Air Evac contended that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Texas workers compensation laws about reimbursement for air-ambulance services. This claim led to a dispute about the scope of Eleventh Amendment liability and the landmark Constitutional case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In a methodical analysis of Young’s history and purpose, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Air Evac could sue: “[T]he balance-billing prohibition works in concert with state defendants’ implementation of the reimbursement system, serving as a backstop against alternative methods of fee collection. State defendants’ pervasive authority to oversee and enforce Texas’ workers’-compensation system satisfies the Ex parte Young exception.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. State of Texas, No. 16-51023 (March 20, 2017).
Just before filing for bankruptcy, Mr. Wiggins signed a “Partition Agreement” in which he and his wife divided their ownership of their home into two separate property interests. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that this was a fraudulent transfer: “When it became clear that Mr. Wiggains would file bankruptcy to satisfy his outstanding debts, the couple entertained various options and made their best estimate on ultimate financial benefits by having only Mr. Wiggains file after the Partition Agreement was recorded. Allowing Mrs. Wiggains to sidestep the statutory limits for homestead exemptions and obtain approximately $500,000 in proceeds that otherwise are for creditors would lay waste to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code involved here.” Wiggains v. Reed, No. 15-11249 (Feb. 14, 2017).
A group of real estate companies paid Prime LLC for consulting services. While the contract allowed termination with 60 days notice, the group and Prime agreed to end the contract without using the notice provision. A creditor complained that this termination made a fraudulent transfer, and the Fifth Circuit agreed that the claim was at least facially plausible: “While the value of the notice period lost by failure to adhere to the notice provision remains an issue for further development in the district court, at this stage we think the notice requirement secured measurable economic benefit to Prime. Assuming the facts alleged surrounding this transaction to be true, as we must under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff has alleged an asset, cognizable as such under TUFTA, that was constructively transferred.” Hometown 2006-1 1925 Valley View LLC v. Prime Income Asset Management LLC, No. 15-10881 (Feb. 2, 2017)
Several unpublished opinions from the Fifth Circuit in recent weeks, most recently Smitherman v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC, No. 16-20328 (Jan. 11, 2017, unpublished), have ordered limited remands to the district court “to permit supplementation of the record and to make findings regarding . . . citizenship.” Once completed, “the district court’s amended opinion shall return” to the panel “for appropriate action.” It appears that the Court is reviewing case files not only to confirm appellate jurisdiction, but also the necessary facts to support federal subject matter jurisdiction as well.
I was on the trial team that won a $146 million verdict in Pecos, Texas last week;here is the Dallas Morning News’s recent story on the case.
In Marshall v. Hunter, a removed action, the Fifth Circuit addressed a notice of appeal from a state court ruling made before ruling about personal jurisdiction. The Court declined to hear the appeal, saying: “while state court orders and rulings remain in effect upon removal, they do not become appealable orders of the district court until the district court adopts them as its own.” No. 16-20646 (Oct. 20, 2016, unpublished).
What better way to celebrate 600Camp.com’s fifth birthday than with Emeril’s muffaletta recipe? Thanks to all blog readers for years of support and encouragement.
In Wilson v. Navika Capital Group LLC, the appellants filed this notice of appeal from adverse rulings in an FLSA dispute. The Fifth Circuit found that the reference in the notice to “Plaintiffs Wilson et al.” did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 in light of the entire record — a case in which “the plaintiffs .. were in ‘continual flux’ at the district court, as various groups of plaintiffs were dismissed at different times.” The notice was sufficient as to two plaintiffs specifically named in named in the style of the case as shown on the notice, as Rule 3 says — “The notice of appeal must: specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of the notice.” No. 15-20204 (Aug. 8, 2016, unpublished).