I recently participated in a mock reargument of Marbury v. Madison (right), albeit changed from the original to (1) actually have discussion about judicial review (2) actually have participation by my character, Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who in “real life” was ordered to stay silent by a highly irritated President Jefferson. In case you should ever need such a thing, here are my notes about the case against judicial review, which rely heavily upon an outstanding 1969 Duke Law Journal article by Professor William Van Alstyne.
The Fifth Circuit website has recently posted an “Important Note Regarding FRAP 28(j) Filings,” which reminds: “Counsel sometimes file a FRAP 28(j) letter after oral argument, ostensibly to provide information requested by the court, but make supplemental argument in the filing. . . . [U]nless authorized or requested by the panel, it is improper to make supplemental argument in the letter.”
While this story does not involve federal practice, the recent death of former Dallas Court of Appeals Justice David Lewis, who resigned from that Court last year to combat alcoholism and depression, sounds a warning note for all in the legal profession about the importance of mental health.
Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clayton involved an unusual argument about the “first-to-file rule, in the context of two actions pending before the same district judge. The Fifth Circuit observed: “[T]he concerns undergirding the firstto-file rule are not triggered when the cases are before the same judge. The first-to-file rule is aimed at avoiding both conflicting rulings on similar issues and duplicative rulings. But when the same judge is deciding both cases, there is no danger of conflicting rulings.” No. 16-60726 (May 18, 2017, unpublished).
“[W]here a plaintiff seeks to rely on epidemiological evidence, Texas law requires that the stifues show a statistically significant doubling of the risk of developing their alleged inuiries. . . . The studies relied on by the Plaintiffs and their experts do not . . . One of these studies did not quantify the risk of developing Plaintiffs’ chromuim-related-acute-irritation injuries at all and the other study did not find a doubling of the risk.” McManaway v. KBR, Inc., No. 15-20641 (March 27, 2017) (applying Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2011)).
Air Evac contended that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Texas workers compensation laws about reimbursement for air-ambulance services. This claim led to a dispute about the scope of Eleventh Amendment liability and the landmark Constitutional case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In a methodical analysis of Young’s history and purpose, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Air Evac could sue: “[T]he balance-billing prohibition works in concert with state defendants’ implementation of the reimbursement system, serving as a backstop against alternative methods of fee collection. State defendants’ pervasive authority to oversee and enforce Texas’ workers’-compensation system satisfies the Ex parte Young exception.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. State of Texas, No. 16-51023 (March 20, 2017).
Just before filing for bankruptcy, Mr. Wiggins signed a “Partition Agreement” in which he and his wife divided their ownership of their home into two separate property interests. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that this was a fraudulent transfer: “When it became clear that Mr. Wiggains would file bankruptcy to satisfy his outstanding debts, the couple entertained various options and made their best estimate on ultimate financial benefits by having only Mr. Wiggains file after the Partition Agreement was recorded. Allowing Mrs. Wiggains to sidestep the statutory limits for homestead exemptions and obtain approximately $500,000 in proceeds that otherwise are for creditors would lay waste to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code involved here.” Wiggains v. Reed, No. 15-11249 (Feb. 14, 2017).
A group of real estate companies paid Prime LLC for consulting services. While the contract allowed termination with 60 days notice, the group and Prime agreed to end the contract without using the notice provision. A creditor complained that this termination made a fraudulent transfer, and the Fifth Circuit agreed that the claim was at least facially plausible: “While the value of the notice period lost by failure to adhere to the notice provision remains an issue for further development in the district court, at this stage we think the notice requirement secured measurable economic benefit to Prime. Assuming the facts alleged surrounding this transaction to be true, as we must under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff has alleged an asset, cognizable as such under TUFTA, that was constructively transferred.” Hometown 2006-1 1925 Valley View LLC v. Prime Income Asset Management LLC, No. 15-10881 (Feb. 2, 2017)
Several unpublished opinions from the Fifth Circuit in recent weeks, most recently Smitherman v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC, No. 16-20328 (Jan. 11, 2017, unpublished), have ordered limited remands to the district court “to permit supplementation of the record and to make findings regarding . . . citizenship.” Once completed, “the district court’s amended opinion shall return” to the panel “for appropriate action.” It appears that the Court is reviewing case files not only to confirm appellate jurisdiction, but also the necessary facts to support federal subject matter jurisdiction as well.
I was on the trial team that won a $146 million verdict in Pecos, Texas last week;here is the Dallas Morning News’s recent story on the case.
In Marshall v. Hunter, a removed action, the Fifth Circuit addressed a notice of appeal from a state court ruling made before ruling about personal jurisdiction. The Court declined to hear the appeal, saying: “while state court orders and rulings remain in effect upon removal, they do not become appealable orders of the district court until the district court adopts them as its own.” No. 16-20646 (Oct. 20, 2016, unpublished).
What better way to celebrate 600Camp.com’s fifth birthday than with Emeril’s muffaletta recipe? Thanks to all blog readers for years of support and encouragement.
In Wilson v. Navika Capital Group LLC, the appellants filed this notice of appeal from adverse rulings in an FLSA dispute. The Fifth Circuit found that the reference in the notice to “Plaintiffs Wilson et al.” did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 in light of the entire record — a case in which “the plaintiffs .. were in ‘continual flux’ at the district court, as various groups of plaintiffs were dismissed at different times.” The notice was sufficient as to two plaintiffs specifically named in named in the style of the case as shown on the notice, as Rule 3 says — “The notice of appeal must: specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of the notice.” No. 15-20204 (Aug. 8, 2016, unpublished).
The Fifth Circuit reversed an ALJ ruling in a labor dispute in DirecTV Holdings v. NLRB. The panel majority, noting that “the NLRB makes much of the fact that [the employee’s] initial suspension was transformed into a termination,” gave no weight to “unsupported speculation” as to why that change occurred. The dissent noted the timing of relevant events around the date of that decision, and gave weight to the ALJ’s credibility determinations as to the relevant witness. This exchange is a classic illustration of how reasonable minds can differ as to when an “inference” becomes impermissible “speculation.” No. 15-60257 (May 31, 2016, unpublished).
At issue in Hefren v. McDermott, Inc. was whether the Front Runner Spar (right) – a type of offshore drilling platform with a remarkable resemblance to a Jawan Sandcrawler – was “immovable” within the meaning of Louisiana law. A dispositive issue of limitations turned on that classification. Noting that the Spar could be moved with sufficient planning and preparation, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that: “Like a ‘building’ under Louisiana law, there is ‘some permanence’ to the Front Runner Spar as it has not moved from its present location, is intended to remain there for its twenty year life, and has a permanent mooring system.” No. 15-30980 (April 25, 2016, unpublished).
A magistrate judge ordered remand to state court in Davidson v. Georgia-Pacific. The Fifth Circuit concluded that because “a remand order is dispositive insofar as proceedings in the federal court are concerned,” it is “the functional equivalent of an order of dismissal.” Therefore, a magistrate judge could not make a final ruling on a motion to remand. In so holding, the Court “join[s] the uniform view of the courts of appeals that have considered this question[.]” No. 14-30925 (April 19, 2016).
In Burell v. Prudential Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit addressed one of the many ERISA summary judgment cases in which it reviews a plan administrator’s work for abuse of discretion – or, in the somewhat cryptic language of ERISA: “our de novo review of [the] summary judgment ruling will also apply the abuse of discretion standard.” The panel affirmed over a dissent, which is not typical in such cases. It noted disagreement among the doctors who reviewed the claim, as well as allegations that the administrator did not follow its own review procedures, and would have found a fact issue for trial based on those matters. No. 15-50035 (April 11, 2016).
Yesterday’s “Above The Law” blog offers this entertaining exchange between a recent Fifth Circuit petition for rehearing — written in part as an imaginary exchange between lawyer and client about the rehearing process — and the Fifth Circuit’s response: rejection by the panel in a short opinion that was also written as an exchange of dialogue. (Thanks to 600Camp friend Cynthia Halatyn for sending along the link.)
In Banco Popular v. Kanning, a dispute over entitlement to life insurance proceeds produced two reminders about important, but not often-litigated, principles in business law. No. 15-50342 (Jan. 29, 2016, unpublished). First, an argument that a purported assignment required further actions to become effective failed when the document in question unambiguously said “hereby assign.” The opinion reviews other language in other cases that obscured the assignor’s intent. Second, insurance policy proceeds — while obviously monetary in nature — are sufficiently specific to support an action for conversion (applying Paschal v. Great Western Drilling, 215 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2006, pet. denied)).
Underwood Cotton sued Clark Freight Lines, seeking a declaratory judgment about alleged overcharges on invoices for shipping containers. Clark removed the case on the basis of complete preemption, and counterclaimed for payment of the invoices. The district court dismissed the counterclaim and remanded, finding that federal jurisdiction had not been established over the declaratory judgment or the “converse breach of contract action” brought by Clark. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the resulting appeal, finding: “[T]he dismissal of the counterclaims did not precede the remand in logic and fact. Dismissing the counterclaims did not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction; the district court ruled it never had jurisdiction to begin with.” Underwood Cotton Co. v. Clark Freight Lines, Inc., No. 14-11327 (Sept. 28, 2015, unpublished). The Court noted that the counterclaims could proceed in state court notwithstanding the district court’s jurisdictional ruling.