed within its borders.”
  3. Fundamental policy. “Wyoming’s ban on oilfield indemnification is codified and voids any such agreement as being ‘against public policy.’ … Because Wyoming “has taken the unusual step of stating [the policy] explicitly” in a statute, and “will refuse to enforce an agreement” contrary to the policy even when other states connected to the agreement would enforce it, the anti-indemnity policy is a fundamental one.” (citations omitted).

Cannon Oil & Gas Servcs., Inc. v. KLX Energy Services, L.L.C, No. 21-20115 (Dec. 10, 2021).

The district court certified a class based on a Texas statute about late fees, which says: “A landlord may not charge a tenant a late fee for failing to pay rent unless … the fee is a reasonable estimate of uncertain damages to the landlord that are incapable of precise calculation and result from late payment of rent.” 

The panel majority in Cleven v. Mid-Am. Apartments disagreed with the district court’s reading of the statute, and thus remanded: “[T]here is no requirement that a landlord engage in a process to arrive at its late fee so long as the fee is a reasonable estimate at the time of contracting of damages that are incapable of precise calculation. Therefore, the district court erred in interpreting section 92.019 and the case is remanded to the district court to determine if class certification is appropriate.”

A dissent saw matters differently: “That the plaintiffs all raised a common contention about how § 92.019 should be interpreted that is central to their claims for relief is sufficient reason for us to affirm class certification, and we do not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s partial summary judgment ruling on only the issue of liability at this stage in the litigation.” No. 18-50846 (Dec. 9, 2021).

A Louisiana-based defendant removed a class action brought by an individual citizen of Louisiana, contending that a co-defendant’s “non-diverse Louisiana citizenship could be disregarded because the [statutory] claims against [the co-defendant] were ‘improperly and egregiously misjoined’ with the assignment-based bad faith claim against the removing defendant.”

This concept — called “fraudulent misjoinder” and reliant upon state-law procedural rules — is distinct from the traditional concept of “improper joinder” (a/k/a “fraudulent joinder”), which focuses on the viability of the claim against the nondiverse defendant.

The panel majority in Williams v. Homeland Ins. Co., written by Judge Haynes and joined by Judge Ho, soundly rejected removal based on fraudulent misjoinder, emphasizing the doctrine’s practical consequences: “Adopting the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine will dramatically expand federal jurisdiction, putting the federal district courts in this circuit in the position of resolving procedural matters that are more appropriately resolved in state court—all without a clear statutory hook.” No. 20-30196 (Nov. 30, 2021).

A concurrence by Judge Ho emphasized the importance of the statutory text in rejecting the doctrine; a dissent by Judge Jones focused on “the unusual circumstances here, which bespeak obvious joinder machinations undertaken to avoid federal court.” (both opinions are in the above link). The trio of opinions suggests that this case may receive serious consideration for en banc review.

The complexity of the route map for the Erie Railway is well-illustrated by Butler v. Denka Performance Elastomer, LLC, No. 20-30365 (Oct. 15, 2021), in which one judge dissented from the panel’s decision to apply Louisiana tort law without certifying the issue to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and another dissented about the panel’s decision, based on Louisiana law, about whether prescription (limitations) had been established. No. 20-30365 (Oct. 15, 2021).

In Jungian psychology, the “Trickster” archetype (right) has been called “the embodiment of ambiguity.” In McDonnel Group, LLC v. Jung, LLC, the Fifth Circuit found an embodiment of ambiguity in an insurance policy provision that defined the flood-damage deductible as:

“5% of the total insured values at risk at the time and place of loss subject to a $500,000 minimum deduction as respects … FLOOD.”

The Court observed that “the plaintiffs read the deductible as saying ‘5% of the total insured values at risk … as  respects FLOOD,'” and that “the insurers read the provision as ‘5% of the total insured values at risk at the time and place of loss, subject to a $500,000 minimum deduction … as respects FLOOD.” In other words: “[U]nder the plaintiffs’ theory, ‘as respects FLOOD’ modifies ‘total insured values at risk,'” while “[u]nder the insurer’s theory, ‘as respects FLOOD’ pertains only to the ‘$500,000 minimum deduction.'” The Court concluded that “[b]oth parties’ interpretations are reasonable, so the policy is ambiguous.” No. 20-30140 (Sept. 24, 2021).

Despite the defeat of the Moorish armies in 732 by Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours (right), the appellants in Luminant Mining Co. v. PakeyBey asserted rights as cotenants to certain real property in East Texas as “’Moorish Americans’ who are ‘sovereign freemen under the Republic . . . .'” The Fifth Circuit affirmed judgment for the appellees, concluding: “[T]the PakeyBey parties contend that Luminant failed to demonstrate hostile possession vis-à-vis its cotenants. They assert that the record is devoid of evidence of actual notice of repudiation of the common title. They further contend that Luminant cannot show constructive notice of repudiation, arguing that constructive notice and ouster require more than Luminant’s demonstrated possession of the land and the absence of a claim against the land by Walling’s heirs. Their argument rests on a correct reading of the law, up to a point. (citation omitted) But Luminant’s possession and Luminant’s recorded deeds are sufficient to give constructive notice of hostility to cotenants and to effect an ouster.” No. 20-40803 (Sept. 17, 2021).

The plaintiffs in Turner v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. obtained a “non-adversarial” default judgment against a defunct vocational school. The Fifth Circuit found that Texas’s “no-direct action” rule did not bar their claim against the school’s insurer: “[T]he Plaintiffs’ default judgment against ATI is an adjudication that satisfies the no-action clause. Accordingly, although the non-adversarial default judgment does not bind Cincinnati to its terms,  the no-direct-action rule is not a bar to this coverage suit.” (citation omitted). (Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court then affirmed the dismissal of their claim on timeliness grounds.) No. 20-50548 (Aug. 13, 2021).

In a will contest, “the district court determined that, because the claims against Craig and Alita were founded on a single deprivation, the loss of the transferred assets, joint and several liability is appropriate.” The Fifth Circuit agreed, quoting the Restatement (First) of Restitution section cited by the district court: “Where a claim against two persons is founded upon a single deprivation as it is where a tort resulting in a single harm has been committed by two persons concurrently or acting in cooperation, the injured person, while having a cause of action against each of the parties for the entire amount of injury, is entitled only to one satisfaction. If he obtains judgment against one and it is satisfied, he thereby loses his claim against the other.” (citation omitted). In other words, “this part of the Restatement ‘effectively imposes joint and several liability on a restitution defendant when the action is founded ‘upon a single deprivation.’” Great American Life v. Tanner, No. 20-60588 (July 16, 2021).

Goodrich v. United States certified a complex issue of Louisiana law to that state’s supreme court; confirming the wisdom of that decision, it summarized a relevant principle as stating: “If the things subject to the usufruct are consumables, the usufructuary becomes owner of them. He may consume, alienate, or encumber them as he sees fit. At the termination of the usufruct he is bound to pay to the naked owner either the value that the things had at the commencement of the usufruct or
deliver to him things of the same quantity and quality.” No. 20-30422 (July 6, 2021) (emphasis added). Hopefully the resulting opinion will clothe the case with quality legal reasoning.

The appellant in Lillie v. Office of Financial Institutions argued that an adverse summary judgment was based on an unreliable case. The Fifth Circuit disagreed: “The court relied on Friedman only in reasoning that a showing of ‘but-for causation’—namely that SEI might have been able to prevent STC’s violations—is not enough to establish control. Such a rationale … is distinct from Friedman’s independent holding that the plaintiffs there had not alleged culpability. One may cite a case without endorsing everything for which it stands. The district court understood the law.” No. 19-30705 (May 14, 2021).

28 USC § 1631 says: “Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title . . . and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed . . ., and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in . . . the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in . . . the court from which it is transferred.” In Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., the Fifth Circuit concluded that “want of jurisdiction” included both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, observing:  “[I]t appears no circuit split currently exists on this issue, and while we cannot predict how those circuits who have left the question open will ultimately resolve the matter, we decline to now create a split by adopting an overly restrictive reading of § 1631. Because no amount of legislative history can defeat unambiguous statutory text, we join the weight of circuit authority and conclude that the use of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in § 1631 encompasses both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.” No. 19-30316 (March 18, 2021) (footnote and citation omitted). The Court also found no Erie problem in section 1631’s definition of the relevant filing date for limitations purposes.

Equity takes many forms; in Louisiana landlord-tenant law, it manifests as the doctrine of “judicial control.” In Richards Clearview LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, the Fifth Circuit observed: “[E]ven assuming arguendo that BB&B defaulted on the lease, the ‘unusual circumstances’ of this case—pandemic-related office closures causing delays in the receipt of notice coupled with prompt efforts to rectify the asserted underpayments— warranted the district court’s exercise of judicial control.” No. 20-30614 (March 8, 2021) (unpublished).

WickFire won a tortious-interference judgment against TriMax. It claimed that TriMax “committed ‘click fraud’ by repeatedly clicking on WickFire’s advertisements without any intention of making purchases,” which has the effect of driving up WickFire’s costs without any corresponding increase in revenues. The Fifth Circuit reversed, noting:

  • Tortious interference with contract. “WickFire produced evidence that a third party had a deleterious financial effect on its bottom line. But as was the case in El Paso Healthcare System, the record here fails to indicate that WickFire’s damages occurred because a co-contracting party breached its agreement with WickFire.”
  • Tortious interference with prospective business relations. “WickFire’s damages theory for this claim was grounded in the assertions that TriMax’s tortious conduct delayed the development of TheCoupon.co website by six months and that WickFire lost $334,000 in profits because of that delay. When WickFire’s damages expert was asked how he calculated that dollar figure, the expert said that he had ‘quantified those damages by calculating the amount of profits that [WickFire] lost because of the six-month delay.’ He did not testify as to how he performed that calculation, nor did he point to any data concerning the business generated by TheCoupon.co. This evidence is threadbare and conclusory.”

Wickfire LLC v. Woodruff, No. 17-50340 (Feb. 26, 2021).

On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit returned to the case of Echeverry v. Jazz Casino to make an Erie guess about Louisiana negligent-hiring law–specifically, whether it requires actual knowledge or only constructive knowledge. Finding its own precedent, and no on-point Louisiana Supreme Court opinion, the Court then reviewed intermediate-court opinions and “general Louisiana principles of negligence and negligent hiring outside of the context of independent contractors” to conclude that constructive knowledge was sufficient. It declined to certify the issue, reminding that “the availability of certification is such an important resource to this court that we will not risk its continued availability by going to that well too often.” No. 20-30038 (Feb. 17, 2021) (on rehearing).

Section 9.343 of the Texas UCC contains a nonuniform provision, “which grants a first
priority purchase money security interest in oil and gas produced in Texas as well as proceeds in the hands of any ‘first purchaser.’ A ‘first purchaser,’ is in pertinent part, ‘the first person that purchases oil or gas production from an operator or interest owner after the production is severed.’  The statute’s purpose is to ‘provide[] a security interest in favor of interest owners, as secured parties, to secure the obligations of the first purchaser of . . . production, as debtor, to pay the purchase price.’ It effectuates a ‘security interest’ that is ‘perfected automatically without the filing of a financing statement.'” (citations omitted). But Delaware lien-priority law does not recognize nonuniform UCC provisions, and in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. U.S. Energy Devel. Corp., the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Delaware law applied to the case before it. The Court observed: “The bankruptcy court adroitly untangled a thorny conflicts of law issue, the result of which, unfortunately, undermines the efficacy of a non-standard UCC provision intended to protect Texas oil and gas producers. . As a result, producers must beware ‘the amazing disappearing security interest’ and continue to file financing statements. The Texas legislature should take note.” No. 19-50646 (Feb. 3, 2021) (citations and footnote omitted).

Belliveau v. Barco, Inc., discussed yesterday as to its holding about veil-piercing, also found that the plaintiff had not established a fiduciary relationship with the defendants under Texas law. The Court examined:

  • The general principle that “one party’s subjective belief” is insufficient to establish an attorney-client relationship;
  • The inadequacy of “vague and conclusory” statements about the parties’ dealings to satisfy that standard (especially if later deposition testimony undermines those statements); and
  • The long-standing principle that to establish an informal relationship of  “trust and confidence,” that relationship must have existed before the “agreement made
    the basis of the suit.”

No. 19-5017 (Jan. 28, 2021). The dissenting judge agreed with the majority on its analysis of this claim.

In a dispute about various licensing agreements, the Fifth Circuit found that Texas law’s requirements for piercing the corporate veil had not been satisfied:

“The evidence, when viewed as a whole, does not raise a fact issue regarding Barco’s dishonest purpose or intent to deceive Belliveau in entering into the Barco Sublicense. Piercing the corporate veil is not a cumulative remedy for creditors of corporate or other legal entities in Texas; that theory does not make owners of such entities codefendants for every breach of contract case. It is a remedy to be used when the actions of the entity’s owner amounting to ‘actual fraud’ have rendered the entity unable to pay its debts. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Belliveau’s claim to pierce the corporate veil.”

Specifically, the court reviewed (and rejected) arguments about the consideration exchanged in the licensing agreement, issues about disclosure, and a “badges of fraud” analysis under Texas’s fraudulent-transfer statute. Belliveau v. Barco, Inc., No. 19-50717 (Jan. 28, 2021). A dissent identified issues for trial on these matters.

An unusual procedural path, winding through a bankruptcy proceeding, led the Fifth Circuit to review a state-court summary judgment. On the issue of the state court’s evidentiary rulings, the Court applied a federal-court approach to a standard form of Texas practice, reasoning: “The grant of these objections improperly excluded important evidence from consideration. To start, the state trial court offered no explanation as to why it granted the objections. It simply checked boxes on a form saying that the objections were sustained. Since a trial court can abuse its discretion by failing to explain the reasons for excluding evidence, the lack of a reasoned explanation weighs in favor of overturning the objections. Courts also typically consider evidence unless the objecting party can show that it could not be reduced to an admissible form at trial.” Cohen v. Gilmore, No. 19-20152 (Dec. 15, 2020) (citations omitted).

“When Amazon allows third parties to sell products on its website, is Amazon ‘placing’ products into the stream of commerce or merely ‘facilitating’ the stream? If the former, then Amazon is a ‘seller’ under Texas products-liability law and potentially liable for injuries caused by unsafe products sold on its website. But if Amazon only facilitates the stream when it hosts third-party vendors on its platform, then it is not a seller, meaning injured consumers cannot sue for alleged product defects.” The Fifth Circuit certified this important issue to the Texas Supreme Court in McMillian v. Amazon, No. 20-20108 (Dec. 18, 2020).

Practice tip: In the Court’s review of whether the issue warranted certification, it noted that both parties had agreed that there was “substantial ground for difference of opinion” in order to proceed with an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Doe, a police officer, sued under Louisiana state law for injuries that he suffered when trying to clear a highway of protesters, who had been organized by McKesson. The district court dismissed the case on First Amendment grounds; a Fifth Circuit panel majority “held that a jury could plausibly find that Mckesson breached his ‘duty not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party’ because ‘a violent confrontation with a police officer was a foreseeable effect of negligently directing a protest’ onto the highway, and the en banc court divided -8 on whether to further review the case.

The Supreme Court held that the issue should be certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court, noting that “the dispute presents novel issues of state law peculiarly calling for the exercise of judgment by the state courts,” and that “certification would ensure that any conflict in this case between state law and the First Amendment is not purely hypothetical. The novelty of the claim at issue here only underscores that ‘[w]arnings against premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State’s law.'” McKesson v. Doe, No.19–1108 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2020) (citation omitted).

All journeys must end, and at long last the journey of the transferee’s good-faith defense has ended in Janvey v. GMAG LLC: “This case requires us to determine whether the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act’s … good faith affirmative defense allows Defendants-Appellees to retain fraudulent transfers received while on inquiry notice of a Ponzi scheme. We initially held it does not. We then vacated that decision so that the Supreme Court of Texas could clarify whether good faith requires a transferee on inquiry notice to conduct an investigation into the fraud, or, alternatively, show that such an investigation would have been futile. Having received an answer to our question, we once  again hold that the Defendants-Appellees’ good faith defense must fail.”  No. 17-11526 (Oct. 8, 2020).

While Adams v. Alcolac, Inc. presents an exotic dispute –civil liability for the use of mustard gas by Saddam Hussein’s regime–it turns on a fundamental issue of foreseeability under Texas tort (conspiracy) law: “The plaintiffs argue that it was foreseeable that the exported TDG [chemical] would be turned into mustard gas by some ‘nefarious character’ and that it would then be ‘used for terrorist activity.’ Perhaps so, but that misses the point. The question is not whether the plaintiffs’ battery was a foreseeable result of the alleged conspiracy but whether the battery was ‘done in pursuance of the common purpose of the conspiracy[.]’ Because there is no evidence of a common purpose beyond the initial sale and exportation of the TDG, any eventual use of mustard gas on the plaintiffs, even if foreseeable, was not in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. The plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim thus fails for lack of an underlying tort.” No. 19-40899 (revised, Sept. 25, 2020) (citations and footnote omitted, emphasis added).

In Franklin v. Regions Bank. “Plaintiffs contracted with Regions Bank for it to manage, as their agent, their mineral interests in a large tract of land.” Under Louisiana law, the parties had “a principal-mandatary relationship, which is equivalent to a common-law principal-agent relationship.” In an Erie analysis, the Fifth Circuit noted that after the Louisiana Supreme Court limited a plaintiff’s ability to choose between a contract or tort remedy (with a large potential effect on limitations) in some mandatary relationships, the legislature then “shortened the limitations periods for claims against engineers, surveyors, professional interior designers, architects, real-estate developers, and home inspectors.  Instead of shortening the limitations period for all mandataries, the legislature chose to single-out certain professions for special treatment.” After then coupling that observation with general Louisiana legal principles about strict construction of limitation statutes, the Court held that the plaintiffs wereable to choose a tort remedy with a 10-year limitations period. No. 19-30684 (Sept. 18, 2020).

Two causes of action under Texas law, frequently asserted but rarely tried, were rejected by the Fifth Circuit in BBX Operating v. Bank of America, No. 19-11050 (Aug. 11, 2020, unpublished):

  • Conversion. “They are conclusory allegations, which merely ‘parrot the words needed to create a claim’ without providing any factual basis for how BBX maintained an ownership interest in the funds. Perhaps recognizing this deficiency, the amended complaint characterized the funds at issue as ‘trust funds,’ and claimed that Murphy ‘held the funds . . . in trust for BBX’—the rightful owner. Yet that label is again unsupported by any factual allegations. The complaint said nothing of when or how this alleged trust was formed. And there are no allegations that Murphy entered into an agreement to create a trust.” (emphasis added)
  • Money had and received. BBX has not alleged facts demonstrating that the funds Bank of America swept from Murphy’s account belong to BBX. Nothing in the sales contract or any other agreement between BBX and Murphy demonstrates that funds Murphy collected and placed in a Bank of America account in Murphy’s name belong to BBX. Furthermore, BBX is no more the owner of those funds than the working interest owners and royalty owners that were supposed to receive payment after Murphy remitted a portion of the funds to
    BBX. At most, the amended complaint demonstrates that BBX has an unsecured breach of contract claim against Murphy for failing to satisfy whatever amounts Murphy owed BBX under the sales contract that governed their relationship. It does not demonstrate that these particular funds belong to BBX. Thus, the district court properly dismissed BBX’s money had and received claim.” (emphasis added)

An alleged tortfeasor, earlier named as a party in a case, settled with the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to submit a conspiracy count related to that party, and the Fifth Circuit agreed: “The alleged co-conspirator need not actually face liability. … [A]settlement in general does not prevent submitting to the jury questions about that party’s conduct (only pursuing an actual judgment against the settling party). Therefore, we conclude that Phadia’s settlement had no bearing on the Plaintiffs’ ability to prove a civil conspiracy case against the Defendants based on an underlying tort committed by Phadia.” United Biologics v. Allergy & Asthma Network, No. 19-50257 (June 24, 2020) (unpublished).

In Williams v. MMO Behavioral Health Systems, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a $244,000 judgment for defamation, entered after a jury trial. Good record keeping often benefits defendants in employment-related litigation, but in this case it helped the plaintiff on a key issue:

Before MMO had published the statement to the [Louisiana Workforce Commission], Williams had informed MMO that she did not falsify her timecard. This should have led MMO to examine Williams’s timecard. If MMO had done so, it would have discovered that even though Williams regularly clocked in every day, the timecard facially showed that someone else clocked in Williams on July 5th. This fact indicates that MMO should have known that Williams was not the one falsifying her timecard. The times for which Williams was clocked in on July 5th were also not her normal working hours, further suggesting that Williams was not the one to clock in on July 5th. Moreover, Williams did not fill out a missed-clock-punch form, which would have been necessary to allow someone else to clock her in or out, suggesting that Williams was not even involved with this July 5th clocking in and out.

No. 19-30757 (July 9, 2020) (unpublished).

Digidrill sued for unjust enrichment, “alleging [that] Petrolink hacked into its software at various oil drilling sites in order to ‘scrape’ valuable drilling data in real time.” The Fifth Circuit held: “Digirill’s claim is not preempted by copyright because—like the claim in GlobeRanger—it requires establishing that Petrolink engaged in wrongful conduct beyond mere reproduction: namely, the taking of an undue advantage. Under Texas law an unjust enrichment claim requires showing that one party ‘has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage.’ Digidrill … contends Petrolink obtained a benefit by taking undue advantage when it surreptitiously installed [certain software]. This is the claim Digidrill put to the jury. Like the alleged misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim in GlobeRanger, which required establishing improper means or breach of a confidential relationship, Digidrill’s alleged unjust enrichment claim requires establishing wrongful conduct—i.e., inducing the MWD
companies to violate the express terms of their DataLogger licenses—that goes
beyond mere copying.” Digital Drilling Data Sysems LLC v. Petrolink Servcs., Inc., No. 19-20116 (July 2, 2020) (footnote omitted, emphasis added). The Court noted that a different type of unjust-enrichment claim could potentially lead to a different result.

Phoneternet complained that an inaccurate report available on Lexis-Nexis caused the loss of a business opportunity (oddly enough, with the car company Lexus). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding (among other matters) as to their negligent-misrepresentation and promissory-estoppel claims:

If Phoneternet believed the errors had already been corrected, there would have been no reason for Phoneternet to repeatedly call LexisNexis. In that case, Phoneternet would be asking LexisNexis to correct already accurate information. Moreover, to the extent Phoneternet did rely on LexisNexis’s alleged statement that all fifteen errors in the report had been “modified . . . as requested,” such reliance cannot be considered reasonable and justified. Given the alleged importance of this report—the only remaining obstacle between Phoneternet and a lucrative multimillion-dollar contract with Toyota—Phoneternet should have at least confirmed that the errors had been corrected before blindly relying on LexisNexis’s representation.”

Phoneternet LLC v. Lexis-Nexis, No. 19-11194 (June 3, 2020) (unpublished) (emphasis added).

In Golden Spread Electric Co-op v. Emerson Process Management, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of business-tort claims under Texas’s economic loss rule.

Golden Spread, a public utility, contracted with Emerson to provide “a new, customized control system” for a steam turbine generator. During testing of the new system, the software installed by Emerson issued a mistaken command that caused the turbine to overheat and become damaged.

The Fifth Circuit reviewed Golden Spread’s claims in light of two policy considerations identified by Texas cases in the area.  First, “[p]urely economic harms proliferate widely and are not self-limiting in the way that physical damage is ….” Second, “the risk of economic harms are better suited to allocation by contract” because the parties “usually have a full opportunity” to negotiate such risks before finalizing a contract.

The Court’s reasoning may prove relevant to future lawsuits involving business issues arising from the current COVID-19 crisis.

This is a cross-post from 600Hemphill, which follows the Texas Supreme Court:

Henry McCall lived in a cabin on Homer Hillis’s property, occasionally helping Hillis with maintenance at the McCall’s bed-and-breakfast. While working on Hillis’s sink, a brown recluse spider bit McCall. The Texas Supreme Court found that the ferae naturae doctrine barred McCall’s lawsuit against Hillis: “[H]e owed no duty to the invitee because he was unaware of the presence of brown recluse spiders on his property and he neither attracted the offending spider to his property nor reduced it to his possession. Further, [McCall] had actual knowledge of the presence of spiders on the property.” Hillis v. McCall, No. 18-1065 (Tex. March 13, 2020). In addition to its impact on brown-recluse litigation, the reasoning of this opinion about liability for small, dangerous creatures well be relevant in any future litigation about coronavirus exposure.

Resolution of the tortious-interference claim in Whitney Bank v. SMI Companies Global, Inc. turned on whether the defendant’s profit motive could establish “actual malice” as required by Louisiana law. To the panel majority:

There is no evidence that Whitney was driven by anything other than profit in its collection efforts. Moreover, the express terms of the contract allowed Whitney to recover from SMI’s customers because both loans were secured by SMI’s accounts receivable. While it may have been more prudent and logical for Whitney to involve SMI in its collection efforts, those efforts, however brusque, served to protect the bank’s legitimate interests—collecting on the defaulted loans.

(citations omitted, emphasis added). The dissent, however:

Often this requirement [of “actual malice”] is insurmountable in the business context because of the “appropriate” motivation of profits. But I disagree with the notion that someone in a corporation who is seeking to collect money from another can never have actual malice or ill will towards that other. Corporations are run by humans, after all. . . . The magistrate judge’s decision rested in part on its determination that Whitney’s employees lacked credibility, and we do not second-guess credibility determinations.

No. 18-31189 (Feb. 3, 2020) (emphais added). (Louisiana’s actual-malice requirement for this tort is uniquely demanding, so this discussion may be less relevant in other jurisdictions.)

Gonzales cited two Texas Supreme Court cases, decided after a summary judgment against her, holding that an insurer’s payment of an appraisal award does not preclude a Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (“TPPCA”) claim. The Fifth Circuit found that she failed to preserve this argument in the district court. The Court noted that “a change in law . . . does not permit a party to raise an entirely new argument that could have been articulated below”–a rule that applies when a party “could have made the same ‘general argument’ to the district court, but had not done so.” As for the state of the law at the time of the summary-judgment briefing, the Court observed:

We recognize that several courts, including our own, had previously concluded a TPPCA claim was extinguished as a matter of law after the payment of an appraisal award. But the Supreme Court of Texas granted review in [the two relevant cases] on January 18, 2019, seven days after Allstate moved for summary judgment and thirteen days before Gonzales filed her response to the motion. This fact undermines her assertion here that she “could not have made a good faith argument in the trial court that payment of the appraisal award did not preclude her from recovering under the TPPCA as a matter of law.”

Gonzales v. Allstate Vehicle & Property Ins. Co., No. 19-40250 (Feb. 11, 2020) (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

The issue in BNSF Railway v. Panhandle Northern Railroad was whether a “handling-carrier” relationship between two railroads was terminable at will. BNSF contended that it was not; Panhandle Northern, a short line operating between BNSF’s cross-country track and a large complex of chemical plants in the Texas Panhandle, argued that it was. The Fifth Circuit made a detailed “Erie guess” about the construction of the parties’ contract under the controlling Illinois law, and rendered judgment in favor of Panhandle Northern:

“[I]in making an Erie guess, we must determine, in our best judgment, how we believe the Illinois Supreme Court would resolve whether the handling-carrier relationship between PNR and BNSF is terminable at will. And, as reflected in the [key Illinois Supreme Court] decision, careful analysis of the text of the contract is paramount in making such a determination. Moreover, in the cases BNSF relies upon, the courts discussed the economics of the parties’ agreements only after first examining closely the text of the contracts at issue and determining that there were termination provisions sufficient to take the contracts of indefinite duration out of the general rule of at-will termination. Although the courts could have ended their decisions upon making those determinations, they then went on to discuss the economics of the parties’ agreements to further bolster their decisions that the contracts were not terminable at will.”

No. 18-11416 (Jan. 3, 2020). (LPCH represented the successful appellant in this case.)

UCC section 9.404(a)(2) say that “the rights of an assignee are subject to . . . any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor that accrues before the account debtor receives a notification of the assignment authenticated by the assignor or the assignee.” Applying this provision, the Fifth Circuit held: “Filing a financing statement does not provide actual notice. Without an inquiry duty, [debtor]’s failure to find the financing statement is not ‘actual notice.’ Because the facts presented do not support the conclusion of actual notice, the district court should have granted judgment in favor of [debtor].” Finserv Casualty Co. v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., No. 18-20245 (Oct. 29, 2019). The Court acknowledged that a sufficient factual record could establish actual notice, but found that this one did not do so: “Although [debtor] knew that the payments might be assigned, and even if it knew that such payments were routinely assigned in the structured-settlement industry, it could not have had more than a suspicion that the payments had in fact been assigned.”

If you are litigating a Texas contract-law case and feel the need to scratch an equitable itch – don’t: “The Supreme Court of Texas has observed that the interpretive role of judges ‘is to be neither generous nor parsimonious’ but unswervingly faithful to what the words actually say. Looser atextual readings may scratch an equitable itch, or at times seem more pragmatic. But the Texas High Court adheres to this centuries-old principle—’law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without law: which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce the most infinite confusion.’ Texas precedent is no-nonsense about giving words their most forthright, contextual meaning. Plain language forbids judicial ad-libbing. Here, the text is clear. And, at least in Texas, clear text = controlling text.” Weaver v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 18-10517 (Sept. 20, 2019).

Nearly a century ago, the unfortunate Helen Palsgraf  was injured in a Long Island Railroad station; the difficult tort-law issues arising from her injury continue to challenge the courts today.  Martinez v. Walgreens Co. presented the question “whether, under Texas law, a pharmacy owes a duty of care to third parties injured on the road by a customer who was negligently given someone else’s prescription.” The Fifth Circuit answered “no,” considering, inter alia: (1) “[I]t was not sufficiently foreseeable that a pharmacy customer would take the medication in a bottle intended for someone else, notwithstanding that the label listed someone else’s name and a different medication,” and (2) “[T]he Texas legislature has shown itself to be both willing and able to undertake the public policy balancing inherent in extensive regulation of pharmacies’ treatment of prescription drugs.” No. 18-40636 (Aug. 6, 2019).

“Resolving an issue that has brewed for several years in this circuit, we conclude that the TCPA does not apply in diversity cases.” Klocke v. Watson, No. 17-11320 (revised Aug. 29, 2019) (emphasis added). “Because the TCPA imposes evidentiary weighing requirements not found in the Federal Rules, and operates largely without pre-decisional discovery, it conflicts with those rules.”

The viability of a tort claim against T-Mobile, arising from delays in obtaining medical treatment, turned on whether this recent statement by the Texas Supreme Court was “obiter dictum” or “judicial dictum”:

Proximate cause requires both cause in fact and foreseeability. For a condition of property to be a cause in fact, the condition must serve as a substantial factor in causing the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. When a condition or use of property merely furnishes a circumstance that makes the injury possible, the condition or use is not a substantial factor in causing the injury. To be a substantial factor, the condition or use of the property must actually have caused the injury. Thus, the use of property that simply hinders or delays treatment does not actually cause the injury and does not constitute a proximate cause of an injury.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the statement was judicial dictum entitled to deference in an Erie analysis, and rendered summary judgment for T-Mobile. Alex v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 18-10555 (June 6, 2019, unpublished) (applying City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. 2016)). (My Pepperdine Law Review article with the University of Idaho’s Wendy Couture remains a strong summary of the underlying theory.)

“The complaint alleges that during the April and October 2016 phone calls, the defendants negligently misrepresented to Mr. Dick that ‘reinstatement was not an option’ and that ‘there was nothing [the] Plaintiff could do to stop a foreclosure.’ The plaintiff’s claim that these misrepresentations prevented her from reinstating the loan merely repackages her claim for breach of contract based on the duty to cooperate. It is therefore barred by the economic loss rule.” Dick v. Colorado Housing Enterprises LLC, No. 18-10900 (July 5, 2019) (unpublished).

Texas Capital Bank sued Zeidman for the alleged breach of a guaranty obligation. The Bank moved for summary judgment; in response, one of Zeidman’s arguments was that the Bank’s claim was barred by quasi-estoppel. He testified that “the Bank orally agreed to accept a $500,000 payment in satisfaction of the Guaranty, Zeidman wired that amount to the Bank, the Bank accepted the payment, and it later demanded additional payment under the Guaranty.” The Bank countered that this defense was barred by the statute of frauds, and the Fifth Circuit agreed that “oral modification of the Guaranty appears to be prohibited by the text of the Guaranty and the statute of frauds . . . .” But the Court found the Bank’s position about the statute of frauds to be inapplicable “because it improperly recharacterizes Zeidman’s affirmative defense as a claim that the underlying Guaranty was modified.” Texas Capital Bank N.A. v. Zeidman, No. 18-1114 (June 27, 2019) (unpubl.)

The Fifth Circuit’s unfortunate Erie guess in Priester v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 708 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2013), about limitations for an action to quiet title on a home-equity lien, was later rejected by the Texas Supreme Court in Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, 505 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2016). Meanwhile, the Priesters’ problems with their lender continued. The Fifth Circuit declined to consider their motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), noting a lengthy delay by the Priesters in bringing the motion, and observing: “If a ‘change in law’ automatically allowed the reopening of federal cases, then anytime the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split, the courts that had taken the view that did not prevail would have to reopen cases no matter how long ago the judgments issued. . . . [The Priesters] are worried that the earlier federal judgment against them may pose a res judicata problem. But res judicata is the ordinary result of a final judgment, not an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief from one.” Priester v. JP Morgan Chase, No. 18-40127 (re-released as published on July 1, 2019).

Sometimes, simply stating the issue gives a strong indication as to the answer. Such was the case in McGlothlin v. State Farm, which examined whether two Mississippi statutes were “repugnant” to one another (synonyms for “repugnant,” according to one online reference, include “abhorrent, revolting, repulsive, repellent, disgusting, offensive, objectionable, vile, foul, nasty, [and] loathsome . . . .” Specifically, Mississippi’s uninsured-motorist statute (1) required State Farm to pay the damages that an insured is “legally entitled to recover” from an uninsured driver, and (2) treats a fireman driving a fire truck as “uninsured,” as a result of the statute’s governmental-immunity statute. A driver who was rear-ended by a fire truck argued that these two statutes were “repugnant” and had to be read in favor of coverage; the Fifth Circuit disagreed: “The two sections’ being ‘confusing’ does not equate to repugnancy.” No. 18-60338 (May 31, 2019).

The Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides a potential defense to a party who receives an otherwise-fraudulent transfer in “good faith.” That said, the exact contours of that defense are not completely clear, leading the Fifth Circuit to vacate an  earlier panel opinion on the issue, to now certify this question to the Texas Supreme Court:

“Is the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act’s ‘good faith’ defense against fraudulent transfer clawbacks, as codified at Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 24.009(a), available to a transferee who had inquiry notice of the fraudulent behavior, did not conduct a diligent inquiry, but who would not have been reasonably able to discover that fraudulent activity through diligent inquiry”

Janvey v. GMAG, LLC, No. 17-11526 (May 24, 2019).

significantly limited new version of the TCPA has passed the Texas House; a similar version is still pending in the Senate. The bill addresses several aspects of the statute’s application in business cases. While the lingering Erie issue about the TCPA’s application in federal court remains, the issue will have less ongoing significance if the Legislature reduces this statute’s force in commercial litigation.

The Texas anti-SLAPP statute has generated an enormous amount of litigation and commentary, especially with the Legislature in session and actively considering amendments. Interestingly, one of the most successful defendants to invoke this statute is President Trump, who used it last year in California federal court to obtain dismissal of a defamation claim about the above Tweet, as well as a substantial award of attorneys’ fees. The district court’s opinion is interesting reading on the merits, as well on choice-of-law and the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the underlying Erie issue.

Texas’s robust attorney-immunity doctrine defeated claims about the Allen Stanford scheme in Troice v. Greenberg Traurig LLP., No. 17-11464 (April 17, 2019). The Fifth Circuit declined to certify the state-law issue, citing “the substantial treatment of the issues by the Texas courts of appeals and the ‘cogent and sound arguments’ presented by counsel,” and held:

  1. “We are persuaded the Supreme Court of Texas would apply the attorney immunity doctrine in the non-litigation context”;
  2. “[I]mmunity can apply even to criminal acts so long as the attorney was acting within the scope of representation” (noting that “[a]fter arguing there was a categorical bar to applying immunity in this context, the plaintiffs did not make an alternative argument that immunity does not apply because Greenberg’s acts were outside the scope of client representation”; and
  3. “We conclude that the Supreme Court of Texas would not consider itself sure that the Texas Legislature intended to abrogate attorney immunity in the context of [Texas Securities Act] claims.” (emphasis in original).

Defendant Blue Cross argued that Plaintiff Encompass’s claim was barred by prescription (limitations), and that contra non valentem (the civilian analog to the discovery rule) did not apply. Plaintiff received the offending letter in 2010, which “immediately caused Encompass to confer with counsel and seek clarification from [Blue Cross],” although Plaintiff did not sue until 2013. Plaintiff argued that the letter “falsified [Blue Cross] internal policies, which it could not discover until 2013 despite diligent inquiry. Although some statements in the letter were independently verifiable, Encompass says others were simultaneously false, damaging, and opaque to outsiders, and that “its diligence to investigate the letter—calling [the author] three times in 2010 and leaving messages without response—was reasonable under the circumstances.” The panel majority accepted the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff; a dissent would have found contra non valentem unavailable as a matter of law. Encompass Office Solutions v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Louisiana, No. 17-10736 (March 19, 2019).

In Janvey v. GMAG, LLC, the Fifth Circuit returned to the “good faith” defense to a claim under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act – a defense that potentially allows an innocent third-party to retain the benefit of a transfer made by a debtor with intent to defraud creditors. The specific question was whether the Texas Supreme Court would accept a “futility” defense to inquiry notice, and the Court concluded that it would not: “No prior court considering TUFTA good faith has applied a futility exception to this exception, and we decline to hold that the Supreme Court of Texas would do so. Transferees seeking to retain fraudulent transfers might offer up evidence of undertaken investigations to prove a reasonable person’s suspicions would not have been aroused when the transfer was received. But the fact that a fraud or scheme is later determined to be too complex for discovery does not excuse a finding of inquiry notice and does not warrant the application of TUFTA good faith.” No. 17-11526 (Jan. 9, 2019).

 

Ironshore, an excess insurance carrier, alleged that the Schiff Hardin law firm made negligent misrepresentations to it while reporting on litigation involving Dorel – the firm’s client and Ironshore’s insured. The Fifth Circuit made “an Erie guess that the Supreme Court of Texas would apply the attorney immunity doctrine to shield attorneys for such negligent misrepresentation claims.” It then concluded:

“The factual allegations of the complaint in this case reflect that all of the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were related to Schiff Hardin’s representation of Dorel in the Hinson litigation. Looking beyond Ironshore’s characterization of the firm’s conduct as wrongful, as we must, the type of conduct at issue in this case includes: (1) reporting on the status of litigation and settlement discussions; (2) providing opinions as to the strength and valuation of plaintiffs’ claims; (3) providing opinions as to the perceived litigation strategies employed by opposing counsel and the potential prejudice of pre-trial developments; (4) providing estimates of potential liability; (5) reporting on the progress of a jury trial; and (6) reporting on pre-trial rulings and pre-trial settlement offers. We are satisfied that the kinds of conduct at issue in this case fall within the routine conduct attorneys engage in when handling this type of litigation. Schiff Hardin’s conduct falls squarely within the scope of the firm’s representation of its client.”

Ironshore Europe DAC v. Schiff Hardin LLP, No. 18-40101 (Jan. 2, 2019).

A serious car accident involving a texting driver led to a products-liability claim based on the human “neurobiological response” to a text message – “They alleged that the accident was caused by Apple’s failure to implement the [lockout mechanism] patent on the iPhone 5 and by Apple’s failure to warn iPhone 5 users about the risks of distracted driving. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that receipt of a text message triggers in the recipient ‘an unconscious and automatic, neurobiological compulsion to engage in texting behavior.‘” The Fifth Circuit declined to extend Texas products law to this theory in this Erie case, recognizing an analogy to the development of dram-shop liability but ultimately finding that it weighed against recognizing this theory. Meador v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-40968 (Dec. 18, 2018).

In JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott Co., the Fifth Circuit certified two questions of state law to the Texas Supreme Court, which involved important but sparsely-litigated topics about remedies under the Texas Sales Representative Act. The Court noted that “[o]n occasion, we have considered the following factors when deciding whether to certify: “(1) the closeness of the question and the existence of sufficient sources of state law; (2) the degree to which considerations of comity are relevant in light of the particular issue and case to be decided; and (3) practical limitations of the certification process: significant delay and possible inability to frame the issue so as to produce a helpful response on the part of the state court.” Two concurrences addressed potential answers that the Texas Supreme Court might provide. No. 17-51023 (Nov. 14, 2018).

 

In an Erie guess based on prior Circuit precedent and intermediate Texas authority, this limitation-of-liability provision was found to not waive a claim for attorneys’ fees under CPRC § 38.001: “[E]ither Party’s liability, if any, for damages to the other Party for any cause whatsoever arising out of or related to this Agreement, and regardless of the form of the action, shall be limited to the damaged Party’s actual damages. Neither Party shall be liable for any indirect, incidental, punitive, exemplary, special or consequential damages of any kind whatsoever sustained as a result of a breach of this Agreement or any action, inaction, alleged tortuous conduct, or delay by the other party.” Ferrari v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 17-20556 (Nov. 7, 2018, unpublished).

The plaintiff  in Bloom v. Aftermath Public Adjusters, Inc. tried to overcome a limitations problem with the tolling doctrine for malpractice claims recognized by Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991). The plaintiff’s claim involved the conduct  of a licensed public adjuster working for an insurance company; the Ffith Circuit characterized his argument as saying “that public adjusters are actually lawyers in disguise. Bloom concedes defendants are technically ‘non-lawyers,’ but he insists they effectively ‘provide[d] legal services,’ because there was once a time when Texas prohibited non-lawyers from engaging in public adjusting.” The Court was unpersuaded in this Erie case:

“But that was then, and this is now. Even assuming Texas law previously classified public adjusting as legal practice, under the relevant regime, these defendants are non-lawyers who were not engaged in legal practice. By definition, Bloom’s claims cannot implicate the unique relationship that triggers the bright-line rule from Hughes. Only Texas has the power to say where lawyer-ing ends and adjusting begins, just as its courts have the sole power to decide Hughes’s outer bounds.”

No. 17-41087 (Sept. 4, 2018).

 

Villareal sought to redeem five certificates of deposit purchased in the early 1980s. His primary legal theory, apparently selected to avoid problems with suing on the instruments themselves, was the quasi-contractual / restitution theory recognized in Texas law for “money had and received.” That theory ordinarily does not apply when an express contract (here, the CDs) addresses the subject. To escape that limitation, Villareal relied on Texas authority under which “an overpayment beyond what a contract provides may sometimes be recovered as unjust enrichment. If an overpayment qualifies as unjust enrichment, reasoned the district court, so should an underpayment.” (citation omitted, emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit disagreed: “Overpayment typically falls outside a contract’s terms and, in that event, the contract would not ‘cover[] the subject matter of the parties’ dispute.’ By contrast, here the dispute involved the claimed non-payment of a debt evidenced by express contracts (the CDs). Unjust enrichment has no role to play.” (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Villareal v. Presidio Nat’l Bank (revised), No. 17-50765 (July 27, 2018, unpublished). (Picture above of Professor Samuel Williston eyeing some of his extensive work on express contracts).

Midwest Feeders, a cattle feedlot business, sued The Bank of Franklin under Mississippi law, alleging that the Bank tolerated a customer’s fraudulent activities that resulted in considerable financial harm. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the bank. Among other rulings, the Court addressed whether Mississippi law imposed  a duty to avoid negligence on a bank, as against a non-customer. Finding no guidance from that state’s supreme court, and inconclusive opinions from other Mississipi courts, the Court surveyed authority nationally and noted “the merits of [the] line of cases” that potentially allowed such liability if the bank knoows of a fiduciary relationship between the customer and the non-customer. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, however, the Court held that “we cannot use our Erie guess to impose upon Mississippi a new regime of liability for its banks.” Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Bank of Franklin, No. 17-60092 (March 27, 2018).

The plaintiff in Al Copeland Investments LLC v. First Specialty Ins. Corp. sued on an insurance policy about a claim for property damage to its business. It argued that this forum selection clause in the policy:

“The parties irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of New York and to the extent permitted by law the parties expressly waive all rights to challenge or otherwise limit such jurisdiction.”

was trumped by this Louisiana statute:

“No insurance contract delivered or issued . . . in [Louisiana] . . . shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement . . . [d]epriving the courts of [Louisiana] of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer.”

The Fifth Circuit disagreed and affirmed dismissal based on forum non conveniens: “[The statute] prohibits provisions in an insurance contract that would deprive Louisiana courts of jurisdiction. ‘A forum-selection clause is a provision . . . that mandates a particular state, county, parish, or court as the proper venue in which the parties to an action must litigate . . . .’ As the district court recognized, venue and jurisdiction are ‘separate and distinct.'” No. 17-30557 (March 9, 2018) (emphasis in original).

In City of San Antonio v. Hotels.com, the Fifth Circuit reversed an $84 million judgment for several cities, against online hotel reservation services, relating to the collection of local occupancy taxes. The holding turned entirely on the force of an intermediate Texas appellate opinon under the Erie doctrine. In its reasoning, the Fifth Circuit rejected a number of arguments against following that opinion, including: (1) the scope of the record before the courts; (2) the analytical framework used by the Texas court; and (3) the precise language of the relevant ordinance. The Court was satisfied with the general principles relied upon by the Texas opinion, as well as its resolution of “absurd result” arguments made in both cases. No. 16-50479 (Nov. 29, 2017). The Dallas Morning News has a good summary of the issues and history of this long-running litigation.

In a return trip to the Fifth Circuit, the defamation case of Block v. Tanenhaus again sidestepped the question of whether state anti-SLAPP laws apply in federal courrt, allowing that elephant to remain in the Erie room for awhile longer. Here, assuming that the Lousiana state law applied, the panel reversed and remanded the dismissal of a professor’s claim that the New York Times misquoted him. Jess Krochtengel summarizes the underlying Erie question and its implications in a recent Law360 article. No. 16-30966 (Aug. 15, 2017).

Guilbeau bought real property and sued Hess Corporation for alleged contamination resulting from oil and gas drilling done several years before. Acknowledging that the Louisiana Supreme Court had not ruled on the precise issue presented – whether the “subsequent purchaser” rule applied to mineral interests – the Fifth Circuit concluded that Louisiana law would bar Guilbeau’s claim. A consensus of Louisiana intermediate courts, applying the most analogous authority from that state’s Supreme Court, reasoned “that while mineral rights in the lessee are real rights, a lessor’s rights, including the right to sue for damages, are personal and do not automatically transfer with the property” absent an assignment. Guilbeau v. Hess Corp., No. 16-30971 (April 18, 2017).

In Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC v. Berry, a dispute about a home equity loan, the Fifth Circuit confirmed that “we now must follow the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in [Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2016)] that no statute of limitations applies to a borrower’s allegations of violations of section 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution in a quiet title action, rather than our prior holding in [Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2013)].” In so doing, the Court reminded that “the issues-not-briefed-are-waived rule is a prudential construct that requires the exercise of discretion,” and addressed the applicability of Wood notwithstanding the appellant not discussing the case in its opening brief, noting that the underlying issues had been briefed, and that the Court had received supplemental briefing on the pure question of law presented about the application of Wood. No. 16-10604 (March 29, 2017).

Gatheright bought sweet potatoes from Clark, paying with two post-dated checks. When they were returned for insufficient funds, Clark instituted criminal proceedings against Gatheright, which were ultimately dismissed after Gatheright spent several weeks in jail. Gatheright then sued Clark for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Clark, observing that “$16,000 in bad checks . . . [is] a sum greater than what the Mississippi Supreme Court has previously found would prompt a reasonable person to institute criminal proceedings.” Based on that observation, the Court rejected arguments about whether a post-dated check was a proper basis for a “false pretenses” prosecution in Mississippi, and about the effect of Gatheright’s filing for personal bankruptcy. Gatheright v. Clark, No. 16-60364 (Feb. 23, 2017, unpublished).

seal_of_the_supreme_court_of_texasLast year, the Fifth Circuit certified these two questions to the Texas Supreme Court:

1. Does a lender or holder violate Article XVI, Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(vii) of the Texas Constitution, becoming liable for forfeiture of principal and interest, when the loan agreement incorporates the protections of Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(vii), but the lender or holder fails to return the cancelled note and release of lien upon full payment of the note and within 60 days after the borrower informs the lender or holder of the failure to comply?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is “no,” then, in the absence of actual damages, does a lender or holder become liable for forfeiture of principal and interest under a breach of contract theory when the loan agreement incorporates the protections of Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(vii), but the lender or holder, although filing a release of lien in the deed records, fails to return the cancelled note and release of lien upon full payment of the note and within 60 days after the borrower informs the lender or holder of the failure to comply?

The TTexasBarToday_TopTen_Badge_VectorGraphicexas Supreme Court answered both questions “no” in Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 15-0437 (Tex. May 20, 2016). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s contract claim in Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 14-51156 (Oct. 3, 2016, unpublished).

stopsignHays, a cardiologist suffering from epilepsy, sued HCA for wrongful discharge as a result of mishandling his illness. The Fifth Circuit agreed that his tortious interference claim against HCA had to be arbitrated, because its viability depended on reference to the employment agreement between him and the specific hospital where he worked. It also affirmed on the theory of “intertwined claims estoppel,” making an Erie guess that the Texas Supreme Court would recognize this theory, and concluding that “Hays’s current efforts to distinguish amongst defendants and claims are the archetype of strategic pleading intended to avoid the arbitral forum, precisely what intertwined claims estoppel is designed to prevent.” Hays v. HCA Holdings, No. 15-51002 (Sept. 29, 2016).

erie railwayThe Fifth Circuit recently denied en banc review — by a “photo finish” 8-7 vote — of Passmore v. Baylor Health System, which concluded that Texas’s expert report requirements for medical malpractice cases were procedural and did not apply in federal court under the Erie doctrine. A dissent argued that this vote was inconsistent with the recent en banc opinion in Flagg v. Stryker Corp. that analyzed a comparable requirement of Louisiana law.

foreFor some time, the Golf Channel and the receiver for Allen Stanford’s affairs have disputed whether the Channel gave value in exchange for the purchase of roughly $6 million in advertising. The Channel contended that it did by giving exactly the advertising that Stanford ordered; the receiver disagreed, noting that Stanford was running a valueless Ponzi scheme. On certification from the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme Court sided with the Channel, holding that under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the Channel gave value from an objective perspective. The Fifth Circuit accepted that holding as to this case, but noted: “The Supreme Court of Texas’s answer interprets the concept of ‘value’ under TUFTA differently than we have understood ‘value’ under other states’ fraudulent transfer laws and under section 548(c) [of] the Bankruptcy Code.” Janvey v. Golf Channel, No. 13-11305 (Aug. 22, 2016).

erie railwayPresenting a textbook Erie problem, Passmore sued Baylor Regional Medical Center about his back surgeries in federal court based on bankruptcy jurisdiction. The defendants obtained dismissal on the expert report requirements in section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Reviewing the requirements of that statute, the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery, and district court opinions on the matter, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding: “Section 74.351’s regulation of discovery and discovery-related sanctions sets it apart from the pre-suit requirements in the cases cited by the defendants and brings it into direct collision with Rules 26 and 37.”   Passmore v. Baylor Health Care System, No. 15-10358 (May 19, 2016).

golf roughAfter a bad start in the Fifth Circuit, the Golf Channel ultimately prevailed in the Texas Supreme Court in a fraudulent transfer case against the Allen Stanford receiver.  The Channel ran advertisements for Stanford’s golf business in exchange for payments of roughly $6 million.  The issue was whether the “value” of those ads, for purposes of the Channel’s defenses under TUFTA, “became valueless based on the true nature of the debtor’s business as a Ponzi scheme or the debtor’s subjective reasons for procuring otherwise lawful services.”  The Texas Supreme Court ruled for the Channel, finding that “TUFTA does not contain separate standards for assessing ‘value’ and ‘reasonably equivalent’ value based on whether the debtor was operating a Ponzi scheme. . . .  “[V]alue must be determined objectively at the time of the transfer and in relation to the individual exchange at hand rather than viewed in the context of the debtor’s entire enterprise, . . . the debtor’s perspective, or . . . a retrospective evaluation of the impact it had on the debtor’s estate.”  Janvey v. Golf Channel, No. 15-0489 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016).

slapp-graphicIn another case that defly manuevers around the thorny Erie issues presented by state anti-SLAPP laws, the Fifth Circuit reminded that Louisiana’s law imposes a burden that “is the same as that of a non-movant opposing summary judgment under Rule 56.” (applying Lozovyy v. Kurtz, No. 15-30086 (5th Cir. Dec. 29, 2015)).  The Court assumed the law would apply, but noted: “We do not conclusively resolve today whether Article 971 applies in diversity cases.”  Block v. Tanenhaus, No. 15-30459 (March 7, 2016).

slapp-graphicThe Texas anti-SLAPP law (the “TCPA”) imposes a number of deadlines that can fit awkwardly with federal practice.  The panel majority in Cuba v. Pylant concluded that when no hearing is held on a TCPA motion as required by the statute (hearings being common in Texas state practice but not in federal court), appeal-related deadlines that start from the hearing date do not begin to run.  A dissent said: “Applying an Erie analysis, I conclude that the TCPA is procedural and must be ignored.”  Nos. 15-10212 & -10213 (Feb. 23, 2016).

scotxbuildingCameron International, a main defendant in the Deepwater Horizon cases, successfully sued Liberty Insurance to help cover its substantial settlement costs. After affirming on the merits, the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Texas Supreme Court: “Whether, to maintain a cause of action under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code against an insurer that wrongfully withheld policy benefits, an insured must allege and prove an injury independent from the denied policy benefits?” Cameron International Corp. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. 14-31321 (Nov. 19, 2015).

texas-ouCardoni v. Prosperity Bank, an appeal from a preliminary injunction ruling in a noncompete case, involved a clash between Texas and Oklahoma law, and led to these noteworthy holdings from the Fifth Circuit in this important area for commercial litigators:

  • Under the Texas Supreme Court’s weighing of the relevant choice-of-law factors, Oklahoma has a stronger interest in the enforcement of a noncompete than Texas, “with the employees located in Oklahoma and employer based in Texas”;
  • As also noted by that Court, “Oklahoma has a clear policy against enforcement of most noncompetition agreements,” which is not so strong as to nonsolicitation agreements;
  • The district court did not clearly err in declining to enforce a nondisclosure agreement, given the unsettled state of Texas law on the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine; and
  • “[T]he University of Texas leads the University of Oklahoma 61-44-5 in the Red River Rivalry.”

No. 14-20682 (Oct. 29, 2015).

hotpotatoEmployees of the Stanford Financial Group sought coverage for attorneys fees incurred in defending federal criminal charges.  The district court held the policy ambiguous and found coverage under the contra proferentem doctrine.  The insurer sought reversal based on the “sophisticated insured” exception to that doctrine under Texas law.  (A previous panel certified the question whether this exception existed in Texas to the Texas Supreme Court, who declined to answer it by resolving that case on other grounds.) Concluding that if Texas were to recognize the exception, it would TexasBarToday_TopTen_Badge_Smallapply a “middle-ground approach,” the majority affirmed: “Absent any information about the content of the negotiations, how the contracts were prepared, or other indicators of relative bargaining power, [the insurer] did not present evidence that the insured did or could have influenced the terms of the exclusion.”  A dissent would have sidestepped saying anything about the exception, preferring to affirm on the ground that the policy unambiguously provided coverage. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Perraud, No. 14-10849 (Aug. 12, 2015, unpublished).

churchontimeCox Operating incurred significant expenses in cleaning up pollution and debris at its oil-and-gas facilities after Hurricane Katrina.  Its insurer disputed coverage.  After a lengthy trial, the district court awarded $9,465,103.22 in damages and $13,064,948.28 in penalty interest under the Texas Prompt Payment Act.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed in Cox Operating LLC v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 13-20529 (July 30, 2015).

After finding that the one-year reporting requirement in Cox’s policy was not an unwaivable limitation on coverage, the Court confronted a “disturbing inconsistency” about the Act. On the one hand, the penalty-interest provision applies generally “[i]f an insurer that is liable for a claim under an insurance policy is not in compliance with this subchapter.”  On the other hand, of the Act’s variously deadlines, only one expressly ties its violation to the penalty provision.  The Fifth Circuit found for the insured, finding “the construction urged by St. Paul . . . would seem to transform all but one of the Act’s deadlines from commands backed by the threat of penalty interest to suggestions backed by nothing at all.”

mulliganAn earlier panel opinion found the Golf Channel liable for $5.9 million under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), even though it delivered airtime with that market value, because the purchaser was Allen Stanford while running a Ponzi scheme. Accordingly, the airtime had no value to creditors, despite its market value.  On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit vacated its initial opinion and certified the controlling issue to the Texas Supreme imageCourt: “Considering the definition of ‘value’ in section 24.004(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, the definition of ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in section 24.004(d) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, and the comment in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act stating that ‘value’ is measured ‘from a creditor’s viewpoint,’ what showing of ‘value’ under TUFTA is sufficient for a transferee to prove the elements of the affirmative defense under section 24.009(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code?”  Janvey v. The Golf Channel, No. 13-11305 (June 30, 2015).

MERSThree counties sued MERS (“Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.”) for violations of various statutes related to the recording of deeds of trust (the Texas equivalent of a mortgage).  In a nutshell, MERS is listed as the “beneficiary” on a deed of trust while the note is executed in favor of the lender.  “If the lender later transfers the promissory note (or its interest in the note) to another MERS member, no assignment of the deed of trust is created or recorded because . . . MERS remains the nominee for the lender’s successors and assigns.”  The counties argued that this arrangement avoided significant filing fees.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed judgment for MERS, finding (1) procedurally, that the Texas Legislature did not create a private right of action to enforce the relevant statute and (2) substantively, that the statute was better characterized as a “procedural directive” to clerks rather than an absolute rule.  Other claims failed for similar reasons.  Harris County v. MERSCORP Inc., No. 14-10392 (June 26, 2015).

Building on In re Deepwater Horizon, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 674744 (Tex. Feb. 13, 2015), in Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. v. Aspen Underwriting, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the following insurance policy provision limited the excess insurer’s obligations to a $5 million that the insured was obliged to provide under another contract: “The word ‘Insured,’ wherever used in this Policy, shall mean . . . any person or entity to whom [Insured] is obliged by a written ‘Insurance Contract’ entered into before any relevant ‘Occurrence’ and/or ‘Claim’ to provide insurance such as is afforded by this Policy.”  The Court found that it did, even though the contract at issue in Deepwater Horizon had additional provisions that bore on this question.  No. 13-51027 (June 10, 2015).

Disputes between borrowers and mortgage servicers are common; jury trials in those disputes are rare.  But rare events do occur, and in McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank, 788 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2015), a servicer lost a judgment for roughly $400,000 after a jury trial.

The underlying relationship was defined by a settlement agreement in which “Wells Fargo has agreed to accept payments from the McCaigs and to give the McCaigs the opportunity to avoid foreclosure of the Property; as long as the McCaigs make the required payments consistent with the Forbearance Agreement and the Loan Agreement.” Unfortunately, Wells’s “‘computer software was not equipped to handle’ the settlement and forbearance agreements meaning ‘manual tracking’ was required.”  This led to a number of accounting mistakes, which in turn led to unjustified threats to foreclose and other miscommunications.

In reviewing and largely affirming the judgment, the Fifth Circuit reached several conclusions of broad general interest:

  • The “bona fide error” defense under the Texas Debt Collection Act allows a servicer to argue that it made a good-faith mistake;  Wells did not plead that defense here, meaning that its arguments about a lack of intent were not pertinent to the elements of the Act sued upon by plaintiffs;
  • The economic loss rule did not bar the TDCA claims, even though the alleged misconduct breached the parties’ contract: “[I]f a particular duty is defined both in a contract and in a statutory provision, and a party violates the duty enumerated in both sources, the economic loss rule does not apply”;
  • Casteel – type charge issue is not preserved if the objecting party submits the allegedly erroneous question with the comment “If I had to draft this over again, that’s the way I’d draft it”;
  • The plaintiffs’ lay testimony was sufficient to support awards for mental anguish; and
  • “[A] print-out from [plaintiffs’] attorney’s case management system showing individual tasks performed by the attorney and the date on which those tasks were performed” was sufficient evidence to support the award of attorneys fees.

A dissent took issue with the economic loss holding, and would find all of the plaintiffs’ claims barred; “[t]he majority’s reading of these [TDCA] provisions specifically equates mere contract breach with statutory violations[.]”

chopperDan Peterson sued his former employer, Bell Helicopter Textron, for age discrimination under the TCHRA. The jury found that age was a motivating factor in his termination, but also found that Bell would have terminated him even without consideration of his age.  The district court awarded no damages, but imposed an injunction on Bell about future age discrimination, and awarded Peterson attorneys fees of approximately $340,000.  The Fifth Circuit reversed.  Noting that the TCHRA allowed an injunction even in light of the unfavorable causation finding, the Court found that plaintiff’s request came too late, as Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) “assumes that a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief not specifically pled has been tested adversarially, tried by consent, or at least developed with meaningful notice to the defendant.”  Here, Bell showed that it would have tried the case differently had it known an injunction was at issue.  Accordingly, the fee award was also vacated. Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 14-10249 (June 4, 2015).  A revised opinion honed the opinion’s analysis as to a potential alternative ground of fee recovery; the same day it issued, the full Court denied en banc review over a lengthy dissent.

Withdrawing an earlier panel opinion, the Fifth Circuit certified two insurance questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court in 2014, which have now been answered:

1.  Whether an insurer can be liable for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim when it never received a firm settlement offer.  (The Fifth Circuit noted that a revised statute imposed “an affirmative duty . . . to make a reasonable effort to settle claims,” drawing into question prior case law in the area.)  The Louisiana Supreme Court said: “Having determined that the plain language supports the existence of a cause of action in favor of the insured under [the revised statute], we answer this question affirmatively.”

2.  Whether an insurer can be liable for “misrepresenting or failing to disclose facts that are not related to the insurance policy’s coverage” — namely, the status of a claim and related settlement negotiations.  The answer: ” An insurer can be found liable under [the statute] for misrepresenting or failing to disclose facts that are not related to the insurance policy’s coverage; the statute prohibits the misrepresentation of ‘pertinent facts,’ without restriction to facts ‘relating to any coverages.'”

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit remanded for further proceedings in Kelly v. State Farm, No. 12-31064 (May 29, 2015, unpublished).

The same week as whoompthe en banc vote in the whooping crane litigation, the Fifth Circuit analyzed “Whoomp! (There It Is).”  The unfortunate song has been mired in copyright infringement litigation for a decade; the district court entered judgment for the plaintiff for over $2 million, and it was affirmed in Isbell v. DM Records, Inc., Nos. 13-40787 and 14-40545 (Dec. 18, 2014).  [The opinion notes: “The word “‘Whoomp!’ appears to be a neologism, perhaps a variant of ‘Whoop!,’ as in a cry of excitement.”]

The main appellate issue was a variant of a frequently-litigated topic — the role of extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation.  The assignment in question was governed by California law, which the Court found to “employ[] a liberal parol evidence rule” with respect to consideration of extrinsic evidence.  The appellant argued that the district image court erred “in interpreting the Recording Agreement without asking the jury to make any findings on the extrinsic evidence.”  The Court disagreed, finding that the record did not present “a question of the credibility of conflicting extrinsic evidence” (emphasis in original): “The only dispute is over the meaning of the Recording Agreement and the inferences that should be drawn from the numerous undisputed pieces of extrinsic evidence.  This is a question of law for the court, not for a jury.”

napoleon lawmakerIn tour de force reviews of Louisiana’s Civil Code and civilian legal tradition, a plurality and dissent — both written by Louisiana-based judges — reviewed whether a 1923 deed created a “predial servitude” with respect to a right of access.  The deed at issue said: “It is understood and agreed that the said Texas & Pacific Railway Company shall fence said strip of ground and shall maintain said fence at its own expense and shall provide three crossings across said strip at the points indicated on said Blue Print hereto attached and made part hereof, and the said Texas and Pacific Railway hereby binds itself, its successors and assigns, to furnish proper drainage out-lets across the land hereinabove conveyed.”

The analysis involved citation to the Revised Civil Code of Louisiana of 1870 (the Code in effect at the time of conveyance), the 1899 treatise Traité de Droit Civil-Des Biens, and the 1893 work, Commentaire théorique & pratique du code civil.  Despite the arcane overlay, the opinions turn on practical observations.  The plurality notes that the deed uses “successors and assigns” language only with respect to drainage — not access — while the dissent observes that a “personal” access right, limited only to the parties to the conveyance and that does not run with the land, is impractical.  Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., No. 13-30990 (Dec. 2, 2014).

Dawna Casey’s family sued Toyota, alleging that the airbag in a 2010 Highlander did not remain inflated for six seconds and caused her death in an accident.  The district court granted judgment as a matter of law and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Casey v. Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing, No. 13-11119 (Oct. 20, 2014).

As to the claim of manufacturing defect, the Court observed: “Casey . . . established only that the air bag did not remain inflated for six seconds,” and relied on alleged violations of Toyota’s performance standards to prove a defect (rather than a technical explanation of the bag’s performance).  The Court rejected those allegations under Texas law and precedent from other jurisdictions: “Each piece of evidence submitted by Casey on this point is result-oriented, not manufacturing-oriented, and provides no detail on how the airbag is constructed.”

As to the claim of design defect, Casey relied primarily on a patent application for an allegedly superior design, which the Court rejected as not having been tested under comparable conditions, and as lacking a real-world track record as to feasibility, risk-benefit, and other such matters.  Law360 has written a summary of the opinion.

ExxonMobil sued US Metals, alleging over $6 million in damages from defects in a set of 350 “weld neck flanges.”  US Metals sought CGL coverage from Liberty.  U.S. Metals, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., No. 1320433 (Sept. 19, 2014, unpublished). Liberty denied US Metals’s request, based on the “your product” and “impaired” property exclusions in the policy, which turned on the terms “physical injury” and “replacement” in those exclusions.   The Fifth Circuit noted a lack of Texas authority as to whether those terms are ambiguous in this context, and no clear answer in other opinions that have addressed them. Accordingly, the Court certified two questions to the Texas Supreme Court: (1) whether those terms, as used in these exclusions, are ambiguous; and (2) if so, whether the insured’s interpretation is reasonable.  The Court observed that the interpretation of these terms “will have far-reaching implications” and “affect a large number of litigants.”  That Court accepted the certification request today.

A vessel sank while in the harbor for repairs.  Afterwards, the insurer sued its insured (the harbor operator) and the vessel owner, to dispute coverage.  National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. R&R Marine, Inc., No. 10-20767 (June 30, 2014).  The insurer argued that the vessel owner had no standing under Texas law when it made a claim against the insurer, as there was no final judgment establishing the insured’s liability at that time.  The plaintiff countered that it was “forced” to assert its claim as a compulsory counterclaim under the Federal Rules.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that — although Texas state law barred the timing of the vessel owner’s counterclaim, it arose out of the same occurrence as and had a logical relationship to the coverage dispute.  Accordingly, the counterclaim was compulsory.  Treating it as such also “permitted the district court to efficiently address all disputes arising from the litigation” and was consistent with the Rules’ goal of only “alter[ing] the mode of enforcing state-created rights.”

In Lemoine v. Wolfe, the Fifth Circuit certified an important question of malicious prosecution law to the Louisiana Supreme Court; namely, whether dismissal of a prosecution constitutes a “bona fide termination in his favor” as required by that tort.  No. 13-30178 (July 18, 2014, unpublished).  “For example, in a case such as this one, the dismissal served almost as a determination of the merits.  The dismissal of [the] cyberstalking charge was expressly based on the fact that the district attorney had determined that there was ‘insufficient credible, admissible, reliable evidence remaining to support a continuation of the prosecution.'”

The Fifth Circuit addressed the Texas rules about settlement credits in two cases this summer:

1.   Credit.  An employee stole a number of checks by endorsing them to himself.  The Court found “that the one satisfaction rule obtains  . . ., for while there are multiple checks at issue, there is but a single injury.”  Coastal Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13-20293 (July 21, 2014).  It then remanded for analysis of the appropriate allocation; a dissent would have dismissed this interlocutory appeal into a complex area of Texas law.  The Court also affirmed that section 3.405 of the UCC — the “padded payroll” defense — provided an affirmative defense for the relevant bank to a common law claim for “money had and received.”

2.  No credit.  The victim of a fraudulent scheme sued the seller of the relevant business for breach of warranty, and the participants in the scheme for a fraudulent transfer.  It settled with the seller and recovered a multi-million dollar judgment against the bank that participated in the transfer.  Held, no credit for the bank: “Citibank’s alleged contractual breach and the TUFTA action against Worthington may share common underlying facts—the three fraudulent transfers from CitiCapital to Worthington totaling $2.5 million, induced by Wright & Wright. But such factual commonality does not suffice to count the contractual dispute’s settlement against TUFTA’s limit on recovery for a single avoidance ‘claim,’ Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 24.009(b), or to render Citibank a joint tortfeasor for one-satisfaction rule purposes.”  GE Capital Commercial, Inc. v. Worthington National Bank, No. 13-10171 (June 10, 2014).  The Court also held that Texas would apply an objective “good faith” test under its fraudulent transfer statute rather than a subjective test referred to in an older Texas Supreme Court opinion.  (LTPC and this blog’s author represented the successful plaintiff/appellee in this case.)

The coverage dispute in Wiszia Co. v. General Star Indemnity Co. involved a lawsuit in which “Jefferson Parish essentially asserted Wisznia improperly designed a building and did not adequately coordinate with the builders during its construction.” No. 13-31125 (July 16, 2014).  Reviewing the allegations under Louisiana’s eight-corners rule, and summarizing the extensive Louisiana jurisprudence on the topic, the Fifth Circuit found that the claim fell within the policy’s professional services exclusion.   Under those authorities, mere use of the word “‘negligence’ is insufficient to obligate a professional liability insurer to defend the insured,” and “the factual allegations in the Jefferson Parish petition here do not give rise to an ordinary claim for negligence—such as an unreasonably dangerous work site.”

A subtle Erie issue flashed by when Andrews alleged premises liability claims against BP, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for BP under a Texas statute. Terry v. BP Amoco, No. 12-40913 (June 27, 2014, unpublished).  BP won summary judgment: “Exhibits C and D are the only evidence that Andrews identified as raising a material issue of fact as to BP’s responsibility for the explosion. Those exhibits are a Safety Bulletin issued by the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) and a CSB press release discussing the bulletin. The statute creating the CSB, however, prohibits Andrews from using the documents as evidence in this case.  Additionally, both CSB documents also likely constitute inadmissible hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”  The question not raised is how much substantive effect this type of federal statute must have in a state law tort claim, removed to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, so as to raise an Erie issue.

The plaintiffs in Garziano v. Louisiana Log Home, Inc. made 88 percent of the installment payments for a build-it-yourself log cabin kit, and then defaulted.  No. 13-60291 (May 29, 2014, unpublished).  The log cabin company won summary judgment against several contract and tort claims by the purchasers.  Before final judgment was entered, however, it came to light that the company had resold several of the logs and actually was ahead on the transaction overall.  The district court denied a Rule 59(e) motion about this information and entered judgment.  The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court should not have focused on plaintiffs’ erroneous characterization of the issue as “unjust enrichment,” and by doing so, “essentially granted LLH an impermissible double recovery—making the earnest money provision an unenforceable penalty.”  The Court remanded “with instructions for the district court to make findings on the amount of actual damages that LLH suffered and to amend the judgment to remit to the Garzianos any monies paid to LLH under the contract that were in excess of LLH’s actual damages.”  (The defendant offers several packages for log homes, all of which look elegant and cost-effective to this author.)

The plaintiff in McKay v. Novartis, Inc. challenged the dismissal on preemption grounds, by an MDL court in Tennessee, of products liability claims about drugs made by Novartis. No. 13-50404 (May 27, 2014).  The Fifth Circuit rejected an argument about inadequate time to get certain medical records, noting that the plaintiffs “sought formal discovery of evidence that was available to them through informal means” (citing other cases from the Court on that general topic), and also observing that two years passed from the filing of suit until Novartis sought summary judgment.  The Court also affirmed the MDL court’s grant of summary judgment on Texas state law grounds about a breach of warranty claim, finding inadequate notice; as an Erie matter: “the majority of Texas intermediate courts have held that a buyer must notify both the intermediate seller and the manufacturer.”

At issue in Hess Management Firm, LLC v. Bankston were the damages arising from the termination of a contract about the operation of a gravel pit (sadly, not a magical gravel pit of rule-against-perpetuities lore).  No. 12-31016 (April 18, 2014).  The dispute was whether damages were capped at 180 days — the contract term for adequate notice of closure — or whether the closure of the pit was post-breach activity that is not relevant to damage calculation.  The Fifth Circuit sided with the bankruptcy court and reversed the district court’s enlargement of the damages, concluding: “A contrary result would defeat the maxim of placing a non-breaching party in the same position they would have been had breach not occurred, and award [plaintiff] more than their expectation interest.”

A law firm argued that the Texas “anti-SLAPP” statute protected its efforts to solicit former patients of a dental clinic as clients.  NCDR, LLC v. Mauze & Bagby PLLC, No. 12-41243 (March 11, 2014).  (This statute has led to a great deal of litigation about communication-related disputes, often in areas that the Legislature may not have fully anticipated — this blog’s sister details such litigation in the Dallas Court of Appeals.)  In a detailed analysis, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the district court’s ruling against the firm was appealable as a collateral order.  The Court then sidestepped an issue as to whether the anti-SLAPP statute was procedural and thus inapplicable in federal court, finding it had not been adequately raised below.  Finally, on the merits, the Court affirmed the ruling that the law firm’s activity fell within the “commercial speech” exception to the statute:  “Ultimately, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that M&B’s ads and other client solicitation are exempted from the TCPA’s protection because M&B’s speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer.”

Taylor sued his employer in state court for violations of Texas law.  Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Manufacturing Co., No. 13-10715 (March 10, 2014). Later, he amended his pleading to add federal claims.  Defendant removed and moved to dismiss on limitations grounds.  Under Texas law, Taylor’s new claims would not relate back because the original state law claims were barred by limitations when suit was filed.  Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), however, the claims would relate back because they “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out” in the original pleading.  Noting that Rule 81(c) says the Federal Rules “apply to a civil action after it is removed,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that they did not “provide for retroactive application to the procedural aspects of a case that occurred in state court prior to removal to federal court.”  Accordingly, it affirmed dismissal.

Mississippi law allows a “bad faith” claim relating to handling of workers’ compensation; Alabama law does not.  Williams, a Mississippi resident, was injured in Mississippi while working for an Alabama resident contract.  Williams v. Liberty Mutual, No. 11-60818 (Jan. 28, 2014).  The Fifth Circuit reversed the choice-of-law question, finding that section 145 of the Restatement (governing tort claims) applied rather than other provisions for contract claims.  Under that framework, Mississippi would give particular weight to the place of injury, and thus apply Mississippi law. The opinion highlights the importance of the threshold issue of properly characterizing a claim before beginning the actual choice-of-law analysis.

Boyett v. Redland Ins. Co. examined whether a forklift is a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of Louisiana’s uninsured motorist statute, and concluded that it is one.  No. 12-31273 (Jan. 27, 2014).  Its Erie analysis illustrates a feature of Louisiana’s civil law system that bedevils outsiders.  On the one hand, a court “must look first to Louisiana’s Constitution, its codes, and statutes, because the ‘primary basis of law for a civilian is legislation, and not (as in the common law) a great body of tradition in the form of prior decisions of the courts.’ Unlike in common law systems, ‘[s]tare decisis is foreign to the Civil Law, including Louisiana.'”  On the other hand, “[W]hile a single decision is not binding on [Louisiana’s] courts, when a series of decisions form a constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings having the same reasoning, jurisprudence constante applies and operates with considerable persuasive authority.”

In Coleman v. H.C. Price Co., a toxic tort case, the Fifth Circuit certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court the question whether that state’s one-year limitations statute for survival actions is “prescriptive” (limitations does not run until the cause of action accrues, based on the plaintiff’s actual or constructive knowledge), or or “preemptive” (the cause of action is extinguished even if it has not accrued).  No. 13-30150 (Dec. 18, 2013, unpublished). The issue is significant, as the opinion says: “the answer will define the time period governing all survival actions brought in Louisiana . . . .”

After a recent example of attorneys fees that were not “inextricably intertwined” under Texas law, the Fifth Circuit followed this month with a practical example of the Texas requirement of “presentment” of a contract claim before fees may be recovered. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. Sanchez-Campuzano, the Court reminded that the pleading of presentment is procedural, and thus not a requirement in the federal system.  No. 12-40544  (Dec. 23, 2013, unpublished).  It is, however, a substantive requirement.  In this case, sending a “Notice of Default” under a primary obligation was enough to “present” a claim for liability on a guaranty, noting the “flexible, practical understanding” of the requirement by Texas courts. The Court distinguished Jim Howe Homes v. Rodgers, 818 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ), which found that service of a DTPA complaint was not presentment of a later-filed contract claim, on the ground that the “Notice” here went beyond mere service of a pleading.  For thorough review of this principle, and other key points about fee awards, please consult the book “How to Recover Attorneys Fees in Texas” by my colleagues Trey Cox and Jason Dennis.)

While nominally about a limited issue of workers compensation law,  Austin v. Kroger Texas LP analyzes basic issues of an “Erie guess,” Texas premises liability law, and the types of negligence claims available in Texas.  No. 12-10772 (Sept. 27, 2013).  Austin, a Kroger employee, slipped while cleaning an oily liquid with a mop.  Contrary to store policy, a product called “Spill Magic” was not available to him that day.   After a thorough discussion of the interplay between the common law of premises liability and the Texas workers compensation statutes (Kroger being a non-subscriber), the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for Kroger that was based on Austin’s subjective awareness of the spill.  “Section 406.033(a) of the Texas Labor Code takes the employee’s own negligence off of the table for a non-subscriber like Kroger . . . ”  The Court went on to find fact issues about Kroger’s negligence in not having Spill Magic available, and about Kroger’s knowledge of the spill.  The Court affirmed dismissal of the gross negligence claim, and in the remand, asked the district court to consider the specific type of negligence claim that Austin asserted under Texas law.

The insured estimated loss from a hailstorm at a shopping center at close to $1 million; the insurer estimated $17,000.  TMM Investments v. Ohio Casualty Insurance, No. 12-40635 (Sept. 17, 2013).  The insurer invoked its contractual right for an appraisal, which came in around $50,000.  The insured sued, alleging that the appraisal improperly excluded damages to the HVAC system and that the panel exceeded its authority by considering causation issues.  Applying State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009), the Fifth Circuit agreed on the HVAC issue, but did not see that as a reason to invalidate the entire award, and reasoned that the appraisers were within their authority when they “merely distinguished damage caused by pre-existing conditions from damage caused by the storm . . . .”

In a high-profile “data breach” case, the district court dismissed several banks’ claims against a credit card processor after hackers entered its system and stole confidential information.  Lone Star National Bank v. Heartland Payment Systems, No. 12-20648 (Sept. 3, 2013).  The banks did not have a contract with the processor.  They sought money damages for the cost of replacing compromised credit cards and reimbursing customers for wrongful charges.  Applying New Jersey law, the Fifth Circuit found that the economic loss rule did not bar a negligence claim on these facts at the Rule 12 stage.  These banks were an “identifiable class,” Heartland’s liability would not be “boundless” but run only to the banks, and the banks would otherwise have no remedy.  The Court also noted that it was not clear whether the risk could have been allocated by contract.  The Court declined to affirm dismissal on several other grounds such as choice-of-law and collateral estoppel, “as they are better addressed by the district court in the first instance.”

The plaintiffs in Young v. United States alleged that the Interior Department negligently prepared two studies which led to flooding along Interstate 12 in Louisiana, bringing federal litigation in 2008 when the last major flood was in 1983.  No. 13-30094 (August 21, 2013).  Plaintiff argued that the “continuing tort” doctrine saved the claim from limitations because the improperly-designed highway remained in place. The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting two controlling Louisiana Supreme Court cases.  The first, Hogg v. Chevron, involved leaking underground gasoline storage tanks and “rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the failure to contain or remediate the leakage constituted a continuing wrong, suspending the commencement of the running of prescription . . . [explaining] that ‘the breach of a duty to right an initial wrong simply cannot be a continuing wrong that suspends the running of prescription, as that is the purpose of every lawsuit and the obligation of every tortfeasor.'” 45 So.3d 991 (La. 2010).  Similarly, the second held: “[T]he actual digging of the canal was the operating cause of the injury[, and t]he continued presence of the canal and the consequent diversion of water from the ox-bow [were] simply the continuing ill effects arising from a single tortious act.”  Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 737 So.2d 720 (La. 1999).

2013 has seen a steady stream of unpublished opinions favoring mortgage servicers, followed by a published opinion affirming a MERS assignment, and now a second published opinion rejecting arguments about the alleged “robosigning” of assignment documents.  In Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank, a suit arising out of foreclosure on a Texas home equity loan, the Fifth Circuit held: (1) borrowers could challenge the validity of assignments to the servicer, since they were not asserting affirmative rights under those instruments; (2) alleged technical defects in the signature on the relevant assignment created rights only for the servicer and lender, not the borrower; (3) the assignment did not have to be recorded, mooting challenges to defects in the acknowledgement; and (4) a violation of the relevant PSA related to the transfer of the note did not create rights for the borrower.  The opinion concluded with two important caveats: it was not deciding whether the Texas Supreme Court would adopt the “note-follows-the-mortgage” concept, and it reminded: “We do not condone ‘robo-signing’ more broadly and remind that bank employees or contractors who commit forgery or prepare false affidavits subject themselves and their supervisors to civil and criminal liability.”  735 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2013).

In Temple v. McCall, the Fifth Circuit confronted a series of property conveyances with ambiguous language about whether mineral rights were included.  No. 12-30661 (June 20, 2013).  The Court affirmed, approving the weight given by the district court to expert testimony about “customary interpretation” of similar deed language in Louisiana.  The Court discussed the proper weight that Erie gives to an intermediate state appellate opinion, but ultimately found the relevant Louisiana case distinguishable on its facts.  (The proper role of extrinsic evidence in contract cases is a recurring issue in the Court’s diversity cases, although the express finding of ambiguity in this dispute simplifed the analysis on that point.)

In its first published opinion of 2013 about the merits of a wrongful foreclosure claim, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s “show-me-the-note” and “split-the-note” arguments.  Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 722 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2013).  In footnote 2, the Court noted that much of the relevant law is federal because of diversity between the borrower and the foreclosing entity.  As to the first theory, the court cited authority that allowed an authenticated photocopy to prove a note, and said: “We find no contrary Texas authority requiring production of the ‘original’ note.”  As to the second, acknowledging some contrary authority, the Court reviewed the relevant statute and held: “The ‘split-the-note’ theory is . . .  inapplicable under Texas law where the foreclosing party is a mortgage servicer and the mortgage has been properly assigned.  The party to foreclose need not possess the note itself.”  An unpublished opinion, originally released a day before Martins, was revised to closely follow its analysis and result.  Casterline v. OneWest Bank, No. 13-50067 (revised July 5, 2013, unpublished).

On June 18, two separate panels — one addressing a chemical spill, the other a vessel crash into an oil well — reached the same conclusion in published opinions:  when an insured fails to give notice within the agreed-upon period, as required by a “negotiated buyback” endorsement to a policy, the insurer does not have to show prejudice to void coverage.   Settoon Towing LLC v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 11-31030; Starr Indemnity & Liability Co. v. SGS Petroleum Service Corp., No. 12-20545.  The notice provision was seen as part of the basic bargain struck about coverage.  Both opinions — especially Starr, arising under Texas law — recognized the continuing viability of Matador Petroleum v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 1989), in this situation, notwithstanding later Texas Supreme Court cases requiring prejudice in other contexts arising from the main body of a policy.  Settoon went on to address other issues under Louisiana insurance law, including whether the Civil Code concept of “impossibility,” which focuses on a failure to perform an obligation, applies to a failure to perform a condition precedent such as giving notice.

A lawyer’s letter making a settlement offer contained a paragraph accusing the other side of giving a witness money for favorable testimony.  The accused party then sued for defamation.  In Lehman v. Holleman, applying Mississippi law, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that such statements are absolutely privileged from liability because they are “plainly related” to an underlying judicial proceeding.  No. 12-60814 (April 15, 2013, unpublished).

A company leased a railcar, and undertook to return it “cleaned of commodities,” which was defined to mean (among other things) “safe for human entry.” Sampson v. GATX Corporation, No. 12-30406 (March 19, 2013, unpublished). The district court concluded that this provision was only part of the contract devoted to allocation of the cost of cleaning.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, and found that the plaintiff had raised a fact issue about whether this contractual duty could give rise to tort liability to someone injured in the car, pursuant to section 324A of the Second Restatement of Torts.

A federal jury awarded $4 million in compensatory damages for a car wreck.  The district judge interpreted the award to include $2.2 million in noneconomic damages, and then reduced that portion of the award to $1 million because of Mississippi’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages.  Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 09-60651 (Feb. 27, 2013, revised March 20, 2013).  The plaintiff challenged the cap as violating the Mississippi Constitution’s jury trial guarantee and separation of power provisions.  The Mississippi Supreme Court declined to answer certified questions about those issues.  The Fifth Circuit found that the cap did not violate the Mississippi Constitution.  The Court declined to consider an argument that the Erie doctrine prevented the district judge from segregating the verdict as a matter of state substantive law, finding that the point was not asserted timely and was thus waived.

In First American Title v. Continental Casualty, the Court analyzed a “claims-made-and-reported” policy under the Louisiana direct action statute, which allows an injured third party to directly sue the responsible party’s insurer.  No. 12-30336 (Feb. 28, 2013).   Notice was not given to the insurer during the required period.  The Court concluded that unlike an occurrence policy, where a notice requirement is intended to protect the insurer and a failure to give notice will not bar a direct action, proper notice under this policy was a condition precedent to coverage and thus barred the direct action.  A concurrence agreed with the result but advocated a narrower ground for decision.

The insured in Mid-Continent Casualty v. Eland Energy recovered a multi-million dollar verdict against its insurer, alleging that the insurer’s efforts to unilaterally settle a claim for environmental damage after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita undermined the defense of an ongoing class action about similar claims.  No. 11-10649 (Feb. 22, 2013).   The district court granted JNOV and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Recognizing that “[the insured] is understandably upset,” the court rejected a common-law duty of good faith under Texas law in the handling of third-party insurance claims, dismissing as dicta or distinguishing several cases cited by the insured.   Potential claims under Louisiana law failed for  choice-of-law reasons since the claim was handled in Texas. Claims based on the Texas Insurance Code failed to establish a causal link between the alleged misconduct and the ultimate settlement terms of the class action.

In Ergon-West Virginia, Inc. v. Dynegy Marketing & Trade, the Fifth Circuit found that Dynegy had no duty under two natural gas supply contracts to attempt to get replacement gas after a declaration of force majeure in response to hurricane damage, affirming the district court as to one contract and reversing as to the other.  No. 11-60492 (Jan. 22, 2013).  The first contract’s force majeure clause required Dynegy to “remed[y] with all reasonable dispatch” the event.  The Court found that “reasonable” was not ambiguous but that extrinsic evidence of industry standards (favorable to Dynegy) was properly admitted to give it full meaning (contrasting its approach with the district court’s, which found the term ambiguous and admitted the testimony to resolve the ambiguity).  The second contract’s provision had language about “due diligence” by Dynegy.  The Court found the term ambiguous as both parties’ readings of it were reasonable, and then held that the district court should have credited the same evidence here as it did for the first contract.

In the third mortgage servicing opinion of 2013, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of contract, promissory estoppel, and tort claims under Texas law arising from the attempted negotiation of a loan modification during a foreclosure situation.   Milton v. U.S. Bank, No. 12-40742 (Jan. 18, 2013, unpublished); see also Gordon v. JP Morgan Chase (contract and estoppel claims under Texas law) and Pennell v. Wells Fargo Bank (negligent misrepresentation claim under Mississippi law).  The Court also found that this mortgagor-mortgagee relationship did not create an independently actionable duty of good faith, and that reliance on alleged representations that were inconsistent with the loan documents and foreclosure notice was not reasonable.  Id. at 5, 6.

The insured in Jamestown Insurance v. Reeder successfully minimized its liability with a winning appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.  No. 12-20437 (Jan. 17, 2013, unpublished).  He only gave notice of a claim at that point, however, and despite the result, ran afoul of the concept that “[o]ne of the purposes of a notice provisions . . . is to allow an insurer ‘to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities before it is obligated to pay.'”  Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).  Because the insurer could have helped influence the trial result, or negotiated a settlement at the appellate level, the “delayed tender thwarted the recognized purposes of the notice provisions” and summary judgment was affirmed for the insurer.  Id.   

Continuing a theme begun a few days ago in Gordon v. JP Morgan Chase, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a servicer on a negligent misrepresentation claim under Mississippi law based on statements during loan modification discussions.  Pennell v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 12-60595 (Jan. 9, 2013, unpublished).  The Court saw the statements as unactionable promises of future conduct.  In reviewing the relevant cases, the Court distinguished two federal district court cases on their facts, while also diminishing their effect under Erie compared to controlling state court authority.

Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. involved the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s reversal of the Fifth Circuit in Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).  No. 11-31073 (Oct. 25, 2012, published Dec. 27).  Pliva held that federal law preempted state laws that would require generic drug manufacturers to change a drug’s label.  Id. at 3.  The plaintiff’s counsel sought relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) from the rulings of the district court after remand from the Fifth Circuit, principally arguing that Pliva impliedly overruled a line of Louisiana authority.  The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief, finding that the plaintiff’s argument stretched Erie too far and that its mandate had been properly interpreted and applied.  Another recent case in the “expanding cohort controlled by Pliva v. Mensing” is Morris v. Pliva, Inc., No. 12-30319 (Feb. 14, 2013).

ACE American Insurance v. Freeport Welding presents a thorough analysis of coverage, in the duty to defend context, under Texas law for a party claiming to be an “additional insured.”  No. 12-20002 (Oct. 19, 2012).  Before analyzing the allegations under Texas’s “eight corners” rule, the Court first reviewed whether the party was within the scope of the policy under general contract principles, and found that it was not.  The key to the Court’s analysis was the clarity of the policy documents about the dates for coverage.  Summary judgment was affirmed for the insurer as to the duty to defend, and the related indemnity issues were remanded for further consideration in light of the parties’ settlement.

In affirming the dismissal of a warranty claim under Louisiana law about the construction of a home, the Fifth Circuit reviewed basic requirements for an “Erie guess” about state law.  Gines v. D.R. Horton Inc., No. 12-30183 (Oct. 17, 2012).  The analysis requires that the federal court “attempt to predict state law, not to create or modify it,” and does not allow it “to fashion new theories of recovery.”  Id. at 4 (quoting American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991)).  Intermediate state court decisions receive deference “unless [we are] convinced by other persuasive data that the higher court of the state would decide otherwise.”  Id. (quoting Cerda v. 2004-EQR1 LLC, 612 F.3d 781, 794 (5th Cir. 2010)).

In Cambridge Integrated Services Group v. Concentra Integrated Services, after reminding that a district court located in a state does not get deference in making an Erie guess about that state’s law, the Fifth Circuit examined the effect of a release obtained by an indemnitor for potential claims against its indemnitee.  No. 11-31032 (Sept. 26, 2012).  The Court found that the release precisely matched the terms of the indemnitor’s obligations to the indemnitee, and thus extinguished its duty to indemnify against such claims in ongoing litigation.  As to the duty to defend, however, the Court found summary judgment improper as issues about the claims “remained to be clarified through litigation.”  Id. at 10.

The plaintiff in Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration won a $20 million judgment for breach of a contract to buy rights in the Haynesville Shale formation, against the background of a a “plummet[]” in the price of natural gas.  No. 11-41003 (Sept. 12, 2012).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.  After review of other analogous energy cases, the Court found that  the parties’ writing had a sufficient “nucleus of description” of the property to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, even though some review of public records was required to fully identify the property from that “nucleus.”  Id. at 11-12.  The Court also found that the parties had reached an enforceable agreement and that Plaintiff had tendered performance, finding an “adjustment clause” specifying a per-acre price particularly relevant on the tender issue.  Id. at 16, 17-18.

The Court vacated its earlier panel opinion in Sawyer v. du Pont, which rejected claims of fraudulent inducement by employees who the Court concluded were “at-will.”  The issue of whether at-will employees can bring such claims (which here, also involves the application of a notice provision in the employees’ CBA with their employer), has now been certified to the Texas Supreme Court.  No. 11-40454 (July 27, 2012).  The Texas Lawyer Blog has some interesting insight on the procedural history of this ruling.

“What follows is the tale of competing mineral leases on the Louisiana property of Lee and Patsy Stockman during the Haynesville Shale leasing frenzy.”  Petrohawk Properties v. Chesapeake Louisiana at 1, No. 11-30576 (as rev’d Aug. 2012).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding that one of the dueling leases was procured by fraudulent misrepresentations as to the legal effect of a lease extension, rejecting several challenges to whether such a representation was actionable under Louisiana law, as well as an argument that the fraud had been “confirmed [ratified].”  The Court also rejected a counterclaim for tortious interference with contract, noting that Louisiana has a limited view of that tort and requires a “narrow, individualized duty” between plaintiff and tortfeasor.  Id. at 20-24 (citing 9 to 5 Fashions v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228 (1989)).

In Greenwood 950 LLC v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, the Court found an ambiguity in a Louisiana mineral lease, seeing two reasonable ways to harmonize clauses about obligations to “repair all surface damages” and “pay . . . all damages.”  No. 11-30436 (June 12, 2012) at 5-7 (emphasis added).  On the threshold Erie issue, the Court reminded: “[W]e look first and foremost ‘to the final decisions of Louisiana’s highest court’ rather than this Court’s prior applications of Louisiana law.”  Op. at 4 n.11 (quoting Holt v. State Farm, 627 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 2010)).

Sawyer v. DuPont presented employee claims of fraudulent inducement to leave jobs with DuPont for new positions at a wholly-owned subsidiary.  No. 11-40454 (April 20, 2012).   The Court began by reminding of the deference for intermediate appellate opinions in making an “Erie guess” about state law — here, the “at will” employment doctrine in Texas and its prohibition of fraudulent inducement claims about employment relationships.  Op. at  5.  Based on intermediate court authority, the Court concluded that a CBA that was terminable on notice did not change the employees’ at-will status, which thus barred their claims.  Op. at 9.  The Court also found that oral representations to another group of employees were not sufficiently definite to change their at-will status, citing Montgomery County Hospital District v. Brown, 965 SW.2d 501 (Tex. 1998).  Op. at 10.  Summary judgment for DuPont was affirmed.

LRK Architects v. State Farm presented the question whether a “breach of contract” exclusion should be analyzed under a “but for” or an “incidental relationship” test to determine whether an insurance policy covered a claim for copyright infringement.  No. 11-30121 (April 4, 2012).   After reminding that under Erie its job “is to attempt to predict state law, not to create or modify it,” the Court concluded that Louisiana would use a “but for” test.  Op. at 7-8.  Because the copyright claim “would exist even in the absence” of the parties’ contractual relationship, the exclusion did not apply and the insurer had a duty to cover and defend.  Op. at 9, 10.

The case of Gilbane Building Co. v. Admiral Insurance (No. 10-20817, Dec. 12, 2011) involved an insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify an injury claim under Texas law.  The Court first reviewed the basic rules in the Circuit for an “Erie guess” about state law.  Op. at 4-5 & 8 n.2.  The Court found that Texas’s “express negligence” rule was limited to contractual indemnity and did not bear on whether the plaintiff was an “additional insured.”  The Court then applied Texas’s “eight corners” rule and found no duty to defend, reminding that this rule “consider[s] only the facts alleged in the pleadings and . . . not . . . factual assumptions or inferences that were not pleaded.”  Id. at 13.   The Court declined to recognize an exception to the “eight corners” rule for claims involving a plaintiff’s unpleaded contributory negligence.  Id. at 14-17.  The Court concluded by affirming the district court’s summary judgment for the insured on the duty to indemnify, applying a broader standard based on “the facts proven in the underlying suit.”  Id. at 17-18 & n.4 (acknowledging that “this may seem like an unusual result,” but referring to a similar result in D.R. Horton v. Markel Int’l Ins., 300 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Tex. 2009)).