In Howard v. Maxum Indemnity Co., “Howard’s appeal raises as a central, threshold question whether he waived application of Oklahoma law” in an insurance dispute. Unfortunately, “[a]lthough Howard did raise the choice of law issue in his Rule 59(e) motion, ‘this court will typically not consider an issue or a new arugment raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration in the district court.’ . . . ‘Parties generally are bound by the theory of law they argue in the district court, absent some manifest injustice.'” No. 16-11746 (Dec. 13, 2017).
A premature notice of appeal is certainly better than nothing, but may not be enough, as the Fifth Circuit noted in Johnson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc.: “Before we address Johnson’s contentions on appeal, we note that Johnson’s notice of appeal from the summary judgment dismissing the claims against some, but not all, of the defendants, was premature. Nevertheless, because the district court could have certified that the summary judgment was appealable, and it subsequently entered a final judgment, the notice of appeal gives us appellate jurisdiction over the summary judgment. However, because Johnson did not file a notice of appeal from the final judgment, which dismissed his remaining claims against REMNI/Homebridge, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the dismissal of his claims against REMNI/Homebridge.” No. 17-20347 (Dec. 1, 2017, unpublished).
In an insurance coverage dispute, the district court granted both sides’ motions for summary judgment as to the meaning of various policy terms. The net result was final judgment for the insurance company. The insured appealed; the insurer cross-appealed, and on that procedural point, the Fifth Circuit held that the cross-appeal was unnecessary, noting:
- “National Union is conflating the district court’s opinion (i.e., the order) with its judgment. Appellate courts review judgments, not opinions. . . . To the extent that the district court rejected the arguments in National Union’s cross-appeal, ‘an appellee may urge any ground available in support of a judgment even if that ground was . . . rejected by the trial court.'” (citations omitted);
- The recent case of ART Midwest v. Atlantic Limited Partnership XII,742 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2014), in which a party was not allowed to raise certain issues after not taking a cross-appeal, was distinguishable because judgment had actually been entered against that party on those issues. “Here,there is no adverse judgment against National Union, such that it might need to protect its rights—just some adverse reasoning”; and
- “This is not just formalism. ‘A cross-appeal filed for the sole purpose of advancing additional arguments in support of a judgment is “worse than unnecessary”, because it disrupts the briefing schedule, increases the number (and usually the length) of briefs, and tends to confuse the issues.’ . . . In this case, National Union’s improper cross-appeal resulted in an over-length opposition brief and an additional reply (giving National Union over four thousand words of additional briefing).” (citations omitted)
Cooper Indus. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 16-20539 (revised Dec. 11, 2017).
In a 2-1 decision, the Fifth Circuit found that Ezekiel Elliott failed to exhaust remedies within the NFL’s dispute-resolution process before filing suit, meaning that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his complaints. A dissent found a sufficient question about the adequacy of the process to justify the exercise of jurisdiction under the relevant authorities. NFLPA v. NFL, No. 17-40936 (Oct. 12, 2017). While of enormous interest to Cowboys fans, so far as arbitration goes, the opinion is centered on issues unique to collective bargaining agreements.
The high-profile dispute between Dallas Cowboys star Ezekiel Elliott and the NFL Players’ Association, on the one hand, and the NFL on the other, has reached the Fifth Circuit after the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against Elliott’s suspension by the league. The NFL has moved for an interim stay; the successful plaintiffs have responded; and a motions panel of the Court will consider that issue in the week ahead.
In AMA Discount, Inc. v. Seneca Specialty Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit rejected an interlocutory appeal on a question of bad faith claims handling under Louisiana insurane law, noting that a potentially conflicting district court decision had recently settled on appeal, and the parties actually disputed the application of law to fact rather than the controlling legal standard. The Court acknowledged that this ruling differed from that of a prior motions panel, but observered that at this stage, the case “has the benefit of full briefing and a completed record.” The Court concluded: “Perhaps an interlocutory certification would ‘materially advance the termination’ of this litigation. If that were the decisive question, of course, there would be few roadblocks to interlocutory appeals of legal issues.” No. 16-31158 (Sept. 11, 2017, unpublished).
- The panel majority in Veasey v. Abbott concluded that a stay was warranted during the appeal of an injunction against certain “voter ID” laws, focusing on the likelihood-of-success element of the standard four-part test: “As the State explains, each of the 27 voters identified – whose testimony the plaintiffs used to support their discriminatory-effect claim – can vote without impediment under SB 5. The State has made a strong showing that htis reasonable-impediment procedure remedies plaintiffs’ alleged harm and thus forecloses plaintiffs’ injunctive relief.”
- A dissent disagreed as to the elements of the four-part test, and the overrarching concept of “preserving the status quo”: “Neither side would be irreparably harmed by continuing to operate under the same election procedures they have been operating under for more than a year. If a stay is granted at all, then it should be comprehensive. In other words, the correct approach would be to stay both the district court’s order and the new legislation.” No. 17-40884 (Sept. 5, 2017).
Duggan, an non-named member of a class certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), made an untimely objection to the fairness of the class settlement. While he was not a named party, he sought to appeal under the doctrine recognized by Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002), which allowed non-named class members “who have objected in a timely manner to approval of the settlement at the fairness hearing have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening.” Unfortunately for Duggan, the Fifth Circuit found no reason to excuse his late objection, in particular rejecting the argument that his opponent was required to move to strike the objection in district court as a prerequisite to arguing waiver on appeal. Farber v. Crestwood Midstream Partners LP , No. 16-20742 (July 17, 2017).
Litigation continues on the Texas tollroads, most recently producing a defamation lawsuit in BancPass v. Highway Toll Administration LLC, arising from letters sent by a company’s competitors to Google and Apple. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the letters were immune from liability by the Texas privilege associated with court proceedings.
Before the Fifth Circuit, matters began well for the defendant – the Court concluded (1) that an immediate interlocutory appeal was allowed because the Texas privilege protects from suit, not just liability, and (2) while “[c]ertainly, the district court expressed its displeasure” at this issue arising late in the proceedings, it did not formally certify the appeal as frivolous (and thus avoided a line of cases that would otherwise have undermined defendant’s appeal right). But on the merits:
“Texas caselaw is clear that our analysis must focus on the connection between the communications and the specific legal action HTA now claims that it was contemplating, rather than legal action more broadly. The letters to Google and Apple in particular put forward bare accusations of unlawful conduct that was unrelated to HTA’s later tortious interference claim and that neither directly implicated HTA’s own legal rights nor constituted legal claims that HTA had any ability to pursue.”
No. 16-51073 (July 13, 2017).
At oral argument, the appellant in a technical dispute about the appointment of arbitrators “argued for the first time that ‘if maritime jurisdiction applies, then . . . there is appellate jurisdiction over the appeal.'” The Fifth Circuit observed: “We do not usually allow parties to raise a new argument for the first time at oral argument. . . . Of course, an argument that this court lacks jurisdiction cannot be waived, but here the argument is that the court has jurisdiction, a matter the appellant is required to prove.” Bordelon Marine, LLC v. Bibby Subsea ROV, LLC, No. 16-30847 (April 14, 2017, unpublished).
In Smitherman v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC, the Fifth Circuit order a limited remand to the district court, so that court could supplement the record about the defendant’s citizenship and then make findings. The district court, however, went on to vacate the judgment it had entered previously and remand the case to state court. The Fifth Circuit observed: “Because the district court lacked the authority to do so, we construe its order to be an indicative ruling made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(2). Accordingly, we REMAND this case to the district court and DISMISS the appeal as moot and relinquish jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1(b).” No. 16-20328 (March 29, 2017, unpublished).
It is well-settled nationally that “an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party” because “it takes a cross-appeal to justify a remedy in favor of an appellee.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244–45 (2008). The Fifth Circuit treats that principle as jurisdictional. See, e.g., Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 250 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[T]his circuit follows the general rule that, in the absence of a cross-appeal, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to modify a judgment so as to enlarge the rights of the appellee or diminish the rights of the appellant.”) Some other Circuits, however, take a different view. See, e.g., Am. Roll-On Roll-Off Carrier LLC v. P&O Parts Baltimore, Inc., 479 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2007) (“This circuit views the cross-appeal requirement as one of practice, rather than as a strict jurisdictional requirement.”) (Thanks to my LPCH colleague Russ Herman for pointing this out.)
In Netsch v. Sherman, the appellants’ counsel missed the 14-day deadline for an appeal from bankruptcy court. The district court denied relief and the Fifth Circuit affirmed; while noting that all relevant factors were either neutral or favored appellants, it concluded:”[T]he bankruptcy court concluded that the reason for the delay weighed strongly against finding excusable neglect. In its analysis of this factor, the bankruptcy court emphasized that the parties had been subject to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure throughout the adversary proceeding, these rules were unambiguous, and Appellants’ counsel confused the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The bankruptcy court also indicated that confusing bankruptcy procedure with civil procedure does not constitute excusable neglect. Consequently, the court held that the reason for the delay should be given greater weight than other factors.” No. 16-10432 (Dec. 22, 2016, unpublished).
Johnson-Williams sued MERS about a foreclosure. She lost a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by MERS, then her own motion for leave to amend, and finally a motion for reconsideration. She appealed, and the Fifth Circuit observed the limited scope of her appeal, as the notice referred only to the district court’s order as to the amendment. Johnson-Williams v. MERS, No. 16-10276 (Jan. 4, 2017, unpublished).
In a dispute about a home loan, the district court wrote an opinion found for the defendant mortgage servicer in all respects, including its counterclaim for judicial foreclosure. The final judgment, unfortunately, did not address that claim or otherwise contain “catch-all” language. Because “[t]he district court’s ‘final judgment’ neither adjudicates ‘all claims . . . of all parties,’ nor expressly styles itself as a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). . . . this Court has no appellate jurisdiction and cannot review the merits of the case.” Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, No. 16-10521 (Dec. 29, 2016, unpublished).
While the Court did address the merits, and its enthusiasm for the appeal was tempered by the many cases brought to it about the BP Deepwater Horizon settlement, the Fifth Circuit offered this cautionary note about briefing the standard of review: “Bailey’s opening brief skips this step — it does not acknowledge the standard of review, and offers no arguments to show that the district court abused its discretion. Bailey therefore has waived an issue necessary to the success of the appeal.” Claimant v. BP Exploration & Production, No. 16-30642 (Dec. 13, 2016, unpublished).
The NLRB consistently holds that an agreement requiring arbitration of individual claims (and thus foreclosing class actions) violates federal labor law; the Fifth Circuit consistently reverses the NLRB on this point. After again reversing the NLRB and citing the Circuit’s “rule of orderliness” about deference to prior panel decisions, the Court noted the NLRB’s remarkably candid litigation position: “The Board concedes that this court has squarely rejected both of those decisions, and that our precedents necessitate rejecting its arguments here. The Board further acknowledges that it seeks to manufacture a circuit split in order to ‘facilitate Supreme Court review.'” Employers Resource v. NLRB, No. 16-60034 (Nov. 1, 2016, unpublished).
A group of optometrists won judgment against Wal-Mart for $1,395,400, consisting entirely of statutory penalties relating to Wal-Mart’s influence over their working hours. After withdrawing the initial panel opinion and then receiving answers to certified questions in Forte v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 15-0146 (Tex. May 20, 2016), the Fifth Circuit again concluded that “the district court’s judgment regarding damages must be vacated; attorneys’ fees are the only matter that remains in the case.” Forte v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-40854 (Oct. 27, 2016).
Bonnie Pereida’s estate successfully brought RICO claims against a dealer in rare coins, arguing that it systematically deceived Ms. Pereida about the quality of the coins she bought from it. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the estate that the RICO claim survived her, finding that “RICO’s remedial purpose predominates” over its penal purposes. But, it reversed as to the proof of a “pattern of racketeering activity,” finding that the relevant time period was too short and did not qualify as “open-ended.” It noted that on remand, the plaintiff could potentially still elect a remedy in common-law fraud where this problem would not arise.
During that analysis, the Court offered a telling general comment: “[Plaintiff] contends that the Defendants waived this challenge to the ‘pattern’ element by raising it for the first time in their motion for a new trial. It should have been raised, he argues, in a motion for summary judgment so he would have known that this was a contested issue. The argument says a lot about modern civil litigation in which summary judgment, rather than trial, has become the focus. But when a case does go to trial, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove every element.” Malvino v. Dellniversita, No. 15-41435 (Oct. 20, 2016) (emphasis added).
Graves v. Colvin provides an exceptionally clear illustration of harmless error:
- Graves challenged the Social Security Administration’s determination that she was not disabled.
- A regulation governing ALJ hearings on such matters provides: “Occupational evidence provided by a VE or VS [vocational expert or vocational specialist] generally should be consistent with the occupational information supplied by the DOT [“Dictionary of Occupational Titles”] . . . At the hearings level, as part of the adjudicator’s duty to fully develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is such consistency.”
- Graves lost, and argued in court that the ALJ failed to ask this required question.
- But — “‘Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required’ as long as ‘the substantial rights of a party have not been affected.’ Graves does not even attempt to show that the vocational expert’s testimony was actually inconsistent with the DOT. Nor has she otherwise demonstrated prejudice. Hence, the ALJ’s procedural error was harmless and does not warrant reversal.”
No. 16-10340 (Sept. 21, 2016).
In Smith Group JJR, PLLC v. Forrest General Hospital, a dispute about an architect’s fee, the appellant argued that “the district court erred by considering extrinsic evidence bearing on the meaning of the term ‘actual contstruction cost’ in the parties’ agreement. This issue – the proper role of extrinsic evidence in determining the meaning of a contract, produces frequent litigation and frequent differences of opinion between district courts and the Fifth Circuit. Here, the court found a waiver of these arguments before the trial court, reminding that “citing cases that may contain a useful argument is simply inadequate to preserve that argument for appeal; ‘to be preserved, an argument must be pressed, and not merely intimated.'” No. 16-60134 (Sept. 9, 2016, unpublished). (This post was picked as one of the top five of the week by the Appellate Advocacy blog on the Law Professor Blogs Network!)
In trademark and trade dress litigation between Diageo, the maker of Crown Royal (left) and Mexcor, who makes Texas Crown Club (right), Diageo stipulated that “Mexcor did not infringe its marks until Mexcor sold its very first Texas Crown Club bottle in a bag bearing the Texas Crown Club logo” during the fourth quarter of 2011. Despite this concession, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Mexcor was not entitled to judgment on related issues when it “failed to urge that these counterclaims be presented to the jury after the district court denied its motions for JMOL.” The Court went on to remand the permanent injunction against Mexcor for revisoin, noting that the injunctoin could not extend to a type of bag that Mexcor had established its legal entitledment to use, and observing as to the last, “catch-all” provision of the injunction: “We are hesitant to approve such open-ended language, particularly because in other contexts this court has held that such ‘obey the law’ injunction orders are not permitted.” Diageo North America, Inc. v. Mexcor, Inc., No 15-20630 (Sept. 2, 2016, unpublished). (The opinon also notes the distinction between “whisky” (distilled in Scotland) and “whiskey” (distilled in the U.S. or Ireland), although none of these countries are the source of the liquor in this case, which the parties spelled “whisky.”)
Jones, the sole shareholder of a bankrupt business, moved to intervene in a lawsuit between the trustee for the business and Bank of America — two weeks after the parties had filed a stipulation of dismissal that the district court accepted. The district court denied Jones’s motion; he appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. As to the stipulation of dismissal, the appeal was untimely; as to the intervention, while Jones’s late arrival did not bar his motion outright, it heavily influenced the relevant factors against him. Sommers v. Bank of America, No. 15-20775 (Aug. 26, 2016).
For some time, the Golf Channel and the receiver for Allen Stanford’s affairs have disputed whether the Channel gave value in exchange for the purchase of roughly $6 million in advertising. The Channel contended that it did by giving exactly the advertising that Stanford ordered; the receiver disagreed, noting that Stanford was running a valueless Ponzi scheme. On certification from the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme Court sided with the Channel, holding that under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the Channel gave value from an objective perspective. The Fifth Circuit accepted that holding as to this case, but noted: “The Supreme Court of Texas’s answer interprets the concept of ‘value’ under TUFTA differently than we have understood ‘value’ under other states’ fraudulent transfer laws and under section 548(c) [of] the Bankruptcy Code.” Janvey v. Golf Channel, No. 13-11305 (Aug. 22, 2016).
The ECF records for the Western District of Texas showed that the appellant in Sudduth v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission filed her notice of appeal on August 31 — one day late. Following Franklin v. McHugh, 804 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2015), the Fifth Circuit found the ECF notices dispositive and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court observed that the Western District local rules and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) allow a party to seek relief from the district court in the event of technical problems with the ECF filing, which the appellant did not do here. Finally, “Sudduth argues that she was not made aware of any jurisdictional defect until this court requested briefing on this issue and that, at the very least, Franklin should not be retroactively applied to her case because it is new law. But, as previously discussed, the local rules and procedures here were sufficiently clear as to the requirements for timely filing, and the onus is on Sudduth, not the court, to be aware of and cure any deficiencies in the notice of appeal.” No. 15-50764 (July 18, 2016).